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GHSA-qh9x-gcfh-pcrw

HIGH

OpenZeppelin Contracts's ERC165Checker may revert instead of returning false

Also known asCVE-2022-31170
Published
Jul 21, 2022
Updated
Nov 8, 2023
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.6%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk45th percentile+0.25%
0.00%0.38%0.75%1.13%0.3%0.6%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

2 pkgs affected

Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.

@openzeppelin/contractsnpm
1.0Mdownloads / week
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeablenpm
264Kdownloads / week

Description

Impact

ERC165Checker.supportsInterface is designed to always successfully return a boolean, and under no circumstance revert. However, an incorrect assumption about Solidity 0.8's abi.decode allows some cases to revert, given a target contract that doesn't implement EIP-165 as expected, specifically if it returns a value other than 0 or 1.

The contracts that may be affected are those that use ERC165Checker to check for support for an interface and then handle the lack of support in a way other than reverting.

Patches

The issue was patched in 4.7.1.

References

https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/pull/3552

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, or need assistance deploying the fix, email us at [email protected].

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npm@openzeppelin/contracts4.0.0&&< 4.7.14.7.1
📦npm@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable4.0.0&&< 4.7.14.7.1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @openzeppelin/contracts. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update @openzeppelin/contracts to 4.7.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-qh9x-gcfh-pcrw is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-qh9x-gcfh-pcrw is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-qh9x-gcfh-pcrw. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact `ERC165Checker.supportsInterface` is designed to always successfully return a boolean, and under no circumstance revert. However, an incorrect assumption about Solidity 0.8's `abi.decode` allows some cases to revert, given a target contract that doesn't implement EIP-165 as expected, specifically if it returns a value other than 0 or 1. The contracts that may be affected are those that use `ERC165Checker` to check for support for an interface and then handle the lack of support in a way other than reverting. ### Patches The issue was patched in 4.7.1. ### References https://gi
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-qh9x-gcfh-pcrw in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-qh9x-gcfh-pcrw across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.