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GHSA-qgpw-8g46-w95v

GHSA-qgpw-8g46-w95v is a Path Traversal vulnerability in n8n. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-qgpw-8g46-w95v is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

n8n: Git Node branch.<name>.remote Config Key Bypasses Sandbox Path Restriction, Enabling Local Git Repository Read

Also known asCVE-2026-86995
Published
Sep 10, 2026
Updated
Sep 10, 2026
Affected
3 pkgs
Patched
3 / 3
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 10, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-qgpw-8g46-w95v.

Real-World Exposure

3 pkgs affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

37other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
n8nnpm
58Kdownloads / week

Description

Impact

The Git node validated the repository that a fetch or pull targeted, but setUpstream wrote a branch.<name>.remote value into the repository's own configuration without validating it. A subsequent fetch or pull resolved the remote from that configuration rather than from the checked parameter, so an authenticated user with workflow-edit permission could point it at any local repository the n8n process could read and receive its contents. The patch validates the branch remote configuration on the same terms as the repository parameter.

Patches

The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 1.123.76, 2.37.7, and 2.38.2. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations:

  • Restrict n8n instance access to fully trusted users only.
  • Disable the Git node by adding n8n-nodes-base.git to the NODES_EXCLUDE environment variable.
  • Ensure the n8n process runs under a dedicated low-privilege OS user account to limit the scope of any filesystem access.

These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.

Affected Packages

3 total 3 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmn8nall versions1.123.76
📦npmn8n2.38.0&&< 2.38.22.38.2
📦npmn8n2.0.0&&< 2.37.72.37.7

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for n8n. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update n8n to 1.123.76 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-qgpw-8g46-w95v is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-qgpw-8g46-w95v is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-qgpw-8g46-w95v. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Impact The Git node validated the repository that a fetch or pull targeted, but `setUpstream` wrote a `branch.<name>.remote` value into the repository's own configuration without validating it. A subsequent fetch or pull resolved the remote from that configuration rather than from the checked parameter, so an authenticated user with workflow-edit permission could point it at any local repository the n8n process could read and receive its contents. The patch validates the branch remote configuration on the same terms as the repository parameter. ## Patches The issue has been fixed in n8n
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-qgpw-8g46-w95v in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-qgpw-8g46-w95v across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

GHSA-qgpw-8g46-w95v: n8n | O3 Security