Storybook dev server vulnerable to code injection from the local networkGHSA-px85-f4q5-jh77
Fix: storybookjs/storybook#36726GHSA-px85-f4q5-jh77 is a Path Traversal vulnerability in storybook. A fix is available for storybook — see the affected versions and patch details below.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
storybooknpmDescription
Summary: The Storybook dev server exposes its WebSocket authentication token to any client that can load its HTML pages. Any host on a LAN can open a Storybook app by IP address, and therefore obtain the token. The WebSocket can be used to inject code into story files or to create new files. Under the right circumstances, an attacker can execute code on the machine of a developer connected on the same LAN.
Who is impacted?
You are impacted if you run a Storybook dev server whilst connected on an untrusted local network, or to a WiFi access point posing as a trusted network. The impact of this advisory is more important if you have the Vitest addon installed and are using an old version of Vitest.
You are not impacted if:
- You run a dev server in an environment that other devices on your network cannot reach (e.g. a container that does not publish the Storybook port, or publishes it only on
127.0.0.1) - You run a dev server whilst connected to a trusted local network
- You serve a built version of Storybook on your machine
Recommended actions
Upgrade Storybook
Storybook has released patched versions of all affected major Storybook versions that fix all the vulnerabilities necessary for the worst-case scenario above to occur.
Upgrade to a patched version listed below before running storybook dev again. If you cannot upgrade immediately, do not run an affected Storybook dev server until you can apply the fix.
- 11.0.0-alpha.6
- 10.6.2
- 9.1.21
- 8.6.19
Review potentially breaking changes
Due to the exceptional nature of the reported vulnerabilities, the Storybook team has decided to change the default behavior of Storybook, including versions 8 and 9, for several network-related features that are not essential to most Storybook users' workflow. If your team relies on the affected features, this document explains how to fall back to the previous behavior.
Storybook now only listens on 127.0.0.1 by default
By default, the Storybook dev server no longer binds to all network interfaces on your machine. It only binds to the loopback address 127.0.0.1. You can still open it at http://localhost:6006. This prevents other devices on the same network from seeing your Storybook server.
To share a Storybook with others, consider publishing it to Chromatic (free). To share it on a LAN without exposing the dev server, build a static Storybook with storybook build and serve the output folder with any static file server.
To share a live Storybook running in dev mode, you can use the --host CLI option to bind to the LAN IP you want to share Storybook on, e.g. storybook dev --host 192.168.0.110. Host and origin validation stays enabled with this option. If you use --host 0.0.0.0 instead, also set core.allowedHosts to the hostnames you will use. Without it, host and origin validation is disabled, and Storybook shows a warning and asks you to confirm before it starts.
Consider using a firewall to restrict incoming packets to known colleague IPs, and avoid using --host on an untrusted WiFi network.
The Vitest addon now disables browser.api.allowWrite and browser.api.allowExec
Storybook no longer allows code running in Vitest Browser mode to write to the developer’s machine or execute other processes. In the unlikely scenario that you rely on this capability in your tests, you can manually re-enable these APIs in your Vitest config.
The saveStoryRequest event validates input more strictly
Storybook strengthened input validation in saveStoryRequest, so addons and the Storybook UI can now only write serialized args and story titles. It is no longer possible to exploit input validation weaknesses to e.g. write play functions with a custom addon.
If you develop an addon that writes or edits files on users’ behalf, reach out to the Storybook team to get advice on security best practice.
Disclosure timeline
On August 19th, the Storybook team received a responsible disclosure showing that the WebSocket token can be stolen by an attacker sharing a LAN with a Storybook dev server.
The disclosure identified several actions an attacker can do. An attacker can bypass input validation to write a payload in a story file.
They can then trigger a test run via the WebSocket. If the Vitest addon is installed, the payload can exploit a Vitest API to write other files, with more exploit logic to the user’s filesystem.
Depending on the exploit content, where the file is written, and what software the developer uses, that exploit could then be executed.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | storybook | ≥ 8.0.0&&< 8.6.19 | 8.6.19npm install storybook@8.6.19 |
| 📦npm | storybook | ≥ 9.0.0&&< 9.1.21 | 9.1.21npm install storybook@9.1.21 |
| 📦npm | storybook | ≥ 10.0.0&&< 10.6.2 | 10.6.2npm install storybook@10.6.2 |
| 📦npm | storybook | ≥ 11.0.0-alpha.0&&< 11.0.0-alpha.6 | 11.0.0-alpha.6npm install storybook@11.0.0-alpha.6 |
| 📦npm | @storybook/core | ≥ 8.0.0&&< 8.6.19 | 8.6.19npm install @storybook/core@8.6.19 |
| 📦npm | @storybook/core-server | ≥ 8.0.0&&< 8.6.19 | 8.6.19npm install @storybook/core-server@8.6.19 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for storybook, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update storybook to 8.6.19 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-px85-f4q5-jh77 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Stop passing untrusted input into the interpreter or shell: call the affected binary with an argument array rather than a composed command string, reject anything outside a strict allowlist of expected values, and run the component under an account that cannot reach beyond the work it legitimately does.
Fixing This On Your OS
If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.
| Product | Fixed in | Advisory |
|---|---|---|
| Red Hat Hardened Images | grafana12-4-main-12.4.13-0.3.hum1 | RHSA-2026:88478 |
| Red Hat Hardened Images | grafana13-1-main-13.1.8-0.4.hum1 | RHSA-2026:88537 |
| Red Hat Hardened Images | grafana13-2-main-13.2.4-0.3.hum1 | RHSA-2026:88541 |
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-px85-f4q5-jh77 in your dependencies?
Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.