GHSA-qvv5-jq5g-4cgg
Fix: WhiskeySockets/Baileys@3beb08eGHSA-qvv5-jq5g-4cgg is a CWE-290 vulnerability in baileys. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-qvv5-jq5g-4cgg is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Baileys has message upsert / hist sync spoofing and app state corruption when using maliciously crafted protocolMessage payload
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-qvv5-jq5g-4cgg.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
baileysnpm@whiskeysockets/baileysnpmDescription
Impact
Any baileys session under the latest version (< 7.0.0-rc12, and < 6.7.22) can be sent a malicious payload via the placeholderResendMessage and trigger a fake messages.upsert event with a fake message key and payload. This allows anyone to spoof messages. The same exploit also allows an attacker to corrupt the app state sync system by sending fake key shares, and also allows for history sync spoofing which also serves the same problem, injecting fake previous context or "on-demand" sync.
Patches
https://github.com/WhiskeySockets/Baileys/commit/3beb08eecfcb4e65722e674034bd84fb11a9de35 This commit has patched the issue, and a version tag has been released under 7.0.0 (6.7.22) for those still on Baileys v6. A new Baileys version, v7.0.0-rc12, has been released to remediate this.
Workarounds
There are no real workarounds other than dropping messages.upsert events that contain a requestId field, turning off automatic history sync (shouldSyncHistoryMessage: () => false) in socket config. There are no workarounds for the app state sync jamming.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | baileys | all versions | 6.7.22 |
| 📦npm | @whiskeysockets/baileys | all versions | 6.7.22 |
| 📦npm | baileys | ≥ 7.0.0-rc.1&&< 7.0.0-rc12 | 7.0.0-rc12 |
| 📦npm | @whiskeysockets/baileys | ≥ 7.0.0-rc.1&&< 7.0.0-rc12 | 7.0.0-rc12 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for baileys. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update baileys to 6.7.22 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-qvv5-jq5g-4cgg is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-qvv5-jq5g-4cgg is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-qvv5-jq5g-4cgg. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-qvv5-jq5g-4cgg in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-qvv5-jq5g-4cgg across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.