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GHSA-qx2q-88mx-vhg7

Fiber Crashes in BodyParser Due to Unvalidated Large Slice Index in Decoder

Also known asCVE-2025-54801GO-2025-3845
Published
Aug 5, 2025
Updated
Feb 4, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk25th percentile-0.11%
0.00%0.31%0.62%0.94%0.1%0.3%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Description

When using Fiber's Ctx.BodyParser to parse form data containing a large numeric key that represents a slice index (e.g., test.18446744073704), the application crashes due to an out-of-bounds slice allocation in the underlying schema decoder.

The root cause is that the decoder attempts to allocate a slice of length idx + 1 without validating whether the index is within a safe or reasonable range. If idx is excessively large, this leads to an integer overflow or memory exhaustion, causing a panic or crash.

Steps to Reproduce

Create a POST request handler that accepts x-www-form-urlencoded data

package main

import (
	"fmt"
	"net/http"

	"github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2"
)

type RequestBody struct {
	NestedContent []*struct{} `form:"test"`
}

func main() {
	app := fiber.New()

	app.Post("/", func(c *fiber.Ctx) error {
		formData := RequestBody{}
		if err := c.BodyParser(&formData); err != nil {
			fmt.Println(err)
			return c.SendStatus(http.StatusUnprocessableEntity)
		}
		return nil
	})

	fmt.Println(app.Listen(":3000"))
}

Run the server and send a POST request with a large numeric key in form data, such as:

curl -v -X POST localhost:3000 --data-raw 'test.18446744073704' \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded'

Relevant Code Snippet

Within the decoder's decode method:

idx := parts[0].index
if v.IsNil() || v.Len() < idx+1 {
    value := reflect.MakeSlice(t, idx+1, idx+1)  // <-- Panic/crash occurs here when idx is huge
    if v.Len() < idx+1 {
        reflect.Copy(value, v)
    }
    v.Set(value)
}

The idx is not validated before use, leading to unsafe slice allocation for extremely large values.


Impact

  • Application panic or crash on malicious or malformed input.
  • Potential denial of service (DoS) via memory exhaustion or server crash.
  • Lack of defensive checks in the parsing code causes instability.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/gofiber/fiber/v2all versions2.52.9

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2 to 2.52.9 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-qx2q-88mx-vhg7 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-qx2q-88mx-vhg7 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-qx2q-88mx-vhg7. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Description When using Fiber's `Ctx.BodyParser` to parse form data containing a large numeric key that represents a slice index (e.g., `test.18446744073704`), the application crashes due to an out-of-bounds slice allocation in the underlying schema decoder. The root cause is that the decoder attempts to allocate a slice of length `idx + 1` without validating whether the index is within a safe or reasonable range. If `idx` is excessively large, this leads to an integer overflow or memory exhaustion, causing a panic or crash. ### Steps to Reproduce Create a POST request handler that acc
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-qx2q-88mx-vhg7 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-qx2q-88mx-vhg7 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.