How severe is GHSA-qv97-5qr8-2266?

GHSA-qv97-5qr8-2266 has a CVSS score of 4.9/10, rated MEDIUM. Review your exposure and patch according to your risk tolerance.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-qv97-5qr8-2266?

GHSA-qv97-5qr8-2266 affects the following packages: mithril-client (crates.io). Ecosystems affected: crates.io.

How do I fix GHSA-qv97-5qr8-2266?

Update mithril-client to 0.12.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-qv97-5qr8-2266 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-qv97-5qr8-2266 in my crates.io dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for mithril-client. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-qv97-5qr8-2266 if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-qv97-5qr8-2266?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-qv97-5qr8-2266 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-qv97-5qr8-2266 actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-qv97-5qr8-2266 yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

When was GHSA-qv97-5qr8-2266 published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-qv97-5qr8-2266 was published on May 7, 2025. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🦀 crates.io

GHSA-qv97-5qr8-2266

MEDIUM

Mithril snapshots for Cardano database could be compromised by an adversary

Published

May 7, 2025

Updated

May 7, 2025

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

🦀mithril-client

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

Mithril certification of Cardano database

The Mithril network provides certification for snapshots of the Cardano database, enabling users to quickly bootstrap a Cardano node without relying on the slower peer-to-peer synchronization process.

To generate a multi-signature, a minimum threshold of Cardano stake registered in the protocol must agree on signing the same message. In this context, a digest is computed from the internal files of the Cardano node's database. However, this mechanism has certain limitations. Specifically, some files are not identically generated across all Cardano nodes, and there is no API to provide consistent snapshots at a specific beacon on the Cardano chain:

All immutable files, except the last one (which is still being created), are used to compute the message
The last immutable file is excluded from the signature
The ledger state files are also excluded from the signature.

Cardano node startup sequence

A Cardano node can only perform a fast bootstrap if a pre-computed ledger state is loaded into its database; otherwise, a full re-computation is required, which is time-consuming. During the startup phase with a pre-computed ledger state, the node performs structural verification of the ledger state and lightweight conformity checks which may not be enough to systematically detect invalid ledger state.

Attack scenarios

Inconsistencies could be introduced into a tampered ledger state distributed through Mithril snapshots, either by an unknown source or by a compromised IOG-operated aggregator. These inconsistencies would not be immediately detected by Cardano nodes started with such snapshots, potentially enabling long-range attacks that might not be corrected by honest nodes, even if they sync from genesis.

Currently, a Mithril network has only one aggregator, which serves snapshots from a secure cloud location operated by IOG and is therefore assumed to be trustworthy. In the future, as Mithril networks become more decentralized, multiple aggregators will operate independently. This increased decentralization could raise the risk of a malicious aggregator distributing a tampered ledger state.

Patches

As a mitigation, the Mithril aggregator now signs the ledger state snapshot and the latest immutable file using an IOG-owned key, and the client library and CLI validate the signature of these files upon download.

The Mithril client library has been fixed with version 0.12.2, previous versions must not be used anymore.
The Mithril client CLI has been fixed with version 0.12.1, previous versions must not be used anymore.
The Mithril aggregator has been fixed with version 0.7.44, previous versions must not be used anymore.

References

Mithril protocol in depth: https://mithril.network/doc/next/mithril/mithril-protocol/protocol
Bootstrap a Cardano node: https://mithril.network/doc/manual/getting-started/bootstrap-cardano-node
Mithril certification of the Cardano node database: https://mithril.network/doc/mithril/advanced/mithril-certification/cardano-node-database

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🦀crates.io	`mithril-client`	all versions	0.12.2

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for mithril-client. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update mithril-client to 0.12.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-qv97-5qr8-2266 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-qv97-5qr8-2266 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-qv97-5qr8-2266. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact #### Mithril certification of Cardano database The Mithril network provides certification for snapshots of the Cardano database, enabling users to quickly bootstrap a Cardano node without relying on the slower peer-to-peer synchronization process. To generate a multi-signature, a minimum threshold of Cardano stake registered in the protocol must agree on signing the same message. In this context, a digest is computed from the internal files of the Cardano node's database. However, this mechanism has certain limitations. Specifically, some files are not identically generated acros

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-qv97-5qr8-2266 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-qv97-5qr8-2266 across crates.io dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

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