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GHSA-pxhg-7xr2-w7xg

MEDIUM

GHSA-pxhg-7xr2-w7xg is a medium-severity (CVSS 4.6) Path Traversal vulnerability in pptagent. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-pxhg-7xr2-w7xg is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

PPTAgent: Arbitrary File Write via `save_generated_slides`

Also known asCVE-2026-42080PYSEC-2026-2894
Published
May 5, 2026
Updated
Jul 13, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐍pptagent

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

This vulnerability has been fixed in https://github.com/icip-cas/PPTAgent/commit/418491a9a1c02d9d93194b5973bb58df35cf9d00.

The save_generated_slides MCP tool accepts a pptx_path argument and writes the generated PPTX file to that path without any workspace restriction or path validation:

# pptagent/mcp_server.py:288-300
async def save_generated_slides(pptx_path: str):
    """Save the generated slides to a PowerPoint file.

    Args:
        pptx_path: The path to save the PowerPoint file
    """
    pptx = Path(pptx_path)
    assert len(self.slides), (
        "No slides generated, please call `generate_slide` first"
    )
    pptx.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)   # ← creates arbitrary directories
    self.empty_prs.save(pptx_path)                    # ← writes to arbitrary path

The call to pptx.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) creates any intermediate directories, and self.empty_prs.save(pptx_path) writes a valid PPTX binary (ZIP archive) to the specified path. No is_relative_to(workspace) check is performed — contrast with download_file in deeppresenter/tools/search.py:290, which correctly enforces workspace confinement.

The server changes directory to WORKSPACE (if set) on startup, so relative paths land in the workspace. Absolute paths, however, reach any filesystem location accessible to the server process.

Impact

The concrete attack scenarios include

  1. Cron persistence (root-running server): pptx_path = "/etc/cron.d/backdoor" → writes a PPTX ZIP to a path the cron daemon reads; if the ZIP header is misinterpreted, this may corrupt cron or be exploitable depending on parser behaviour.
  2. Dot-file overwrite: pptx_path = "/home/user/.bashrc" → overwrites shell init file with a binary blob containing arbitrary content in the PPTX's embedded comments/custom properties.
  3. Directory traversal from workspace: pptx_path = "../../.ssh/known_hosts.pptx" → escapes workspace entirely.
  4. Denial of service: pptx_path = "/dev/sda" writes to a raw device.

Remediation

The potential fix is something like:

async def save_generated_slides(pptx_path: str):
    workspace = Path(os.getcwd()).resolve()
    target = Path(pptx_path).resolve()
    if not target.is_relative_to(workspace):
        raise ValueError(f"Access denied: path outside workspace: {target}")
    target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
    self.empty_prs.save(str(target))

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIpptagentall versions1.1.36

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for pptagent. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update pptagent to 1.1.36 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-pxhg-7xr2-w7xg is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-pxhg-7xr2-w7xg is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-pxhg-7xr2-w7xg. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary > This vulnerability has been fixed in https://github.com/icip-cas/PPTAgent/commit/418491a9a1c02d9d93194b5973bb58df35cf9d00. The `save_generated_slides` MCP tool accepts a pptx_path argument and writes the generated PPTX file to that path without any workspace restriction or path validation: ```python # pptagent/mcp_server.py:288-300 async def save_generated_slides(pptx_path: str): """Save the generated slides to a PowerPoint file. Args: pptx_path: The path to save the PowerPoint file """ pptx = Path(pptx_path) assert len(self.slides), ( "No s
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-pxhg-7xr2-w7xg in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-pxhg-7xr2-w7xg across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.