GHSA-qqc3-94qv-7fw3
Hubuum client library (Rust): Configured custom transports may be bypassed, exposing credentials and network traffic
Blast Radius
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Description
Summary
When an application configures hubuum_client with ClientBuilder::with_transport, several client operations still use the built-in reqwest client directly. The bypass includes password login, bearer-token validation, authentication-provider discovery, health and readiness probes, export-output downloads, and unified-search streams.
Impact
Applications may use a custom transport as a security boundary for network isolation, proxy enforcement, request signing, audit logging, or policy checks. Affected operations bypass those controls and make direct network requests to the configured base URL. Password login can therefore send plaintext credentials outside the intended transport, while token validation can send a bearer token outside it. Other bypassing calls can evade audit and routing policy.
The issue affects custom transports introduced in 0.3.0. Applications that do not configure a custom transport are not affected by the bypass.
Defense in depth
The same private fix disables redirect following for built-in async and blocking clients so an authenticated request remains at the endpoint validated and constructed by the client. Applications supplying a preconfigured reqwest client continue to control its redirect policy.
Remediation
The proposed fix routes authentication, public discovery and probe calls, export downloads, unified-search streams, raw requests, and typed requests through the configured transport in both async and blocking clients. It preserves retry and error-body policies, documents the buffering semantics of custom transports, and surfaces built-in-client redirects as 3xx API errors.
Validation
Regression tests assert async and blocking routing, paths, login bodies, bearer headers, streaming bodies, retries, error handling, and redirect behavior. Formatting, Clippy with warnings denied, rustdoc warnings, the complete workspace suite, all supported feature combinations, Rust 1.88 MSRV, OpenAPI validation, and the combined library plus downstream-consumer integration suites pass against the immutable Hubuum 0.0.3 image.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🦀crates.io | hubuum_client | ≥ 0.3.0&&< 0.6.1 | 0.6.1 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for hubuum_client. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update hubuum_client to 0.6.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-qqc3-94qv-7fw3 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-qqc3-94qv-7fw3 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-qqc3-94qv-7fw3. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-qqc3-94qv-7fw3 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-qqc3-94qv-7fw3 across crates.io dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.