GHSA-r657-rxjc-j557
MEDIUMRack has a Possible Information Disclosure Vulnerability
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
rack💎rack💎rackReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects RubyGems packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
A possible information disclosure vulnerability existed in Rack::Sendfile when running behind a proxy that supports x-sendfile headers (such as Nginx). Specially crafted headers could cause Rack::Sendfile to miscommunicate with the proxy and trigger unintended internal requests, potentially bypassing proxy-level access restrictions.
Details
When Rack::Sendfile received untrusted x-sendfile-type or x-accel-mapping headers from a client, it would interpret them as proxy configuration directives. This could cause the middleware to send a "redirect" response to the proxy, prompting it to reissue a new internal request that was not subject to the proxy's access controls.
An attacker could exploit this by:
- Setting a crafted
x-sendfile-type: x-accel-redirectheader. - Setting a crafted
x-accel-mappingheader. - Requesting a path that qualifies for proxy-based acceleration.
Impact
Attackers could bypass proxy-enforced restrictions and access internal endpoints intended to be protected (such as administrative pages). The vulnerability did not allow arbitrary file reads but could expose sensitive application routes.
This issue only affected systems meeting all of the following conditions:
- The application used
Rack::Sendfilewith a proxy that supportsx-accel-redirect(e.g., Nginx). - The proxy did not always set or remove the
x-sendfile-typeandx-accel-mappingheaders. - The application exposed an endpoint that returned a body responding to
.to_path.
Mitigation
-
Upgrade to a fixed version of Rack which requires explicit configuration to enable
x-accel-redirect:use Rack::Sendfile, "x-accel-redirect" -
Alternatively, configure the proxy to always set or strip the headers (you should be doing this!):
proxy_set_header x-sendfile-type x-accel-redirect; proxy_set_header x-accel-mapping /var/www/=/files/; -
Or in Rails applications, disable sendfile completely:
config.action_dispatch.x_sendfile_header = nil
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 💎RubyGems | rack | all versions | 2.2.20 |
| 💎RubyGems | rack | ≥ 3.0&&< 3.1.18 | 3.1.18 |
| 💎RubyGems | rack | ≥ 3.2&&< 3.2.3 | 3.2.3 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for rack. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update rack to 2.2.20 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-r657-rxjc-j557 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-r657-rxjc-j557 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-r657-rxjc-j557. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-r657-rxjc-j557 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-r657-rxjc-j557 across RubyGems dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.