Nautobot: Authorization bypass in approval workflow REST API allows self-approval and unauthorized activation of scheduled jobsGHSA-q4c5-2j6f-r476
MEDIUMFix: nautobot/nautobot@8682707GHSA-q4c5-2j6f-r476 is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.4) CWE-285 vulnerability in nautobot. A fix is available for nautobot — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-q4c5-2j6f-r476.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-q4c5-2j6f-r476 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 394,803 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.
Real-World Exposure
nautobotReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Impact
This is an authorization bypass that escalates into unauthorized server-side job execution.
-
Primary impact - self-approval: The approver checks (approver-group membership,
changepermission on the object under review, one-response-per-user) are enforced only in theapprove/denyactions onApprovalWorkflowStage. The genericApprovalWorkflowStageResponsecreate endpoint enforces none of them, so a user holding onlyextras.add_approvalworkflowstageresponsecanPOSTapproved responses directly and drive a stage past itsmin_approversthreshold with no legitimate approver involved. The serializer also exposesuserandstateas writable, letting the attacker attribute responses to arbitrary users. -
Escalated impact job activation: Because the approval workflow gates a
ScheduledJob, self-approval does not stop at the approval record. Stage approval cascades throughApprovalWorkflow.save()toon_workflow_approved(), which sets the target job to enabled/active.
Patches
Fixed in Nautobot v3.1.8
Workarounds
Restrict the extras.add_approvalworkflowstageresponse permission so that no untrusted user holds it; approval responses should only ever be created via the stage approve/deny actions. There is no configuration flag that disables the generic create endpoint prior to the patch.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | nautobot | ≥ 3.0.0&&< 3.1.8 | 3.1.8pip install --upgrade 'nautobot==3.1.8' |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for nautobot, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update nautobot to 3.1.8 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-q4c5-2j6f-r476 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-q4c5-2j6f-r476 in your dependencies?
Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.