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📦 npm

GHSA-rf6f-7fwh-wjgh

Prototype Pollution via parse() in NodeJS flatted

Also known asCVE-2026-33228
Published
Mar 19, 2026
Updated
Mar 25, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.6%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk45th percentile+0.54%
0.00%0.37%0.74%1.11%0.0%0.1%0.1%0.6%Apr 26Jun 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.

flattednpm
132.2Mdownloads / week

Description


Summary

The parse() function in flatted can use attacker-controlled string values from the parsed JSON as direct array index keys, without validating that they are numeric. Since the internal input buffer is a JavaScript Array, accessing it with the key "__proto__" returns Array.prototype via the inherited getter. This object is then treated as a legitimate parsed value and assigned as a property of the output object, effectively leaking a live reference to Array.prototype to the consumer. Any code that subsequently writes to that property will pollute the global prototype.


Root Cause

File: esm/index.js:29 (identical in cjs/index.js)

  const resolver = (input, lazy, parsed, $) => output => {
    for (let ke = keys(output), {length} = ke, y = 0; y < length; y++) {
      const k = ke[y];
      const value = output[k];    
      if (value instanceof Primitive) {
        const tmp = input[value];      // Bug is here

No validation that value is a safe numeric index input is built as a plain Array. JavaScript's property lookup on arrays traverses the prototype chain for non-numeric keys. The key "__proto__" resolves to Array.prototype, which:

  • has type "object" → passes the typeof tmp === object guard at line 30
  • is not in the parsed Set yet → passes the !parsed.has(tmp) guard.
  • The reference to Array.prototype is then enqueued in lazy and later unconditionally assigned to the output object.

Replication Steps

  const Flatted = require('flatted'); 
  const parsed = Flatted.parse('[{"x":"__proto__"}]');
  parsed.x.polluted = 'pwned';
  console.log([].polluted);  // Returns true

Impact An attacker can supply a crafted flatted string to parse() that causes the returned object to hold a live reference to Array.prototype, enabling any downstream code that writes to that property to pollute the global prototype chain, potentially causing denial of service or code execution.

Recommended solution Validate that the index string represents an integer within the bounds of input before accessing it:

// Before (vulnerable) const tmp = input[value];

// After (safe) const idx = +value; // coerce boxed String → number const tmp = (Number.isInteger(idx) && idx >= 0 && idx < input.length) ? input[idx] : undefined;

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmflattedall versions3.4.2

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for flatted. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update flatted to 3.4.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-rf6f-7fwh-wjgh is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-rf6f-7fwh-wjgh is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-rf6f-7fwh-wjgh. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

--- **Summary** The parse() function in flatted can use attacker-controlled string values from the parsed JSON as direct array index keys, without validating that they are numeric. Since the internal input buffer is a JavaScript Array, accessing it with the key "\_\_proto\_\_" returns Array.prototype via the inherited getter. This object is then treated as a legitimate parsed value and assigned as a property of the output object, effectively leaking a live reference to Array.prototype to the consumer. Any code that subsequently writes to that property will pollute the global pro
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-rf6f-7fwh-wjgh in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-rf6f-7fwh-wjgh across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.