GHSA-r3xh-3r3w-47gp
FrankenPHP leaks session data between requests in worker mode
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
github.com/dunglas/frankenphpReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
When running FrankenPHP in worker mode, the $_SESSION superglobal is not correctly reset between requests. This allows a subsequent request processed by the same worker to access the $_SESSION data of the previous request (potentially belonging to a different user) before session_start() is called.
Details
In standard PHP execution, the environment is torn down completely after every request. In FrankenPHP's worker mode, the application stays in memory, and superglobals are manually reset between requests.
The vulnerability exists because $_SESSION is stored in the Zend Engine's symbol table (EG(symbol_table)). While the standard PHP request shutdown (RSHUTDOWN) decrements the reference count of the session data, it does not remove the $_SESSION variable itself from the symbol table. FrankenPHP's reset logic (frankenphp_reset_super_globals) previously cleared other superglobals but failed to explicitly delete $_SESSION.
Consequently, until session_start() is called in the new request (which re-initializes the variable), the $_SESSION array retains the data from the previous request processed by that specific worker thread.
Impact
This is a cross-request data leakage vulnerability.
- Confidentiality: If an application reads
$_SESSIONbefore callingsession_start(), it can access sensitive information (authentication tokens, user IDs, PII) belonging to the previous user. - Logic Errors / Impersonation: If application logic relies on
$_SESSIONbeing empty or unset to detect a "guest" state, or checks for specific keys in$_SESSIONprior to session initialization, a malicious actor (or accidental race condition) could trigger privilege escalation or user impersonation.
This affects only users running FrankenPHP in worker mode and not session_start() for each request, which is done by default by most frameworks.
PoC
The following steps demonstrate the issue (derived from the regression tests added in the fix):
- Client A sends a request that starts a session and sets sensitive data:
// Request 1
session_start();
$_SESSION['secret'] = 'AliceData';
session_write_close();
- Client B (or the same client without cookies) sends a request to the same worker. This script checks
$_SESSIONwithout starting a session:
// Request 2
// session_start() is NOT called
if (!empty($_SESSION)) {
echo "Leaked Data: " . $_SESSION['secret'];
}
- Result: Client B receives "Leaked Data: AliceData".
Workarounds
- Ensure
session_start()is called immediately at the entry point of your worker script to overwrite any residual data (though this may not cover all edge cases if middleware runs before the controller). - Manually unset
$_SESSIONat the very beginning of the worker loop, before handling the request.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/dunglas/frankenphp | all versions | 1.11.2 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/dunglas/frankenphp. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/dunglas/frankenphp to 1.11.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-r3xh-3r3w-47gp is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-r3xh-3r3w-47gp is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-r3xh-3r3w-47gp. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-r3xh-3r3w-47gp in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-r3xh-3r3w-47gp across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.