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HIGH severity

Evmos vulnerable to exploit of smart contract account and vestingGHSA-q6hg-6m9x-5g9c

HIGHFix: evmos/evmos@0a620e1

GHSA-q6hg-6m9x-5g9c is a high-severity (CVSS 8.8) CWE-863 vulnerability in github.com/evmos/evmos/v18. A fix is available for github.com/evmos/evmos/v18 — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2024-39696GO-2024-2974
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 10, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-q6hg-6m9x-5g9c.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs45th percentile — riskier than 45% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.02%0.36%0.69%1.02%0.5%0.5%0.5%0.5%0.5%Jul 26Oct 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v18

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

This advisory board aims to describe two vulnerabilities found in the Evmos codebase:

  • Authorization check on the fundVestingAccount: unauthorized spend of funds.

Details

Authorization check on the fundVestingAccount

With the current implementation, a user can create a vesting account with a 3rd party account (EOA or contract) as funder. Then, this user can create an authorization for the contract.CallerAddress, this is the authorization checked in the code. But the funds are taken from the funder address provided in the message. Consequently, the user can fund a vesting account with a 3rd party account without its permission. The funder address can be any address, so this vulnerability can be used to drain all the accounts in the chain.

Severity

Based on ImmuneFi Severity Classification System the severity was evaluated to Critical since the attack could have lead to direct loss of funds.

Patches

The issue has been patched in versions >=V19.0.0

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/evmos/evmos/v18all versions19.0.0go get github.com/evmos/evmos/v18@v19.0.0

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
evmosevmos
< 19.0.0
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/evmos/evmos/v18, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/evmos/evmos/v18 to 19.0.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-q6hg-6m9x-5g9c is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary This advisory board aims to describe two vulnerabilities found in the Evmos codebase: - _Authorization check on the fundVestingAccount_: unauthorized spend of funds. ### Details #### Authorization check on the fundVestingAccount With the current implementation, a user can create a vesting account with a 3rd party account (EOA or contract) as funder. Then, this user can create an authorization for the contract.CallerAddress, this is the authorization checked in the code. But the funds are taken from the funder address provided in the message. Consequently, the user can fund a v
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Evmos vulnerable to exploit of smart contract account…