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GHSA-qp7j-x725-g67f hydraide

CRITICALFix: hydraide/hydraide@b252554

GHSA-qp7j-x725-g67f is a critical-severity (CVSS 10) vulnerability in github.com/hydraide/hydraide. A fix is available for github.com/hydraide/hydraide — see the affected versions and patch details below.

HydrAIDE Authentication Bypass Vulnerability

Also known asGO-2025-3895
Published
Aug 19, 2025
Updated
Aug 29, 2025
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Aug 29, 2025 · OSV.dev, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected
🐹github.com/hydraide/hydraide🐹github.com/hydraide/hydraide

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

There is no authentication of any kind.

Details

TLS is implemented, the tunnel between the client and server is secure, however once data is on the server, it's free to be read by any adversaries.

On the client side : https://github.com/hydraide/hydraide/blob/main/sdk/go/hydraidego/client/client.go#L221 It should be using a TLS Config with RootCAs and Certificates, currently RootCAs only (under NewClientTLSFromFile)

And on the server side, there should be ClientCAs and ClientAuth filled.

PoC

To bypass as is, the simplest way is to take the client and modify the code as such :

Modified from https://github.com/hydraide/hydraide/blob/main/sdk/go/hydraidego/client/client.go#L209

			// hostOnly := strings.Split(server.Host, ":")[0]
			// creds, certErr := credentials.NewClientTLSFromFile(server.CertFilePath, hostOnly)
			// if certErr != nil {
			// 	slog.Error("error while loading TLS credentials: ", "error", certErr, "server", server.Host, "fromIsland", server.FromIsland, "toIsland", server.ToIsland)
			// 	errorMessages = append(errorMessages, certErr)
			// }
			var opts []grpc.DialOption
			tlsConfig := &tls.Config{
				InsecureSkipVerify: true,
			}
			creds := credentials.NewTLS(tlsConfig)
			opts = append(opts, grpc.WithTransportCredentials(creds))

Impact

It impacts everyone who think there is any kind of authentication.


Resolution

This vulnerability has been fully fixed in server/v2.2.1 together with hydraidectl/v0.2.1.

All users are strongly advised to upgrade:

  1. Update to hydraidectl v0.2.1
  2. Re-initialize server instances with hydraidectl init into a new folder. This generates the required certificate files, downloads the latest binaries, and sets up the necessary environment variables.

For migration help, join the community Discord: https://discord.gg/xE2YSkzFRm or open a GitHub Discussion. If anything does not work, please report it.

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/hydraide/hydraide2.1.1&&< 2.2.12.2.1go get github.com/hydraide/hydraide@v2.2.1
🐹Gogithub.com/hydraide/hydraideall versions0.0.0-20250816184905-1256db38c33cgo get github.com/hydraide/hydraide@v0.0.0-20250816184905-1256db38c33c

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/hydraide/hydraide, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/hydraide/hydraide to 2.2.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-qp7j-x725-g67f is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-qp7j-x725-g67f can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to GHSA-qp7j-x725-g67f. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary There is no authentication of any kind. ### Details TLS is implemented, the tunnel between the client and server is secure, however once data is on the server, it's free to be read by any adversaries. On the client side : https://github.com/hydraide/hydraide/blob/main/sdk/go/hydraidego/client/client.go#L221 It should be using a TLS Config with RootCAs and Certificates, currently RootCAs only (under NewClientTLSFromFile) And on the server side, there should be ClientCAs and ClientAuth filled. ### PoC To bypass as is, the simplest way is to take the client and modify the code as
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-qp7j-x725-g67f in your dependencies?

O3 Security finds GHSA-qp7j-x725-g67f across Go dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.

GHSA-qp7j-x725-g67f: hydraide (Critical 10) | O3 Security