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📦 npm

GHSA-q6wc-xx4m-92fj

MEDIUM

PowerSync: Some sync filters ignored on 1.20.0 using `config.edition: 3`

Also known asCVE-2026-30870
Published
Mar 7, 2026
Updated
Mar 23, 2026
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk10th percentile+0.16%
0.00%0.23%0.47%0.70%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.2%Apr 26Jun 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

2 pkgs affected

Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.

@powersync/service-corenpm
575downloads / week
@powersync/service-sync-rulesnpm
30Kdownloads / week

Description

Impact

In version 1.20.0, when using new sync streams with config.edition: 3, certain subquery filters were ignored when determining which data to sync to users.

Depending on the sync stream configuration, this could result in authenticated users syncing data that should have been restricted.

Only queries that gate synchronization using subqueries without partitioning the result set are affected.

Not affected:

  • Sync rules (bucket_definitions)
  • Sync streams using config.edition: 2
  • No data is exposed without authenticating

Patches

The issue is fixed in 1.20.1. Restarting the service with the new version is sufficient - no reprocessing of sync streams is required.

Any data that users erroneously synced will be automatically removed from those devices when they connect again.

We have updated all affected PowerSync Cloud instances to the fixed version, and are reaching out to affected customers.

For self-hosted PowerSync instances, update to the latest version and restart.

Affected queries

Subqueries used only to determine whether or not a table should be synced (without partitioning the data itself) are affected. Examples:

-- Goal: Sync a table only to admin users
-- 1.20.0: all authenticated users would sync this table
SELECT * FROM sensitive_table WHERE auth.user_id() IN (SELECT user_id FROM admins)
SELECT * FROM sensitive_table WHERE 1 IN (SELECT 1 FROM users WHERE id = auth.user_id() AND is_admin = TRUE)

-- Goal: Sync a table only if authorized
-- 1.20.0: all authenticated users would sync this table
SELECT * FROM sensitive_table WHERE 'sensitive_table' IN (SELECT table_name FROM synced_table WHERE "user" = auth.user_id())
SELECT * FROM sensitive_table WHERE 'sensitive_table' IN auth.parameter('allowed_tables')

Queries that partition data (for example SELECT * FROM sensitive_table WHERE owner IN (SELECT id FROM users WHERE is_admin AND id = auth.user_id())) are not affected by this issue.

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npm@powersync/service-core1.20.0&&< 1.20.11.20.1
📦npm@powersync/service-sync-rules0.32.0&&< 0.33.00.33.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @powersync/service-core. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update @powersync/service-core to 1.20.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-q6wc-xx4m-92fj is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-q6wc-xx4m-92fj is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-q6wc-xx4m-92fj. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact In version **1.20.0**, when using new sync streams with `config.edition: 3`, certain subquery filters were ignored when determining which data to sync to users. Depending on the sync stream configuration, this could result in authenticated users syncing data that should have been restricted. Only queries that gate synchronization using subqueries without partitioning the result set are affected. Not affected: * Sync rules (bucket_definitions) * Sync streams using `config.edition: 2` * No data is exposed without authenticating ### Patches The issue is **fixed in 1.20.1**. Re
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-q6wc-xx4m-92fj in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-q6wc-xx4m-92fj across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.