GHSA-pq5c-rjhq-qp7p is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.5) CWE-770 vulnerability in vllm. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-pq5c-rjhq-qp7p is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
vLLM: Denial of Service via Unbounded Frame Count in video/jpeg Base64 Processing
Real-World Exposure
vllmReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The VideoMediaIO.load_base64() method at vllm/multimodal/media/video.py:51-62 splits video/jpeg data URLs by comma to extract individual JPEG frames, but does not enforce a frame count limit. The num_frames parameter (default: 32), which is enforced by the load_bytes() code path at line 47-48, is completely bypassed in the video/jpeg base64 path. An attacker can send a single API request containing thousands of comma-separated base64-encoded JPEG frames, causing the server to decode all frames into memory and crash with OOM.
Details
Vulnerable code
# video.py:51-62
def load_base64(self, media_type: str, data: str) -> tuple[npt.NDArray, dict[str, Any]]:
if media_type.lower() == "video/jpeg":
load_frame = partial(self.image_io.load_base64, "image/jpeg")
return np.stack(
[np.asarray(load_frame(frame_data)) for frame_data in data.split(",")]
# ^^^^^^^^^^
# Unbounded split — no frame count limit
), {}
return self.load_bytes(base64.b64decode(data))
The load_bytes() path (line 47-48) properly delegates to a video loader that respects self.num_frames (default 32). The load_base64("video/jpeg", ...) path bypasses this limit entirely — data.split(",") produces an unbounded list and every frame is decoded into a numpy array.
video/jpeg is part of vLLM's public API
video/jpeg is a vLLM-specific MIME type, not IANA-registered. However it is part of the public API surface:
encode_video_url()atvllm/multimodal/utils.py:96-108generatesdata:video/jpeg;base64,...URLs- Official test suites at
tests/entrypoints/openai/test_video.py:62andtests/entrypoints/test_chat_utils.py:153both use this format
Memory amplification
Each JPEG frame decodes to a full numpy array. For 640x480 RGB images, each frame is ~921 KB decoded. 5000 frames = ~4.6 GB. np.stack() then creates an additional copy. The compressed JPEG payload is small (~100 KB for 5000 frames) but decompresses to gigabytes.
Data flow
POST /v1/chat/completions
→ chat_utils.py:1434 video_url type → mm_parser.parse_video()
→ chat_utils.py:872 parse_video() → self._connector.fetch_video()
→ connector.py:295 fetch_video() → load_from_url(url, self.video_io)
→ connector.py:91 _load_data_url(): url_spec.path.split(",", 1)
→ media_type = "video/jpeg"
→ data = "<frame1>,<frame2>,...,<frame10000>"
→ connector.py:100 media_io.load_base64("video/jpeg", data)
→ video.py:54 data.split(",") ← UNBOUNDED
→ video.py:55-57 all frames decoded into numpy arrays
→ video.py:56 np.stack([...]) ← massive combined array → OOM
connector.py:91 uses split(",", 1) which splits on only the first comma. All remaining commas stay in data and are later split by video.py:54.
Comparison with existing protections
| Code Path | Frame Limit | File |
|---|---|---|
load_bytes() (binary video) | Yes — num_frames (default 32) | video.py:46-49 |
load_base64("video/jpeg", ...) | No — unlimited data.split(",") | video.py:51-62 |
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | vllm | ≥ 0.7.0&&< 0.19.0 | 0.19.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for vllm. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update vllm to 0.19.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-pq5c-rjhq-qp7p is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-pq5c-rjhq-qp7p is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-pq5c-rjhq-qp7p. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-pq5c-rjhq-qp7p in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-pq5c-rjhq-qp7p across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.