How severe is GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3?

GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3 has a CVSS score of 8.8/10, rated HIGH. Immediate patching is strongly recommended.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3?

GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3 affects the following packages: gitpython (PyPI). Ecosystems affected: PyPI.

How do I fix GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3?

Update gitpython to 3.1.54 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3 in my PyPI dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for gitpython. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3 if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3 actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3 yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

When was GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3 published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3 was published on July 24, 2026 and was last updated on July 24, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🐍 PyPI

GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3

HIGH

GitPython: Unsafe git option guard bypass via single-character kwarg value token smuggling enables arbitrary command execution

Published

Jul 24, 2026

Updated

Jul 24, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

🐍gitpython

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

GitPython's check_unsafe_options guard (the control introduced by CVE-2026-42215 / GHSA-2f96 and hardened since) can be bypassed for every guarded method (clone/clone_from, fetch/pull/push, ls_remote, iter_commits, blame, archive) by smuggling an option token inside the VALUE of a single-character kwarg. In the default allow_unsafe_options=False configuration this yields arbitrary command execution via --upload-pack.

Root Cause

The guard builds its candidate option list from kwarg KEYS only: _option_candidates([], {"n":"--upload-pack=<cmd>"}) returns ['-n'] (cmd.py:1042-1046 derives the candidate from the key, never the value). -n is not on the denylist, so check_unsafe_options passes. But transform_kwarg('n', value, split_single_char_options=True) (cmd.py:1600-1606) emits two argv tokens ['-n', '--upload-pack=<cmd>']. git then parses the second token as --upload-pack and executes the attacker-supplied command. The guard never inspects the value that becomes a separate argv token.

Impact

Arbitrary OS command execution as the host process (via --upload-pack) in the default configuration, affecting all guarded methods since they all build candidates through the name-only _option_candidates.

Proof of Concept

from git import Repo
Repo.clone_from(bare_repo, out_dir, n="--upload-pack=touch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack")
# /tmp/ACE created -> ACE. Direct-name form upload_pack="..." is correctly BLOCKED.

File-write variant on a guarded revision command: iter_commits('HEAD', g='--output=/path') -> candidate ['-g'] passes, argv ['-g','--output=/path'], victim file truncated.

Attack Chain

Entry: app forwards a user-supplied options dict -> Repo.clone_from(url, path, n="--upload-pack=touch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack"). Guard: check_unsafe_options(options=_option_candidates([], kwargs), unsafe=unsafe_git_clone_options) at base.py. Bypass proof: _option_candidates([], {"n":"--upload-pack=..."}) -> ['-n'] (key-only), not on denylist -> no UnsafeOptionError (verified live).
Transform: transform_kwarg('n', value, split_single_char_options=True) -> ['-n', '--upload-pack=touch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack']. Guard: none (guard already passed on name-only candidate). Bypass proof: verified transform emits two tokens.
Sink: git clone -n --upload-pack='touch ...;git-upload-pack' -- <src> <dst>; git parses and runs the second token. Impact: ACE (marker created, verified end-to-end).

Bypass Evidence

Live-verified on HEAD (tag 3.1.53): _option_candidates returns key-only candidate ['-n']; transform_kwargs emits the smuggled --upload-pack= token; clone_from with the payload created the marker file; the direct-name upload_pack= form raised UnsafeOptionError. All prior bypasses (GHSA-rpm5 underscore key, GHSA-2f96 long-option abbreviation, GHSA-v396 joined short option, GHSA-x2qx multi-before-split) are BLOCKED on HEAD — this is a distinct kwarg-value->separate-token vector.

Affected Versions

<= 3.1.53

Suggested Fix

Make _option_candidates also emit candidates derived from single-character kwarg VALUES when split_single_char_options is in effect, OR run check_unsafe_options over the fully-transformed argv rather than the reconstructed name-only candidate list.

Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @manus-use

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐍PyPI	`gitpython`	all versions	3.1.54

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for gitpython. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update gitpython to 3.1.54 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary GitPython's `check_unsafe_options` guard (the control introduced by CVE-2026-42215 / GHSA-2f96 and hardened since) can be bypassed for **every** guarded method (`clone`/`clone_from`, `fetch`/`pull`/`push`, `ls_remote`, `iter_commits`, `blame`, `archive`) by smuggling an option token inside the VALUE of a single-character kwarg. In the default `allow_unsafe_options=False` configuration this yields arbitrary command execution via `--upload-pack`. ## Root Cause The guard builds its candidate option list from kwarg KEYS only: `_option_candidates([], {"n":"--upload-pack=<cmd>"})` return

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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