GHSA-q4x6-6mm2-crg9 — WWBN/AVideo
MEDIUMGHSA-q4x6-6mm2-crg9 is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.5) Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in WWBN/AVideo. No vendor fix is recorded yet; mitigation options are listed below.
WWBN AVideo has a Live restream log callback flow enabling stored SSRF to internal services
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-q4x6-6mm2-crg9.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-q4x6-6mm2-crg9 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 378,567 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
WWBN/AVideoReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The Live restream log callback flow accepted an attacker-controlled restreamerURL and later fetched that stored URL server-side, enabling stored SSRF for authenticated streamers.
The vulnerable flow allowed a low-privilege user with streaming permission to store an arbitrary callback URL and trigger server-side requests to loopback or internal HTTP services through the restream log feature.
Details
The vulnerable chain was:
plugin/Live/view/getRestream.json.phpexposed a freshtokenForActionplugin/Live/view/Live_restreams/verifyTokenForAction.json.phpexchanged it for a validresponseTokenplugin/Live/view/Live_restreams_logs/add.json.phpaccepted attacker-controlledrestreamerURLplugin/Live/view/getRestream.json.phpandplugin/Live/view/Live_restreams/getAction.json.phplater fetched that stored URL server-side
The original issue existed because the responseToken was accepted, but the callback destination was not tightly constrained to trusted restreamer endpoints.
The maintainer confirmed the vulnerability and stated that the fix was applied by validating restreamerURL at storage time and re-validating the log-entry branch before use. The maintainer also noted that the m3u8 field follows the same general pattern but is not server-fetched in the current flow.
Proof of concept
- Log in as a non-admin user with streaming permission.
- Create a normal restream destination.
- Trigger
plugin/Live/view/Live_restreams/testRestreamer.json.phpto create a live transmission history row. - Call:
GET /plugin/Live/view/getRestream.json.php?live_transmitions_history_id=<id>&restreams_id=<id>
- Extract
tokenForActionfrom the returned URL. - Exchange it for
responseTokenvia:
POST /plugin/Live/view/Live_restreams/verifyTokenForAction.json.php
- Store a loopback callback URL:
POST /plugin/Live/view/Live_restreams_logs/add.json.php
restreamerURL=http://127.0.0.1:9999/index.php
- Trigger
getRestream.json.phpagain. - Observe that the returned response now contains the JSON body from the loopback-only service.
Impact
An authenticated streamer can cause the AVideo server to send HTTP requests to loopback or internal services and return the response through normal application endpoints by storing a malicious restreamerURL in the restream log flow. Because the callback destination was not constrained to trusted restreamer endpoints, the application could be used as a proxy to internal-only services that trust network locality. Successful exploitation can expose local admin panels, internal-only APIs, cloud metadata services if reachable, or other sensitive internal responses available from the application host.
Recommended fix
- Validate
restreamerURLagainst explicitly configured restreamer endpoints at storage time - Re-validate the stored callback URL before server-side fetch
- Bind
responseTokento the expected restream row and callback host - Apply SSRF validation to the initial destination of every server-side fetch, not only redirect targets
- Ignore or reject user-supplied callback hosts that do not match trusted configuration
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | WWBN/AVideo | all versions | No fix |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for WWBN/AVideo, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Remediation status
No patched version of WWBN/AVideo has shipped for GHSA-q4x6-6mm2-crg9 yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.
Mitigate without a patch
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-q4x6-6mm2-crg9 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-q4x6-6mm2-crg9. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-q4x6-6mm2-crg9 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-q4x6-6mm2-crg9 across Packagist dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.