How severe is GHSA-qp7j-x725-g67f?

GHSA-qp7j-x725-g67f has a CVSS score of 10/10, rated CRITICAL. Immediate patching is strongly recommended.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-qp7j-x725-g67f?

GHSA-qp7j-x725-g67f affects the following packages: github.com/hydraide/hydraide (Go), github.com/hydraide/hydraide (Go). Ecosystems affected: Go.

How do I fix GHSA-qp7j-x725-g67f?

Update github.com/hydraide/hydraide to 2.2.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-qp7j-x725-g67f is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-qp7j-x725-g67f in my Go dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/hydraide/hydraide. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-qp7j-x725-g67f if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-qp7j-x725-g67f?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-qp7j-x725-g67f is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-qp7j-x725-g67f actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-qp7j-x725-g67f yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

When was GHSA-qp7j-x725-g67f published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-qp7j-x725-g67f was published on August 19, 2025 and was last updated on August 29, 2025. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🐹 Go

GHSA-qp7j-x725-g67f

CRITICAL

HydrAIDE Authentication Bypass Vulnerability

Also known asGO-2025-3895

Published

Aug 19, 2025

Updated

Aug 29, 2025

Affected

2 pkgs

Patched

2 / 2

Exploits

None indexed

Blast Radius

2 pkgs affected

🐹github.com/hydraide/hydraide🐹github.com/hydraide/hydraide

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

There is no authentication of any kind.

Details

TLS is implemented, the tunnel between the client and server is secure, however once data is on the server, it's free to be read by any adversaries.

On the client side : https://github.com/hydraide/hydraide/blob/main/sdk/go/hydraidego/client/client.go#L221 It should be using a TLS Config with RootCAs and Certificates, currently RootCAs only (under NewClientTLSFromFile)

And on the server side, there should be ClientCAs and ClientAuth filled.

PoC

To bypass as is, the simplest way is to take the client and modify the code as such :

Modified from https://github.com/hydraide/hydraide/blob/main/sdk/go/hydraidego/client/client.go#L209

			// hostOnly := strings.Split(server.Host, ":")[0]
			// creds, certErr := credentials.NewClientTLSFromFile(server.CertFilePath, hostOnly)
			// if certErr != nil {
			// 	slog.Error("error while loading TLS credentials: ", "error", certErr, "server", server.Host, "fromIsland", server.FromIsland, "toIsland", server.ToIsland)
			// 	errorMessages = append(errorMessages, certErr)
			// }
			var opts []grpc.DialOption
			tlsConfig := &tls.Config{
				InsecureSkipVerify: true,
			}
			creds := credentials.NewTLS(tlsConfig)
			opts = append(opts, grpc.WithTransportCredentials(creds))

Impact

It impacts everyone who think there is any kind of authentication.

Resolution

This vulnerability has been fully fixed in server/v2.2.1 together with hydraidectl/v0.2.1.

All users are strongly advised to upgrade:

Update to hydraidectl v0.2.1
Re-initialize server instances with hydraidectl init into a new folder. This generates the required certificate files, downloads the latest binaries, and sets up the necessary environment variables.

For migration help, join the community Discord: https://discord.gg/xE2YSkzFRm or open a GitHub Discussion. If anything does not work, please report it.

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐹Go	`github.com/hydraide/hydraide`	≥ 2.1.1&&< 2.2.1	2.2.1
🐹Go	`github.com/hydraide/hydraide`	all versions	0.0.0-20250816184905-1256db38c33c

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/hydraide/hydraide. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/hydraide/hydraide to 2.2.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-qp7j-x725-g67f is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-qp7j-x725-g67f is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-qp7j-x725-g67f. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary There is no authentication of any kind. ### Details TLS is implemented, the tunnel between the client and server is secure, however once data is on the server, it's free to be read by any adversaries. On the client side : https://github.com/hydraide/hydraide/blob/main/sdk/go/hydraidego/client/client.go#L221 It should be using a TLS Config with RootCAs and Certificates, currently RootCAs only (under NewClientTLSFromFile) And on the server side, there should be ClientCAs and ClientAuth filled. ### PoC To bypass as is, the simplest way is to take the client and modify the code as

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-qp7j-x725-g67f in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-qp7j-x725-g67f across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

Scan my dependencies How O3 SCA works