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@cardano402/mcp-server missing spending limits, LAN-exposed HTTP transport, and SSRF via catalog.server.urlGHSA-rp72-5v5q-2446

NONE

GHSA-rp72-5v5q-2446 is a none-severity (CVSS 0) vulnerability in @cardano402/mcp-server. A fix is available for @cardano402/mcp-server — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 10, 2026 · OSV.dev, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

0other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
@cardano402/mcp-servernpm
41downloads / week

Description

Summary

@cardano402/mcp-server versions <= 0.1.1 ship three security gaps that can lead to unauthorized fund movement when the package is used as designed (an MCP server exposing Cardano payment tools to an

Impact

1. No spending limits on signed payments

An LLM (or prompt-injected LLM) calling tools registered by the MCP server can invoke them in a loop. Each call signs a real Cardano transaction for the catalog-advertised amount. There is no per-call cap, daily ceiling, MCP elicitation/confirmation step, or recipient allowlist. The MAINNET=true env-var guardrail can be bypassed by any LLM with shell-tool access. Worst case: full wallet drain.

2. HTTP transport binds 0.0.0.0 without authentication

cardano402-mcp --transport http listens on all interfaces with no Origin allowlist, no bearer-token requirement, and no CORS check. Anyone on the same LAN can POST MCP tools/call and trigger signed payments from the operator's wallet.

3. SSRF via catalog.server.url

A malicious catalog can declare a server.url pointing at internal infrastructure (e.g. http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data). The allowInsecure guard in 0.1.1 only checks the catalog URL itself, not the server.url it returns. endpoint.path is also not normalized, so .. traversal or absolute URLs work.

Patches

Fixed in @cardano402/[email protected]:

  • Per-call and per-day spending limits (default 5 ADA / 50 ADA) + optional recipient allowlist + MCP elicitation/create confirmation hook.
  • HTTP transport defaults to 127.0.0.1; non-loopback requires --http-bearer-token; per-request Origin allowlist + bearer check.
  • catalog.server.url validated against private-CIDR rules (RFC1918, RFC4193, link-local, CGNAT, multicast, IPv4-mapped IPv6, loopback) unless CARDANO402_ALLOW_INSECURE=true.
  • endpoint.path rejected if it contains .., NUL, whitespace/CRLF, an absolute URL, or //host/....
  • Per-tool mainnet opt-in via --mainnet-confirmed-tools.

Workarounds for 0.1.1 users

  • Do not run with --transport http on an untrusted network; use --transport stdio (default).
  • Only point the server at catalogs you control or have audited.
  • Use a low-balance hot wallet, never your main wallet.
  • Avoid MAINNET=true until upgraded to 0.1.2.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npm@cardano402/mcp-serverall versions0.1.2npm install @cardano402/mcp-server@0.1.2

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @cardano402/mcp-server, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update @cardano402/mcp-server to 0.1.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-rp72-5v5q-2446 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Restrict outbound requests from the affected component to an allowlist of hosts, block access to link-local and internal address ranges at the network layer, and require authentication on internal services so a forged request cannot reach them unauthenticated.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary `@cardano402/mcp-server` versions `<= 0.1.1` ship three security gaps that can lead to unauthorized fund movement when the package is used as designed (an MCP server exposing Cardano payment tools to an ## Impact ### 1. No spending limits on signed payments An LLM (or prompt-injected LLM) calling tools registered by the MCP server can invoke them in a loop. Each call signs a real Cardano transaction for the catalog-advertised amount. There is no per-call cap, daily ceiling, MCP elicitation/confirmation step, or recipient allowlist. The `MAINNET=true` env-var guardrail can be bypass
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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@cardano402/mcp-server missing spending limits,…