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GHSA-rjr7-jggh-pgcp

GHSA-rjr7-jggh-pgcp is a CWE-290 vulnerability in github.com/go-chi/chi/middleware. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-rjr7-jggh-pgcp is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

chi's RealIP Middleware allows IP spoofing via unvalidated X-Forwarded-For header

Also known asCVE-2026-72816GO-2026-5777
Published
Jun 25, 2026
Updated
Aug 15, 2026
Affected
5 pkgs
Patched
1 / 5
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 7, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-rjr7-jggh-pgcp.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs12th percentile — riskier than 12% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.24%0.48%0.72%0.2%0.2%Sep 26Sep 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Real-World Exposure

5 pkgs affected
🐹github.com/go-chi/chi/middleware🐹github.com/go-chi/chi/v2/middleware🐹github.com/go-chi/chi/v3/middleware🐹github.com/go-chi/chi/v4/middleware🐹github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

realip middleware in go-chi/chi trusts headers like x-forwarded-for without checking them, so attackers can fake their ip and bypass rate limits or access controls

Details

the vuln is in middleware/realip.go , the realIP() function pulls IPs straight from client headers and replaces r.RemoteAddr without checking if the request came from a trusted proxy

func realIP(r *http.Request) string {
    var ip string
    if tcip := r.Header.Get(trueClientIP); tcip != "" {
        ip = tcip  // controlled by attacker
    } else if xrip := r.Header.Get(xRealIP); xrip != "" {
        ip = xrip  // controlled by attacker
    } else if xff := r.Header.Get(xForwardedFor); xff != "" {
        ip, _, _ = strings.Cut(xff, ",")  // controlled by attacker
    }
    // ...
    return ip
}

no trusted proxy cidr check in place, any client can send these headers

PoC

create a server with chi and use realip middleware

package main

import (
    "fmt"
    "net/http"
    "github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
    "github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware"
)

func main() {
    r := chi.NewRouter()
    r.Use(middleware.RealIP)

    r.Get("/admin", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
        // ip-based access control got bypassed
        if r.RemoteAddr == "127.0.0.1" {
            w.Write([]byte("SECRET ADMIN DATA"))
            return
        }
        http.Error(w, "Forbidden", 403)
    })

    http.ListenAndServe(":8080", r)
}

spoofed the ip to bypass access control

curl -H "X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1" http://localhost:8080/admin

Impact

  • ip-based access control bypass lets attackers reach restricted endpoints
  • rate limiting bypass lets attackers avoid limits by rotating spoofed ips
  • audit logs show fake ips picked by attacker instead of real ones
  • attackers can get around geo ip restrictions

Remediation Recommendation

validate proxy cidr first before trusting forwarded ip headers

// add your reverse proxy ip addresses here
var trustedProxies = []net.IPNet{
       {IP: net.ParseIP("10.0.0.0"), Mask: net.CIDRMask(8, 32)},
    {IP: net.ParseIP("172.16.0.0"), Mask: net.CIDRMask(12, 32)},
    {IP: net.ParseIP("192.168.0.0"), Mask: net.CIDRMask(16, 32)},
}

func isTrustedProxy(ip net.IP) bool {
    for _, cidr := range trustedProxies {
        if cidr.Contains(ip) {
            return true
        }
    }
    return false
}

Affected Packages

5 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/go-chi/chi/middlewareall versionsNo fix
🐹Gogithub.com/go-chi/chi/v2/middlewareall versionsNo fix
🐹Gogithub.com/go-chi/chi/v3/middlewareall versionsNo fix
🐹Gogithub.com/go-chi/chi/v4/middlewareall versionsNo fix
🐹Gogithub.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middlewareall versions5.3.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/go-chi/chi/middleware. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    No patched version of github.com/go-chi/chi/middleware has shipped for GHSA-rjr7-jggh-pgcp yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-rjr7-jggh-pgcp is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-rjr7-jggh-pgcp. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatModerate

An IP spoofing flaw exists in go-chi/chi's RealIP middleware (middleware/realip.go). The realIP() function parses untrusted HTTP headers (True-Client-IP, X-Real-IP, X-Forwarded-For) and overwrites r.RemoteAddr without validating upstream proxy identity. Remote unauthenticated attackers can supply arbitrary IP values…

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary realip middleware in go-chi/chi trusts headers like x-forwarded-for without checking them, so attackers can fake their ip and bypass rate limits or access controls ### Details the vuln is in middleware/realip.go , the realIP() function pulls IPs straight from client headers and replaces r.RemoteAddr without checking if the request came from a trusted proxy ```go func realIP(r *http.Request) string { var ip string if tcip := r.Header.Get(trueClientIP); tcip != "" { ip = tcip // controlled by attacker } else if xrip := r.Header.Get(xRealIP); xrip != "" {
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-rjr7-jggh-pgcp in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-rjr7-jggh-pgcp across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

GHSA-rjr7-jggh-pgcp: middleware | O3 Security