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MEDIUM severity

sevenz-rust2: decompress builds each output path as dest.join(entry.name()) with no traversal guard, allowing a crafted .7z to write files outside the destination (Zip-Slip)GHSA-qh76-45cr-8xrc

MEDIUMFix: hasenbanck/sevenz-rust2@ef760b6

GHSA-qh76-45cr-8xrc is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.1) Path Traversal vulnerability in sevenz-rust2. A fix is available for sevenz-rust2 — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-61725
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 20, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-qh76-45cr-8xrc.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.1%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs3th percentile — riskier than 3% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.21%0.43%0.64%0.1%0.1%Nov 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🦀sevenz-rust2

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Extracting an attacker-supplied 7z archive can write files outside the destination directory. The 7z header stores each entry's path as a UTF-16 name with nothing constraining it to a relative, in-tree path. The extractor joins that name onto the destination and writes to the result without normalizing it or checking that it stays under the destination root, so an entry named ../../etc/cron.d/x or an absolute path escapes the target.

Details

In src/util/decompress.rs, decompress_impl computes the per-entry destination directly (line 140):

let dest_path = dest.join(entry.name());
extract_fn(entry, reader, &dest_path)

default_entry_extract_fn (line 154) then acts on that path:

let file = File::create(path)
    .map_err(|e| Error::file_open(e, path.to_string_lossy().to_string()))?;

There is no normalization, no dest_path.starts_with(dest) check, and no symlink-entry handling. Path::join discards the base when the joined component is absolute, and .. components are not collapsed against the base. The convenience entry points (decompress, decompress_file, decompress_with_password, decompress_file_with_password) all route through decompress_impl with default_entry_extract_fn, so the default API is affected.

The trust boundary is the archive bytes. Any caller that extracts an untrusted .7z reaches the sink.

PoC

  1. Build a .7z whose FilesInfo contains an entry named ../../../../tmp/pwned (or, on Windows, an absolute path such as C:\Windows\Temp\pwned).
  2. Call sevenz_rust2::decompress_file("evil.7z", "./out").
  3. The file is created at the traversed location outside ./out. Targeting a startup/cron path or a config file turns the write into code execution or persistence.

Impact

Arbitrary file write outside the intended directory (CWE-22 / CWE-23, the Zip-Slip class). On extraction of an attacker-controlled archive, an entry overwrites files outside the destination — config, cron, autostart, or build artifacts — which can escalate to code execution. Reachable by upload-handling backends, malware-analysis sandboxes, mod/game installers, and CI steps that unpack user-supplied 7z files.

Suggested remediation

Reject any entry whose name contains a ParentDir, RootDir, or Prefix component, or canonicalize the joined path and verify starts_with(dest) before creating it. Apply the guard inside default_entry_extract_fn (and decompress_impl) so the hardening is the default rather than left to each caller. Reject or explicitly opt-in symlink entries.

Maintainer response

This issue was patched with ef760b61f3535ac8b93006212aef41bfebc237eb and released as v0.21.1 to crates.io

Consumers that extract attacker-supplied archives received over a network without user interaction should re-score as AV:N/UI:N (≈8.6).

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🦀crates.iosevenz-rust2all versions0.21.1cargo update -p sevenz-rust2 --precise 0.21.1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for sevenz-rust2, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update sevenz-rust2 to 0.21.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-qh76-45cr-8xrc is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Resolve every user-supplied path to its canonical form and reject anything that escapes the intended directory, and run the component under an account that has no read or write access outside the directory it legitimately serves.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Extracting an attacker-supplied 7z archive can write files outside the destination directory. The 7z header stores each entry's path as a UTF-16 name with nothing constraining it to a relative, in-tree path. The extractor joins that name onto the destination and writes to the result without normalizing it or checking that it stays under the destination root, so an entry named `../../etc/cron.d/x` or an absolute path escapes the target. ### Details In `src/util/decompress.rs`, `decompress_impl` computes the per-entry destination directly (line 140): ```rust let dest_path = dest.
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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