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Not in CISA KEV
NONE severity

GHSA-rp72-5v5q-2446

NONE

GHSA-rp72-5v5q-2446 is a none-severity (CVSS 0) vulnerability in @cardano402/mcp-server. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-rp72-5v5q-2446 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

@cardano402/mcp-server missing spending limits, LAN-exposed HTTP transport, and SSRF via catalog.server.url

Published
Jun 26, 2026
Updated
Jun 26, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Jun 26, 2026 · OSV.dev, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
📦@cardano402/mcp-server

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects npm packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

@cardano402/mcp-server versions <= 0.1.1 ship three security gaps that can lead to unauthorized fund movement when the package is used as designed (an MCP server exposing Cardano payment tools to an

Impact

1. No spending limits on signed payments

An LLM (or prompt-injected LLM) calling tools registered by the MCP server can invoke them in a loop. Each call signs a real Cardano transaction for the catalog-advertised amount. There is no per-call cap, daily ceiling, MCP elicitation/confirmation step, or recipient allowlist. The MAINNET=true env-var guardrail can be bypassed by any LLM with shell-tool access. Worst case: full wallet drain.

2. HTTP transport binds 0.0.0.0 without authentication

cardano402-mcp --transport http listens on all interfaces with no Origin allowlist, no bearer-token requirement, and no CORS check. Anyone on the same LAN can POST MCP tools/call and trigger signed payments from the operator's wallet.

3. SSRF via catalog.server.url

A malicious catalog can declare a server.url pointing at internal infrastructure (e.g. http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data). The allowInsecure guard in 0.1.1 only checks the catalog URL itself, not the server.url it returns. endpoint.path is also not normalized, so .. traversal or absolute URLs work.

Patches

Fixed in @cardano402/[email protected]:

  • Per-call and per-day spending limits (default 5 ADA / 50 ADA) + optional recipient allowlist + MCP elicitation/create confirmation hook.
  • HTTP transport defaults to 127.0.0.1; non-loopback requires --http-bearer-token; per-request Origin allowlist + bearer check.
  • catalog.server.url validated against private-CIDR rules (RFC1918, RFC4193, link-local, CGNAT, multicast, IPv4-mapped IPv6, loopback) unless CARDANO402_ALLOW_INSECURE=true.
  • endpoint.path rejected if it contains .., NUL, whitespace/CRLF, an absolute URL, or //host/....
  • Per-tool mainnet opt-in via --mainnet-confirmed-tools.

Workarounds for 0.1.1 users

  • Do not run with --transport http on an untrusted network; use --transport stdio (default).
  • Only point the server at catalogs you control or have audited.
  • Use a low-balance hot wallet, never your main wallet.
  • Avoid MAINNET=true until upgraded to 0.1.2.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npm@cardano402/mcp-serverall versions0.1.2

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @cardano402/mcp-server. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update @cardano402/mcp-server to 0.1.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-rp72-5v5q-2446 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-rp72-5v5q-2446 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-rp72-5v5q-2446. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary `@cardano402/mcp-server` versions `<= 0.1.1` ship three security gaps that can lead to unauthorized fund movement when the package is used as designed (an MCP server exposing Cardano payment tools to an ## Impact ### 1. No spending limits on signed payments An LLM (or prompt-injected LLM) calling tools registered by the MCP server can invoke them in a loop. Each call signs a real Cardano transaction for the catalog-advertised amount. There is no per-call cap, daily ceiling, MCP elicitation/confirmation step, or recipient allowlist. The `MAINNET=true` env-var guardrail can be bypass
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-rp72-5v5q-2446 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-rp72-5v5q-2446 across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.