GHSA-q6f4-qqrg-jv6x is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) CWE-524 vulnerability in @angular/common. A fix is available for @angular/common — see the affected versions and patch details below.
@angular/common: Information Leak via Default Caching of Credentialed Requests in HttpTransferCache
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-q6f4-qqrg-jv6x.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-q6f4-qqrg-jv6x by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 380,066 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
@angular/commonnpmDescription
A vulnerability was discovered in @angular/common when Server-Side Rendering (SSR) and hydration are enabled. The HttpTransferCache utility optimizes hydration by caching outgoing HTTP requests performed during SSR and transferring the cached state to the client-side application via TransferState.
However, the caching mechanism fails to inspect the withCredentials flag or the Cookie header of outgoing requests. As a result, credentialed, user-specific responses may be cached by default in the shared TransferState payload. When these responses are serialized into the HTML, any caching layer (such as a CDN, reverse proxy, or shared server cache) that caches the SSR-rendered HTML page could inadvertently cache and leak one user's private data to other users, leading to a high-severity information disclosure vulnerability.
Impact
Successful exploitation allows an unauthenticated attacker to obtain sensitive, user-specific information of other authenticated users. This occurs when:
- The SSR-rendered HTML containing the cached private data is stored in a shared cache (e.g., CDN, reverse proxy).
- Subsequent requests for the same page receive the cached HTML containing the first user's private data.
Attack Preconditions
- SSR and Hydration Enabled: The Angular application must be configured to use Server-Side Rendering and hydration (e.g., using
provideClientHydration()). - Credentialed Requests during SSR: The application must perform HTTP requests that require user-specific authentication (using cookies or
withCredentials: true) during the initial server-side render. - Shared Caching: The application's HTML responses must be cached by a shared caching layer (CDN, reverse proxy, or server-side cache) without proper cache-control headers to distinguish authenticated users.
Patches
- 22.0.0-rc.2
- 21.2.15
- 20.3.22
- 19.2.23
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | @angular/common | ≥ 22.0.0-next.0&&< 22.0.0-rc.2 | 22.0.0-rc.2npm install @angular/common@22.0.0-rc.2 |
| 📦npm | @angular/common | ≥ 20.0.0-next.0&&< 20.3.22 | 20.3.22npm install @angular/common@20.3.22 |
| 📦npm | @angular/common | ≥ 19.0.0-next.0&&< 19.2.23 | 19.2.23npm install @angular/common@19.2.23 |
| 📦npm | @angular/common | all versions | No fix |
| 📦npm | @angular/common | ≥ 21.0.0-next.0&&< 21.2.15 | 21.2.15npm install @angular/common@21.2.15 |
Affected Products
angularangularDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @angular/common, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update @angular/common to 22.0.0-rc.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-q6f4-qqrg-jv6x is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Assume what was exposed is already known: rotate any credential, token or key that the affected component could return, restrict the endpoint to callers that genuinely need it, and strip sensitive fields from responses and error output at the boundary rather than relying on the client not to read them.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-q6f4-qqrg-jv6x in your dependencies?
Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.