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Not in CISA KEV
MEDIUM severity

GHSA-qqxw-m5fj-f7gv

MEDIUMFix: oauth2-proxy/oauth2_proxy@a316f8a

GHSA-qqxw-m5fj-f7gv is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.9) Open Redirect vulnerability in github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy. 1 public exploit reference exists, so weaponization risk is real. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-qqxw-m5fj-f7gv is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

The pattern '/\domain.com' is not disallowed when redirecting, allowing for open redirect

Also known asBIT-oauth2-proxy-2020-5233CVE-2020-5233
Published
Dec 20, 2021
Updated
Jul 8, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
1 known
Exploitation data as of Aug 23, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
1.1%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs63th percentile — riskier than 63% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-qqxw-m5fj-f7gv plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 0 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

An open redirect vulnerability has been found in oauth2_proxy. Anyone who uses oauth2_proxy may potentially be impacted.

For a context [detectify] have an in depth blog post about the potential impact of an open redirect. Particularly see the OAuth section.

tl;dr: People's authentication tokens could be silently harvested by an attacker. e.g: facebook.com/oauth.php?clientid=123&state=abc&redirect_url=https://yourdomain.com/red.php?url%3dhttps://attacker.com/

Patches

@sauyon found the issue, and has submitted a patch.

diff --git a/oauthproxy.go b/oauthproxy.go
index 72ab580..f420df6 100644
--- a/oauthproxy.go
+++ b/oauthproxy.go
@@ -517,7 +517,7 @@ func (p *OAuthProxy) GetRedirect(req *http.Request) (redirect string, err error)
 // IsValidRedirect checks whether the redirect URL is whitelisted
 func (p *OAuthProxy) IsValidRedirect(redirect string) bool {
 	switch {
-	case strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "/") && !strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "//"):
+	case strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "/") && !strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "//") && !strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "/\\"):
 		return true
 	case strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "http://") || strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "https://"):
 		redirectURL, err := url.Parse(redirect)

This patch will be applied to the next release, which is scheduled for when this is publicly disclosed.

Workarounds

At this stage there is no work around.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxyall versions5.0.0
Exploits & PoCs
1

Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy to 5.0.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-qqxw-m5fj-f7gv is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-qqxw-m5fj-f7gv is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-qqxw-m5fj-f7gv. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact An open redirect vulnerability has been found in `oauth2_proxy`. Anyone who uses `oauth2_proxy` may potentially be impacted. For a context [detectify] have an in depth blog post about the potential impact of an open redirect. Particularly see the OAuth section. **tl;dr**: People's authentication tokens could be silently harvested by an attacker. e.g: `facebook.com/oauth.php?clientid=123&state=abc&redirect_url=https://yourdomain.com/red.php?url%3dhttps://attacker.com/` ### Patches @sauyon found the issue, and has submitted a patch. ``` diff --git a/oauthproxy.go b/oauthproxy.g
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-qqxw-m5fj-f7gv in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-qqxw-m5fj-f7gv across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

GHSA-qqxw-m5fj-f7gv: oauth2-proxy Open… | O3 Security