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GHSA-qjv7-627w-8qjv

GHSA-qjv7-627w-8qjv is a security vulnerability in github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-qjv7-627w-8qjv is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

Fiber vulnerable to XSS in AutoFormat Content Negotiation

Also known asCVE-2026-42554GO-2026-5585
Published
May 5, 2026
Updated
Jul 24, 2026
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

2 pkgs affected
🐹github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3🐹github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Description

A Cross-Site Scripting (CWE-79) vulnerability in Go Fiber allows a remote attacker to inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript by supplying Accept: text/html on any request whose handler passes attacker-influenced data to the AutoFormat() feature. This affects github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3 (DefaultRes.AutoFormat) through version 3.1.0 and github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2 (Ctx.Format) through version 2.52.12.

The developer opts into content negotiation by calling AutoFormat(), but does not opt into raw HTML emission for a particular request; Fiber chooses that branch from attacker-controlled Accept. Five of the six branches of the same method already escape. JSON, XML, MsgPack, and CBOR all route through encoders that neutralize markup; the txt branch emits text/plain and cannot execute. The html branch is the sole outlier in a method whose name (AutoFormat) and symmetrical structure actively telegraph "safe, format-agnostic reply."

Details

The issue resides in res.go within (*DefaultRes).AutoFormat(). The method negotiates against the request Accept header, selects one of html | json | txt | xml | msgpack | cbor, and serializes the caller-supplied body accordingly.

The "html" branch concatenates the stringified body directly into HTML markup with no output encoding:

  • accept comes from r.c.Accepts(...), i.e. is fully attacker-controlled. An attacker can force the "html" branch on any AutoFormat() call regardless of which format the developer tested against.
  • b is produced from body via direct assignment (string / []byte) or fmt.Sprintf("%v", body). No html.EscapeString is applied.
  • The resulting string is sent as text/html; charset=utf-8, so browsers render it as active HTML.
// res.go
func (r *DefaultRes) AutoFormat(body any) error {

    accept := r.c.DefaultReq.Accepts("html", "json", "txt", "xml", "msgpack", "cbor")

    r.Type(accept)
    var b string
    switch val := body.(type) {
    case string:
        b = val
    case []byte:
        b = r.c.app.toString(val)
    default:
        b = fmt.Sprintf("%v", val)
    }

    switch accept {
    case "txt":
        return r.SendString(b)
    case "json":
        return r.JSON(body)
    case "xml":
        return r.XML(body)
    case "html":
        return r.SendString("<p>" + b + "</p>")
    case "msgpack":
        return r.MsgPack(body)
    case "cbor":
        return r.CBOR(body)
    }
    return r.SendString(b)
}

Impact

This impacts all current v3 releases ≤ 3.1.0 containing DefaultRes.AutoFormat, and all current v2 releases ≤ 2.52.12 where the identical "<p>" + b + "</p>" construction exists in (*Ctx).Format(). Exploitation requires that an application call c.AutoFormat(v) where v (or a field stringified by %v) contains request-influenced data.

A handler that uses AutoFormat() to serve multiple representations of the same data can be turned into an HTML XSS sink when the client sends Accept: text/html, even if the developer only tested the JSON path.

This may result in:

  • Reflected XSS in the application's origin via any request-derived value reaching AutoFormat.
  • Stored XSS where the reflected value originates from persisted input later passed to AutoFormat.

Proposed Patch

The injection surface is r.Type("html") followed by r.SendString(b) with unescaped caller data, where it constructs markup on the caller's behalf around a value whose HTML-ness the caller did not declare. A few options:

  • AutoFormat() should treat body as data, not markup, in the "html" branch and escape it before concatenating it into the framework-generated <p> wrapper. Callers that need raw negotiated HTML should use Format() with an explicit HTML handler.
  • Introduce a sibling method that escapes, leave AutoFormat alone for backward compatibility.

HTML-escape the value in the "html" branch before concatenating it into the <p> wrapper.

import "html"

// ...
case "html":
    return r.SendString("<p>" + html.EscapeString(b) + "</p>")

html.EscapeString escapes <, >, &, ', ", which is sufficient for an element-text context. Apply the same change to v2's (*Ctx).Format().

Proof of Concept

# Create project directory
mkdir fiber-xss-poc && cd fiber-xss-poc

# Initialize Go module
go mod init fiber-xss-poc

# Install Fiber v3
go get github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3

# Create the PoC file
cat > main.go << 'EOF'
package main

import (
	"github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3"
)

type User struct {
	ID   int    `json:"id"`
	Name string `json:"name"`
}

func main() {
	app := fiber.New()
	
	app.Get("/api/user", func(c fiber.Ctx) error {
		user := User{
			ID:   1,
			Name: c.Query("name", "anonymous"),
		}
		return c.AutoFormat(user)
	})

	app.Listen(":3000")
}
EOF

# Run it
go run main.go
}

Benign JSON

curl -s 'http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/user?name=Alice' -H 'Accept: application/json'
{"id":1,"name":"Alice"}

HTML sink enables XSS

curl -s 'http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/user?name=<script>alert(document.domain)</script>' -H 'Accept: text/html'
<p>{1 <script>alert(document.domain)</script>}</p>

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/gofiber/fiber/v3all versions3.2.0
🐹Gogithub.com/gofiber/fiber/v2all versions2.52.13

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3 to 3.2.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-qjv7-627w-8qjv is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-qjv7-627w-8qjv is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-qjv7-627w-8qjv. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary **Description** A Cross-Site Scripting (CWE-79) vulnerability in Go Fiber allows a remote attacker to inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript by supplying `Accept: text/html` on any request whose handler passes attacker-influenced data to the AutoFormat() feature. This affects `github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3` (`DefaultRes.AutoFormat`) through version 3.1.0 and `github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2` (`Ctx.Format`) through version 2.52.12. The developer opts into content negotiation by calling AutoFormat(), but does not opt into raw HTML emission for a particular request; Fiber chooses that branch f
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-qjv7-627w-8qjv in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-qjv7-627w-8qjv across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.