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HIGH severity

Admidio has Inverted 2FA Reset Authorization Check that Lets Group Leaders Strip Admin TOTPGHSA-rh3w-4ccx-prf9

HIGH

GHSA-rh3w-4ccx-prf9 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.1) CWE-863 vulnerability in admidio/admidio. A fix is available for admidio/admidio — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-41660
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 23, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-rh3w-4ccx-prf9.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs37th percentile — riskier than 37% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.31%0.63%0.94%0.0%0.4%Jun 26Sep 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐘admidio/admidio

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

A logic error in Admidio's two-factor authentication reset inverts the authorization check. Non-admin users cannot remove their own TOTP configuration, but they can remove other users' TOTP, including administrators. A group leader with profile edit rights on an admin account can strip that admin's 2FA.

Details

In modules/profile/two_factor_authentication.php at line 84, the authorization check uses an inverted condition:

// modules/profile/two_factor_authentication.php line 84
if (!($gCurrentUser->isAdministrator() || $gCurrentUserId !== $userId))
{
    throw new AdmException('SYS_NO_RIGHTS');
}

By De Morgan's law, this condition evaluates as:

  • Blocks when: NOT isAdministrator() AND $gCurrentUserId === $userId
  • In practice: blocks non-admins from resetting their OWN 2FA
  • Passes: non-admins resetting OTHER users' 2FA (the opposite of the intended behavior)

The intended logic should block non-admins from resetting other users' 2FA. The !== operator on line 84 should be ===.

A group leader who holds hasRightEditProfile() permission on an admin user (checked earlier in the flow) can exploit this to strip 2FA from administrator accounts, reducing their security to password-only authentication.

Proof of Concept

  1. As testuser (a non-admin group leader with edit rights on admin profiles), send:
POST /adm_program/modules/profile/two_factor_authentication.php HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Cookie: ADMIDIO_..._SESSION_ID=<testuser_session>

mode=reset&user_uuid=<admin_user_uuid>

Result: the server removes 2FA from the admin account.

  1. As testuser, attempt to reset their own 2FA:
POST /adm_program/modules/profile/two_factor_authentication.php HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Cookie: ADMIDIO_..._SESSION_ID=<testuser_session>

mode=reset&user_uuid=<testuser_user_uuid>

Result: SYS_NO_RIGHTS error. The user cannot reset their own 2FA.

This confirms the authorization logic is inverted.

Impact

A group leader (or any user with profile edit rights on an admin) can disable two-factor authentication on administrator accounts. This degrades admin account security to password-only, opening the door to credential stuffing or brute force attacks without a 2FA barrier.

Recommended Fix

Change !== to === on line 84 of modules/profile/two_factor_authentication.php:

// Fixed condition: block non-admins from resetting OTHER users' 2FA
if (!($gCurrentUser->isAdministrator() || $gCurrentUserId === $userId))
{
    throw new AdmException('SYS_NO_RIGHTS');
}

Found by aisafe.io

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistadmidio/admidioall versions5.0.9composer require admidio/admidio:^5.0.9

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for admidio/admidio, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update admidio/admidio to 5.0.9 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-rh3w-4ccx-prf9 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary A logic error in Admidio's two-factor authentication reset inverts the authorization check. Non-admin users cannot remove their own TOTP configuration, but they can remove other users' TOTP, including administrators. A group leader with profile edit rights on an admin account can strip that admin's 2FA. ## Details In `modules/profile/two_factor_authentication.php` at line 84, the authorization check uses an inverted condition: ```php // modules/profile/two_factor_authentication.php line 84 if (!($gCurrentUser->isAdministrator() || $gCurrentUserId !== $userId)) { throw new Ad
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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Admidio has Inverted 2FA Reset Authorization Check that…