How severe is GHSA-pxv8-qhrh-jc7v?

GHSA-pxv8-qhrh-jc7v has a CVSS score of 3.5/10, rated LOW. Review your exposure and patch according to your risk tolerance.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-pxv8-qhrh-jc7v?

GHSA-pxv8-qhrh-jc7v affects the following packages: github.com/evmos/evmos/v17 (Go), github.com/evmos/evmos/v16 (Go), github.com/evmos/evmos/v15 (Go), github.com/evmos/evmos/v14 (Go), github.com/evmos/evmos/v13 (Go), github.com/evmos/evmos/v12 (Go), github.com/evmos/evmos/v11 (Go), github.com/evmos/evmos/v10 (Go), and 4 more. Ecosystems affected: Go.

How do I fix GHSA-pxv8-qhrh-jc7v?

Update github.com/evmos/evmos/v17 to 18.0.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-pxv8-qhrh-jc7v is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-pxv8-qhrh-jc7v in my Go dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/evmos/evmos/v17. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-pxv8-qhrh-jc7v if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-pxv8-qhrh-jc7v?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-pxv8-qhrh-jc7v is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-pxv8-qhrh-jc7v actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-pxv8-qhrh-jc7v yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

What is the EPSS score for GHSA-pxv8-qhrh-jc7v?

GHSA-pxv8-qhrh-jc7v has an EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) score of 0.4%, placing it in the 30th percentile of all CVEs. EPSS is maintained by FIRST.org and estimates the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days. This score indicates relatively lower exploitation probability, though the CVSS severity should still guide your patching priority.

What type of vulnerability is GHSA-pxv8-qhrh-jc7v?

GHSA-pxv8-qhrh-jc7v is classified as CWE-682 (CWE-682). This weakness type describe the underlying flaw category, which helps determine the potential impact and the right class of mitigation.

When was GHSA-pxv8-qhrh-jc7v published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-pxv8-qhrh-jc7v was published on June 6, 2024 and was last updated on October 15, 2025. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🐹 Go

GHSA-pxv8-qhrh-jc7v

LOW

evmos allows transferring unvested tokens after delegations

Also known asCVE-2024-32873 CVE-2024-37158 CVE-2024-37159GO-2024-2891GO-2024-2926GO-2024-2927

Published

Jun 6, 2024

Updated

Oct 15, 2025

Affected

12 pkgs

Patched

12 / 12

Exploits

None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗

0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days

Lower Risk30th percentile+0.21%

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

12 pkgs affected

🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v17🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v16🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v15🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v14🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v13🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v12🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v11🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v10+4 more

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

This advisory has been created to address the following vulnerabilities found in the Evmos codebase and affecting vesting accounts.

Wrong spendable balance computation

The spendable balance is not updated properly when delegating vested tokens. The following example help in describing the issue:

Given a clawback vesting account with a starting 15M vesting schedule. The initial spendable balance is 0.
Time passes and 5M are vested. The spendable balance is now 5M.
The account delegate 5M. The spendable balance should be 0, but returns 5M
The account can send 5M to another account.

The issue allowed a clawback vesting account to anticipate the release of unvested tokens.

Missing precompile checks

Preliminary checks on actions computed by the clawback vesting accounts are performed in the ante handler. Evmos core, implements two different ante handlers: one for Cosmos transactions and one for Ethereum transactions. Checks performed on the two implementation are different.

The vulnerability discovered allowed a clawback account to bypass Cosmos ante handler checks by sending an Ethereum transaction targeting a precompile used to interact with a Cosmos SDK module.

Missing create validator check

This vulnerability allowed a user to create a validator using vested tokens to deposit the self-bond.

Patches

The spendable balance function has been fixed correcting the TrackDelegation function.
The checks for the staking module, for the delegation and the create validator, has been moved into the MsgServer of a wrapper around the Cosmos SDK staking module.

The issues have been patched in versions >=V18.0.0.

References

Evmos vesting module

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

Reach out to the Core Team in Discord Open a discussion in evmos/evmos Email us at [email protected] for security questions

Affected Packages

12 total 12 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐹Go	`github.com/evmos/evmos/v17`	all versions	18.0.0
🐹Go	`github.com/evmos/evmos/v16`	all versions	18.0.0
🐹Go	`github.com/evmos/evmos/v15`	all versions	18.0.0
🐹Go	`github.com/evmos/evmos/v14`	all versions	18.0.0
🐹Go	`github.com/evmos/evmos/v13`	all versions	18.0.0
🐹Go	`github.com/evmos/evmos/v12`	all versions	18.0.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/evmos/evmos/v17. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/evmos/evmos/v17 to 18.0.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-pxv8-qhrh-jc7v is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-pxv8-qhrh-jc7v is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-pxv8-qhrh-jc7v. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Impact This advisory has been created to address the following vulnerabilities found in the Evmos codebase and affecting vesting accounts. ### Wrong spendable balance computation The spendable balance is not updated properly when delegating vested tokens. The following example help in describing the issue: - Given a clawback vesting account with a starting `15M` vesting schedule. The initial spendable balance is `0`. - Time passes and `5M` are vested. The spendable balance is now `5M`. - The account delegate `5M`. The spendable balance should be `0`, but returns `5M` - The account can se

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-pxv8-qhrh-jc7v in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-pxv8-qhrh-jc7v across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

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