Your RSA-2048 keys break in 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
📦 npm

GHSA-q447-rj3r-2cgh

HIGH

OpenClaw affected by denial of service via unbounded webhook request body buffering

Also known asCVE-2026-28478
Published
Feb 18, 2026
Updated
Mar 5, 2026
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
1 / 2
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk35th percentile+0.29%
0.00%0.31%0.62%0.94%0.1%0.1%0.1%0.4%Apr 26Jun 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

2 pkgs affected

Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.

openclawnpm
4.4Mdownloads / week
clawdbotnpm
10Kdownloads / week

Description

Summary

Multiple webhook handlers accepted and buffered request bodies without a strict unified byte/time limit. A remote unauthenticated attacker could send oversized payloads and cause memory pressure, degrading availability.

Details

Affected packages:

  • openclaw (npm): <2026.2.12
  • clawdbot (npm): <=2026.1.24-3

Root cause:

  • Webhook code paths buffered request payloads without consistent maxBytes + timeoutMs enforcement.
  • Some SDK-backed handlers parse request bodies internally and needed stream-level guards.

Attack shape:

  • Send very large JSON payloads or slow/incomplete uploads to webhook endpoints.
  • Observe elevated memory usage and request handler pressure.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated availability impact (DoS) via request body amplification/memory pressure.

Patch details (implemented)

  • Added shared bounded request-body helper in src/infra/http-body.ts.
  • Exported helper in src/plugin-sdk/index.ts for extension reuse.
  • Migrated webhook body readers to shared helper for:
    • LINE
    • Nextcloud Talk
    • Google Chat
    • Zalo
    • BlueBubbles
    • Nostr profile HTTP
    • Voice-call
    • Gateway hooks
  • Added stream guards for SDK handlers that parse request bodies internally:
    • Slack
    • Telegram
    • Feishu
  • Added explicit Express JSON body limit handling for MS Teams webhook path.
  • Standardized failure responses:
    • 413 Payload Too Large
    • 408 Request Timeout

Tests

  • Added regression tests:
    • src/infra/http-body.test.ts
    • src/line/monitor.read-body.test.ts
    • extensions/nextcloud-talk/src/monitor.read-body.test.ts
  • Focused webhook/security test suite passes for patched paths.

Remediation

Upgrade to the first release containing this patch.

Credits

Thanks @vincentkoc for reporting.

Affected Packages

2 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmopenclawall versions2026.2.13
📦npmclawdbotall versionsNo fix

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for openclaw. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update openclaw to 2026.2.13 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-q447-rj3r-2cgh is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-q447-rj3r-2cgh is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-q447-rj3r-2cgh. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Multiple webhook handlers accepted and buffered request bodies without a strict unified byte/time limit. A remote unauthenticated attacker could send oversized payloads and cause memory pressure, degrading availability. ### Details Affected packages: - `openclaw` (npm): `<2026.2.12` - `clawdbot` (npm): `<=2026.1.24-3` Root cause: - Webhook code paths buffered request payloads without consistent `maxBytes` + `timeoutMs` enforcement. - Some SDK-backed handlers parse request bodies internally and needed stream-level guards. Attack shape: - Send very large JSON payloads or slow/inco
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-q447-rj3r-2cgh in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-q447-rj3r-2cgh across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.