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GHSA-q5hj-mxqh-vv77

GHSA-q5hj-mxqh-vv77 is a Improper Input Validation vulnerability in @anthropic-ai/claude-code. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-q5hj-mxqh-vv77 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

Claude Code: Trust Dialog Bypass via Git Worktree Spoofing Allows Arbitrary Code Execution

Also known asCVE-2026-40068
Published
Apr 24, 2026
Updated
May 8, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Aug 9, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-q5hj-mxqh-vv77.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs20th percentile — riskier than 20% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.26%0.52%0.78%0.1%0.3%0.3%0.3%Jun 26Aug 26Aug 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

271other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
@anthropic-ai/claude-codenpm
15.1Mdownloads / week

Description

Claude Code used the git worktree commondir file when determining folder trust but did not validate its contents. By crafting a repository with a commondir file pointing to a path the victim had previously trusted, an attacker could bypass the trust dialog and immediately execute malicious hooks defined in .claude/settings.json. Exploiting this required the victim to clone a malicious repository and run Claude Code within it, and for the attacker to know or guess a path the victim had already trusted.

Users on standard Claude Code auto-update have received this fix already. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version.

Claude Code thanks hackerone.com/masato_anzai for reporting this issue.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npm@anthropic-ai/claude-code2.1.63&&< 2.1.842.1.84

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @anthropic-ai/claude-code. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update @anthropic-ai/claude-code to 2.1.84 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-q5hj-mxqh-vv77 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-q5hj-mxqh-vv77 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-q5hj-mxqh-vv77. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

Claude Code used the git worktree `commondir` file when determining folder trust but did not validate its contents. By crafting a repository with a `commondir` file pointing to a path the victim had previously trusted, an attacker could bypass the trust dialog and immediately execute malicious hooks defined in `.claude/settings.json`. Exploiting this required the victim to clone a malicious repository and run Claude Code within it, and for the attacker to know or guess a path the victim had already trusted. Users on standard Claude Code auto-update have received this fix already. Users perfor
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-q5hj-mxqh-vv77 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-q5hj-mxqh-vv77 across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.