How severe is GHSA-q9m2-fhv9-3jcf?

GHSA-q9m2-fhv9-3jcf has a CVSS score of 5.1/10, rated MEDIUM. Review your exposure and patch according to your risk tolerance.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-q9m2-fhv9-3jcf?

GHSA-q9m2-fhv9-3jcf affects the following packages: potato-annotation (PyPI). Ecosystems affected: PyPI.

How do I fix GHSA-q9m2-fhv9-3jcf?

Update potato-annotation to 2.4.5 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-q9m2-fhv9-3jcf is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-q9m2-fhv9-3jcf in my PyPI dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for potato-annotation. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-q9m2-fhv9-3jcf if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-q9m2-fhv9-3jcf?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-q9m2-fhv9-3jcf is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-q9m2-fhv9-3jcf actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-q9m2-fhv9-3jcf yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

When was GHSA-q9m2-fhv9-3jcf published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-q9m2-fhv9-3jcf was published on May 8, 2026 and was last updated on May 8, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🐍 PyPI

GHSA-q9m2-fhv9-3jcf

MEDIUM

`potato-annotation` has a Project-Boundary Bypass

Published

May 8, 2026

Updated

May 8, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

🐍potato-annotation

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

validate_path_security uses string-prefix containment (startswith) for boundary checks. This allows paths that are outside the intended project directory but share its prefix string (e.g., /tmp/potato_proj_demo_evil/... vs /tmp/potato_proj_demo) to be accepted.

Details

Affected source location (root cause)

File: potato/server_utils/config_module.py

Snippet (lines 370–373):

real_path = os.path.realpath(normalized_path)
real_base = os.path.realpath(base_dir)
if not real_path.startswith(real_base):
    raise ConfigSecurityError(...)

Snippet (lines 384–389):

real_path = os.path.realpath(normalized_path)
check_dir = project_dir if project_dir else base_dir
real_check_dir = os.path.realpath(check_dir)
if not real_path.startswith(real_check_dir):
    raise ConfigSecurityError(...)

startswith() is string-based, so /tmp/potato_proj_demo_evil/... passes when checked against /tmp/potato_proj_demo.

Confirmed affected call sites

File: potato/server_utils/config_module.py

validate_file_paths task_dir branch (line 2113)

validated_task_dir = validate_path_security(task_dir, project_dir)

validate_file_paths data_files branch (line 2151)

validated_path = validate_path_security(file_path, base_dir, project_dir)

validate_training_config training.data_file branch (line 2286)

validated_path = validate_path_security(data_file, base_dir, project_dir)

PoC

from potato.server_utils.config_module import validate_path_security

base = '/tmp/potato_proj_demo'
vuln = '/tmp/potato_proj_demo_evil/file.txt'

try:
    print('inside=', validate_path_security('/tmp/potato_proj_demo/file.txt', base, base))
except Exception as e:
    print('inside_error=', type(e).__name__, e)

try:
    validate_path_security('/tmp/other_demo/file.txt', base, base)
except Exception as e:
    print('baseline=', type(e).__name__, e)

print('trigger=', validate_path_security(vuln, base, base))

Impact

Can allow unauthorized sibling-prefix file access outside intended project boundary.
Can affect read paths (data_files, training.data_file, base_css, header_logo) and output/path placement depending on configuration.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐍PyPI	`potato-annotation`	≥ 2.0.0&&< 2.4.5	2.4.5

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for potato-annotation. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update potato-annotation to 2.4.5 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-q9m2-fhv9-3jcf is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-q9m2-fhv9-3jcf is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-q9m2-fhv9-3jcf. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary `validate_path_security` uses string-prefix containment (`startswith`) for boundary checks. This allows paths that are **outside** the intended project directory but share its prefix string (e.g., `/tmp/potato_proj_demo_evil/...` vs `/tmp/potato_proj_demo`) to be accepted. ## Details ### Affected source location (root cause) **File:** `potato/server_utils/config_module.py` **Snippet (lines 370–373):** ```python real_path = os.path.realpath(normalized_path) real_base = os.path.realpath(base_dir) if not real_path.startswith(real_base): raise ConfigSecurityError(...) ``` **Snipp

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-q9m2-fhv9-3jcf in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-q9m2-fhv9-3jcf across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

Scan my dependencies How O3 SCA works