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MEDIUM severity

Mithril snapshots for Cardano database could be compromised by an adversaryGHSA-qv97-5qr8-2266

MEDIUM

GHSA-qv97-5qr8-2266 is a medium-severity (CVSS 4.9) vulnerability in mithril-client. A fix is available for mithril-client — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of May 7, 2025 · OSV.dev, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🦀mithril-client

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

Mithril certification of Cardano database

The Mithril network provides certification for snapshots of the Cardano database, enabling users to quickly bootstrap a Cardano node without relying on the slower peer-to-peer synchronization process.

To generate a multi-signature, a minimum threshold of Cardano stake registered in the protocol must agree on signing the same message. In this context, a digest is computed from the internal files of the Cardano node's database. However, this mechanism has certain limitations. Specifically, some files are not identically generated across all Cardano nodes, and there is no API to provide consistent snapshots at a specific beacon on the Cardano chain:

  • All immutable files, except the last one (which is still being created), are used to compute the message
  • The last immutable file is excluded from the signature
  • The ledger state files are also excluded from the signature.

Cardano node startup sequence

A Cardano node can only perform a fast bootstrap if a pre-computed ledger state is loaded into its database; otherwise, a full re-computation is required, which is time-consuming. During the startup phase with a pre-computed ledger state, the node performs structural verification of the ledger state and lightweight conformity checks which may not be enough to systematically detect invalid ledger state.

Attack scenarios

Inconsistencies could be introduced into a tampered ledger state distributed through Mithril snapshots, either by an unknown source or by a compromised IOG-operated aggregator. These inconsistencies would not be immediately detected by Cardano nodes started with such snapshots, potentially enabling long-range attacks that might not be corrected by honest nodes, even if they sync from genesis.

Currently, a Mithril network has only one aggregator, which serves snapshots from a secure cloud location operated by IOG and is therefore assumed to be trustworthy. In the future, as Mithril networks become more decentralized, multiple aggregators will operate independently. This increased decentralization could raise the risk of a malicious aggregator distributing a tampered ledger state.

Patches

As a mitigation, the Mithril aggregator now signs the ledger state snapshot and the latest immutable file using an IOG-owned key, and the client library and CLI validate the signature of these files upon download.

  • The Mithril client library has been fixed with version 0.12.2, previous versions must not be used anymore.
  • The Mithril client CLI has been fixed with version 0.12.1, previous versions must not be used anymore.
  • The Mithril aggregator has been fixed with version 0.7.44, previous versions must not be used anymore.

References

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🦀crates.iomithril-clientall versions0.12.2cargo update -p mithril-client --precise 0.12.2

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for mithril-client, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update mithril-client to 0.12.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-qv97-5qr8-2266 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact #### Mithril certification of Cardano database The Mithril network provides certification for snapshots of the Cardano database, enabling users to quickly bootstrap a Cardano node without relying on the slower peer-to-peer synchronization process. To generate a multi-signature, a minimum threshold of Cardano stake registered in the protocol must agree on signing the same message. In this context, a digest is computed from the internal files of the Cardano node's database. However, this mechanism has certain limitations. Specifically, some files are not identically generated acros
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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