GHSA-q95x-7g78-rccv
OneRingBuf has a Use After Free Vulnerability
Blast Radius
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Description
Affected versions of oneringbuf exposed the obsolete IntoRef::into_ref method through the public IntoRef trait. For heap-backed ring buffers, this method returned a DroppableRef handle.
DroppableRef stored an owning raw pointer created from Box::into_raw. Its Clone implementation copied this raw pointer without incrementing the internal alive_iters counter. Internally, this clone pattern appears to rely on a fixed number of handles being created to match the initial alive_iters value. However, exposing DroppableRef through the public IntoRef::TargetRef associated type allows safe external code to create additional clones beyond that fixed count, breaking the lifetime protocol. Drop later dereferenced the pointer and could free the backing allocation with Box::from_raw.
Safe code could call IntoRef::into_ref to obtain a DroppableRef and then clone it. Each clone pointed to the same allocation, but the internal alive_iters counter was not increased. As a result, one clone could free the allocation while another clone still existed. Dropping the remaining clone then accessed freed memory, causing a heap-use-after-free.
The issue was fixed in version 0.8.0 by removing the obsolete into_ref method.
Trigger
use oneringbuf::{IntoRef, LocalHeapRB};
fn main() {
let rb = LocalHeapRB::<usize>::from(vec![1, 2, 3]);
let r = <LocalHeapRB<usize> as IntoRef>::into_ref(rb);
let r2 = r.clone();
let r3 = r.clone();
drop(r);
drop(r2);
drop(r3); // AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free
}
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🦀crates.io | oneringbuf | all versions | 0.8.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for oneringbuf. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update oneringbuf to 0.8.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-q95x-7g78-rccv is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-q95x-7g78-rccv is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-q95x-7g78-rccv. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-q95x-7g78-rccv in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-q95x-7g78-rccv across crates.io dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.