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GHSA-q95x-7g78-rccv

OneRingBuf has a Use After Free Vulnerability

Also known asRUSTSEC-2026-0152
Published
Jul 8, 2026
Updated
Jul 9, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🦀oneringbuf

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Affected versions of oneringbuf exposed the obsolete IntoRef::into_ref method through the public IntoRef trait. For heap-backed ring buffers, this method returned a DroppableRef handle.

DroppableRef stored an owning raw pointer created from Box::into_raw. Its Clone implementation copied this raw pointer without incrementing the internal alive_iters counter. Internally, this clone pattern appears to rely on a fixed number of handles being created to match the initial alive_iters value. However, exposing DroppableRef through the public IntoRef::TargetRef associated type allows safe external code to create additional clones beyond that fixed count, breaking the lifetime protocol. Drop later dereferenced the pointer and could free the backing allocation with Box::from_raw.

Safe code could call IntoRef::into_ref to obtain a DroppableRef and then clone it. Each clone pointed to the same allocation, but the internal alive_iters counter was not increased. As a result, one clone could free the allocation while another clone still existed. Dropping the remaining clone then accessed freed memory, causing a heap-use-after-free.

The issue was fixed in version 0.8.0 by removing the obsolete into_ref method.

Trigger

use oneringbuf::{IntoRef, LocalHeapRB};

fn main() {
    let rb = LocalHeapRB::<usize>::from(vec![1, 2, 3]);

    let r = <LocalHeapRB<usize> as IntoRef>::into_ref(rb);
    let r2 = r.clone();
    let r3 = r.clone();

    drop(r);
    drop(r2);
    drop(r3); // AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free
}

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🦀crates.iooneringbufall versions0.8.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for oneringbuf. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update oneringbuf to 0.8.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-q95x-7g78-rccv is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-q95x-7g78-rccv is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-q95x-7g78-rccv. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

Affected versions of `oneringbuf` exposed the obsolete `IntoRef::into_ref` method through the public `IntoRef` trait. For heap-backed ring buffers, this method returned a `DroppableRef` handle. `DroppableRef` stored an owning raw pointer created from `Box::into_raw`. Its `Clone` implementation copied this raw pointer without incrementing the internal `alive_iters` counter. Internally, this clone pattern appears to rely on a fixed number of handles being created to match the initial `alive_iters` value. However, exposing `DroppableRef` through the public `IntoRef::TargetRef` associated type al
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-q95x-7g78-rccv in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-q95x-7g78-rccv across crates.io dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.