How severe is GHSA-rp72-5v5q-2446?

GHSA-rp72-5v5q-2446 has a CVSS score of 0/10, rated NONE. Review your exposure and patch according to your risk tolerance.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-rp72-5v5q-2446?

GHSA-rp72-5v5q-2446 affects the following packages: @cardano402/mcp-server (npm). Ecosystems affected: npm.

How do I fix GHSA-rp72-5v5q-2446?

Update @cardano402/mcp-server to 0.1.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-rp72-5v5q-2446 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-rp72-5v5q-2446 in my npm dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @cardano402/mcp-server, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

How do I mitigate GHSA-rp72-5v5q-2446 if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-rp72-5v5q-2446?

O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-rp72-5v5q-2446 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Is GHSA-rp72-5v5q-2446 actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-rp72-5v5q-2446 yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

When was GHSA-rp72-5v5q-2446 published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-rp72-5v5q-2446 was published on June 26, 2026 and was last updated on September 10, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

📦

📦 npm

Not in CISA KEV

NONE severity

GHSA-rp72-5v5q-2446 — @cardano402/mcp-server

NONE

GHSA-rp72-5v5q-2446 is a none-severity (CVSS 0) vulnerability in @cardano402/mcp-server. A fix is available for @cardano402/mcp-server — see the affected versions and patch details below.

@cardano402/mcp-server missing spending limits, LAN-exposed HTTP transport, and SSRF via catalog.server.url

Published

Jun 26, 2026

Updated

Sep 10, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

Exploitation data as of Sep 10, 2026 · OSV.dev, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

0other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream

@cardano402/mcp-servernpm

8downloads / week

Description

Summary

@cardano402/mcp-server versions <= 0.1.1 ship three security gaps that can lead to unauthorized fund movement when the package is used as designed (an MCP server exposing Cardano payment tools to an

Impact

1. No spending limits on signed payments

An LLM (or prompt-injected LLM) calling tools registered by the MCP server can invoke them in a loop. Each call signs a real Cardano transaction for the catalog-advertised amount. There is no per-call cap, daily ceiling, MCP elicitation/confirmation step, or recipient allowlist. The MAINNET=true env-var guardrail can be bypassed by any LLM with shell-tool access. Worst case: full wallet drain.

2. HTTP transport binds 0.0.0.0 without authentication

cardano402-mcp --transport http listens on all interfaces with no Origin allowlist, no bearer-token requirement, and no CORS check. Anyone on the same LAN can POST MCP tools/call and trigger signed payments from the operator's wallet.

3. SSRF via `catalog.server.url`

A malicious catalog can declare a server.url pointing at internal infrastructure (e.g. http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data). The allowInsecure guard in 0.1.1 only checks the catalog URL itself, not the server.url it returns. endpoint.path is also not normalized, so .. traversal or absolute URLs work.

Patches

Fixed in @cardano402/[email protected]:

Per-call and per-day spending limits (default 5 ADA / 50 ADA) + optional recipient allowlist + MCP elicitation/create confirmation hook.
HTTP transport defaults to 127.0.0.1; non-loopback requires --http-bearer-token; per-request Origin allowlist + bearer check.
catalog.server.url validated against private-CIDR rules (RFC1918, RFC4193, link-local, CGNAT, multicast, IPv4-mapped IPv6, loopback) unless CARDANO402_ALLOW_INSECURE=true.
endpoint.path rejected if it contains .., NUL, whitespace/CRLF, an absolute URL, or //host/....
Per-tool mainnet opt-in via --mainnet-confirmed-tools.

Workarounds for 0.1.1 users

Do not run with --transport http on an untrusted network; use --transport stdio (default).
Only point the server at catalogs you control or have audited.
Use a low-balance hot wallet, never your main wallet.
Avoid MAINNET=true until upgraded to 0.1.2.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
📦npm	`@cardano402/mcp-server`	all versions	0.1.2`npm install @cardano402/mcp-server@0.1.2`

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @cardano402/mcp-server, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update @cardano402/mcp-server to 0.1.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-rp72-5v5q-2446 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-rp72-5v5q-2446 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to GHSA-rp72-5v5q-2446. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary `@cardano402/mcp-server` versions `<= 0.1.1` ship three security gaps that can lead to unauthorized fund movement when the package is used as designed (an MCP server exposing Cardano payment tools to an ## Impact ### 1. No spending limits on signed payments An LLM (or prompt-injected LLM) calling tools registered by the MCP server can invoke them in a loop. Each call signs a real Cardano transaction for the catalog-advertised amount. There is no per-call cap, daily ceiling, MCP elicitation/confirmation step, or recipient allowlist. The `MAINNET=true` env-var guardrail can be bypass

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-rp72-5v5q-2446 in your dependencies?

O3 Security finds GHSA-rp72-5v5q-2446 across npm dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.

Scan my dependencies How O3 SCA works