How severe is GHSA-pqh8-p93p-2rx7?

GHSA-pqh8-p93p-2rx7 has a CVSS score of 4.3/10, rated MEDIUM. Review your exposure and patch according to your risk tolerance.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-pqh8-p93p-2rx7?

GHSA-pqh8-p93p-2rx7 affects the following packages: @dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp-server (npm). Ecosystems affected: npm.

How do I fix GHSA-pqh8-p93p-2rx7?

Update @dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp-server to 2.1.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-pqh8-p93p-2rx7 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-pqh8-p93p-2rx7 in my npm dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp-server. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-pqh8-p93p-2rx7 if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-pqh8-p93p-2rx7?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-pqh8-p93p-2rx7 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-pqh8-p93p-2rx7 actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-pqh8-p93p-2rx7 yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

When was GHSA-pqh8-p93p-2rx7 published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-pqh8-p93p-2rx7 was published on July 31, 2026 and was last updated on July 31, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

📦 npm

GHSA-pqh8-p93p-2rx7

MEDIUM

GHSA-pqh8-p93p-2rx7 is a medium-severity (CVSS 4.3) vulnerability in @dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp-server. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-pqh8-p93p-2rx7 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

@dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp-server has a DQL injection via parameters not documented as DQL

Published

Jul 31, 2026

Updated

Jul 31, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.

@dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp-servernpm

19Kdownloads / week

Description

Summary

A DQL injection vulnerability in several read tools lets a caller bypass the tools' documented field-scope, time-window, and display caps by injecting DQL pipeline stages through parameters typed as identifiers.

Details

Several tools interpolate caller-supplied parameters directly into DQL query strings without quoting or escaping. The affected parameters are documented in their Zod schemas as identifiers or constrained shorthand (such as "24h" timeframe values or Kubernetes UIDs) - not as DQL expressions. The interpolation lets a caller break out of string literals, append arbitrary DQL pipeline stages, and use // line comments (documented in the Dynatrace DQL language reference) to discard the rest of the intended query.

The marginal-privilege ceiling is low because the operator's token also exposes execute_dql with full DQL access. What the injection grants is the ability to bypass the affected tools' contract: the readOnlyHint: true annotation that MCP clients may treat as a signal to auto-approve, the per-tool field selection (e.g., | fields id, name, type), the display caps (maxProblemsToDisplay, maxVulnerabilitiesToDisplay, maxEntitiesToDisplay), and the time-window bounds.

The vulnerable interpolations are:

File	Line	Parameter	Interpolation
`src/capabilities/find-monitored-entity-by-name.ts`	23	`entityNames[]`	`fetch ${entityType} \| search "${entityNames.join('" OR "')}" \| fieldsAdd entity.type \| expand tags`
`src/capabilities/find-monitored-entity-by-name.ts`	41	`entityNames[]`	`smartscapeNodes "" \| search "${entityNames.join('" OR "')}*" \| fields id, name, type`
`src/capabilities/list-problems.ts`	27	`timeframe`	`fetch dt.davis.problems, from: now()-${timeframe}, to: now()`
`src/capabilities/list-vulnerabilities.ts`	19	`timeframe`	`fetch security.events, from: now()-${timeframe}, to: now()`
`src/capabilities/list-exceptions.ts`	11	`timeframe`	`fetch user.events, from: now()-${timeframe}, to: now()`
`src/capabilities/get-events-for-cluster.ts`	20	`timeframe`	`fetch events, from: now()-${timeframe}, to: now()`
`src/capabilities/get-events-for-cluster.ts`	27	`clusterId`, `kubernetesEntityId`	`\| filter k8s.cluster.uid == "${clusterId}" or dt.entity.kubernetes_cluster == "${kubernetesEntityId}"`

All Zod schemas for these parameters use z.string() or z.array(z.string()) with no pattern validation.

PoC

clusterId - quote-and-comment break-out. With clusterId = 'x" or 1==1 //' the constructed query becomes:

| filter k8s.cluster.uid == "x" or 1==1 //" or dt.entity.kubernetes_cluster == ""

The first " closes the string literal, or 1==1 neutralises the filter to match every row, and // discards the rest of the line including the kubernetesEntityId guard.

entityNames - pipeline-stage injection. With entityNames = ['svc" | fields id, name, tags //'] the constructed smartscape query becomes:

smartscapeNodes "*" | search "*svc" | fields id, name, tags //*" | fields id, name, type

After the // line comment, the effective query is smartscapeNodes "*" | search "*svc" | fields id, name, tags. The original | fields id, name, type stage is suppressed and replaced with the attacker's field selection - the tool returns whatever field set the attacker requests (including ones not in the tool's documented output contract).

timeframe - prefix injection. With timeframe = '30d, to: now() | fieldsAdd internal_secret //' the list-problems query becomes:

fetch dt.davis.problems, from: now()-30d, to: now() | fieldsAdd internal_secret //, to: now()
| filter isNull(dt.davis.is_duplicate) OR not(dt.davis.is_duplicate)
...

A new pipeline stage is injected before the tool's intended | filter, and the rest of the query is commented out.

The server's own verify_dql tool can be used to confirm any specific injection payload parses as valid DQL.

Impact

A caller (typically via prompt injection of an LLM that has access to the affected tools) can bypass the tools' field-scope, time-window, and display caps.
The affected tools are annotated readOnlyHint: true, which some MCP clients treat as a signal to auto-approve. The injection turns a "safe" read tool into an arbitrary-DQL surface.
No new data access beyond what execute_dql already provides - the marginal impact is the auto-approval pathway and the broken tool contract, not privilege escalation.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
📦npm	`@dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp-server`	all versions	2.1.1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp-server. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update @dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp-server to 2.1.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-pqh8-p93p-2rx7 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-pqh8-p93p-2rx7 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-pqh8-p93p-2rx7. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary A DQL injection vulnerability in several read tools lets a caller bypass the tools' documented field-scope, time-window, and display caps by injecting DQL pipeline stages through parameters typed as identifiers. ### Details Several tools interpolate caller-supplied parameters directly into DQL query strings without quoting or escaping. The affected parameters are documented in their Zod schemas as identifiers or constrained shorthand (such as `"24h"` timeframe values or Kubernetes UIDs) - not as DQL expressions. The interpolation lets a caller break out of string literals, append

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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