How severe is GHSA-q6h8-4j2v-pjg4?

GHSA-q6h8-4j2v-pjg4 has a CVSS score of 4.6/10, rated MEDIUM. Review your exposure and patch according to your risk tolerance.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-q6h8-4j2v-pjg4?

GHSA-q6h8-4j2v-pjg4 affects the following packages: github.com/stacklok/minder (Go). Ecosystems affected: Go.

How do I fix GHSA-q6h8-4j2v-pjg4?

Update github.com/stacklok/minder to 0.20240226.1425 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-q6h8-4j2v-pjg4 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-q6h8-4j2v-pjg4 in my Go dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/stacklok/minder. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-q6h8-4j2v-pjg4 if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-q6h8-4j2v-pjg4?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-q6h8-4j2v-pjg4 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-q6h8-4j2v-pjg4 actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-q6h8-4j2v-pjg4 yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

What is the EPSS score for GHSA-q6h8-4j2v-pjg4?

GHSA-q6h8-4j2v-pjg4 has an EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) score of 0.6%, placing it in the 42th percentile of all CVEs. EPSS is maintained by FIRST.org and estimates the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days. This score indicates relatively lower exploitation probability, though the CVSS severity should still guide your patching priority.

What type of vulnerability is GHSA-q6h8-4j2v-pjg4?

GHSA-q6h8-4j2v-pjg4 is classified as Improper Input Validation (CWE-20). This weakness type describe the underlying flaw category, which helps determine the potential impact and the right class of mitigation.

When was GHSA-q6h8-4j2v-pjg4 published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-q6h8-4j2v-pjg4 was published on February 26, 2024 and was last updated on February 5, 2025. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🐹 Go

GHSA-q6h8-4j2v-pjg4

MEDIUM

Minder trusts client-provided mapping from repo name to upstream ID

Also known asCVE-2024-27093GO-2024-2582

Published

Feb 26, 2024

Updated

Feb 5, 2025

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗

0.6%probability of exploitation in next 30 days

Lower Risk42th percentile+0.12%

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

🐹github.com/stacklok/minder

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

When using a modified client or the grpc interface directly, the RegisterRepository call accepts both the repository owner / repo and the repo_id. Furthermore, these two are not checked for matching before registering webhooks and data in the database.

Details

It is possible for an attacker to register a repository with a invalid or differing upstream ID, which causes Minder to report the repository as registered, but not remediate any future changes which conflict with policy (because the webhooks for the repo do not match any known repository in the database). When attempting to register a repo with a different repo ID, the registered provider must have admin on the named repo, or a 404 error will result. Similarly, if the stored provider token does not have repo access, then the remediations will not apply successfully. Lastly, it appears that reconciliation actions do not execute against repos with this type of mismatch.

PoC

With an RPC like the following text proto:

context {
  ...
}
repository {
  owner: "Stacklok-Demo-Org"
  repo: "python-app"
  # repo_id is defaulted to 0
}

I was able to produce the following minder output:

+--------------------------------------+--------------------------------------+----------+-------------+-------------------+------------+
|                  ID                  |               PROJECT                | PROVIDER | UPSTREAM ID |       OWNER       |    NAME    |
+--------------------------------------+--------------------------------------+----------+-------------+-------------------+------------+
| da3acba4-ef66-4d9b-b41e-250869107fd5 | f9f4aef0-74af-4909-a0c3-0e8ac7fbc38d | github   |           0 | Stacklok-Demo-Org | python-app |
+--------------------------------------+--------------------------------------+----------+-------------+-------------------+------------+
| 7cf8f7b8-b19b-40dd-a96b-b88bb1ef5563 | f9f4aef0-74af-4909-a0c3-0e8ac7fbc38d | github   |   762029128 | evankanderson     | bad-python |
+--------------------------------------+--------------------------------------+----------+-------------+-------------------+------------+

$ gh api repos/Stacklok-Demo-Org/python-app | jq .id                  
762029128

I've registered bad-python with the ID of python-app, and python-app with an ID of 0.

Impact

This appears to primarily be a potential denial-of-service vulnerability.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐹Go	`github.com/stacklok/minder`	all versions	0.20240226.1425

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/stacklok/minder. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/stacklok/minder to 0.20240226.1425 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-q6h8-4j2v-pjg4 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-q6h8-4j2v-pjg4 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-q6h8-4j2v-pjg4. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary When using a modified client or the grpc interface directly, the `RegisterRepository` call accepts _both_ the repository owner / repo **and** the repo_id. Furthermore, these two are not checked for matching before registering webhooks and data in the database. ### Details It is possible for an attacker to register a repository with a invalid or differing upstream ID, which causes Minder to report the repository as registered, but not remediate any future changes which conflict with policy (because the webhooks for the repo do not match any known repository in the database). Wh

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-q6h8-4j2v-pjg4 in your dependencies?

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