GHSA-q6hg-6m9x-5g9c is a high-severity (CVSS 8.8) CWE-863 vulnerability in github.com/evmos/evmos/v18. A fix is available for github.com/evmos/evmos/v18 — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Evmos vulnerable to exploit of smart contract account and vesting
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-q6hg-6m9x-5g9c.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-q6hg-6m9x-5g9c plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 377,636 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/evmos/evmos/v18Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
This advisory board aims to describe two vulnerabilities found in the Evmos codebase:
- Authorization check on the fundVestingAccount: unauthorized spend of funds.
Details
Authorization check on the fundVestingAccount
With the current implementation, a user can create a vesting account with a 3rd party account (EOA or contract) as funder. Then, this user can create an authorization for the contract.CallerAddress, this is the authorization checked in the code. But the funds are taken from the funder address provided in the message. Consequently, the user can fund a vesting account with a 3rd party account without its permission. The funder address can be any address, so this vulnerability can be used to drain all the accounts in the chain.
Severity
Based on ImmuneFi Severity Classification System the severity was evaluated to Critical since the attack could have lead to direct loss of funds.
Patches
The issue has been patched in versions >=V19.0.0
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/evmos/evmos/v18 | all versions | 19.0.0go get github.com/evmos/evmos/v18@v19.0.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/evmos/evmos/v18, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/evmos/evmos/v18 to 19.0.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-q6hg-6m9x-5g9c is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-q6hg-6m9x-5g9c can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-q6hg-6m9x-5g9c. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-q6hg-6m9x-5g9c in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-q6hg-6m9x-5g9c across Go dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.