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GHSA-ppxx-5m9h-6vxf

MEDIUM

quic-go's path validation mechanism can be exploited to cause denial of service

Also known asCVE-2023-49295GO-2024-2459
Published
Jan 10, 2024
Updated
Feb 4, 2026
Affected
4 pkgs
Patched
4 / 4
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
1.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk64th percentile-0.57%
0.56%1.13%1.70%2.27%1.1%1.2%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

4 pkgs affected
🐹github.com/quic-go/quic-go🐹github.com/quic-go/quic-go🐹github.com/quic-go/quic-go🐹github.com/quic-go/quic-go

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

An attacker can cause its peer to run out of memory sending a large number of PATH_CHALLENGE frames. The receiver is supposed to respond to each PATH_CHALLENGE frame with a PATH_RESPONSE frame. The attacker can prevent the receiver from sending out (the vast majority of) these PATH_RESPONSE frames by collapsing the peers congestion window (by selectively acknowledging received packets) and by manipulating the peer's RTT estimate.

I published a more detailed description of the attack and its mitigation in this blog post: https://seemann.io/posts/2023-12-18-exploiting-quics-path-validation/

There's no way to mitigate this attack, please update quic-go to a version that contains the fix.

Affected Packages

4 total 4 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/quic-go/quic-go0.40.0&&< 0.40.10.40.1
🐹Gogithub.com/quic-go/quic-go0.39.0&&< 0.39.40.39.4
🐹Gogithub.com/quic-go/quic-go0.38.0&&< 0.38.20.38.2
🐹Gogithub.com/quic-go/quic-goall versions0.37.7

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/quic-go/quic-go. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/quic-go/quic-go to 0.40.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-ppxx-5m9h-6vxf is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-ppxx-5m9h-6vxf is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-ppxx-5m9h-6vxf. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

An attacker can cause its peer to run out of memory sending a large number of PATH_CHALLENGE frames. The receiver is supposed to respond to each PATH_CHALLENGE frame with a PATH_RESPONSE frame. The attacker can prevent the receiver from sending out (the vast majority of) these PATH_RESPONSE frames by collapsing the peers congestion window (by selectively acknowledging received packets) and by manipulating the peer's RTT estimate. I published a more detailed description of the attack and its mitigation in this blog post: https://seemann.io/posts/2023-12-18-exploiting-quics-path-validation/ Th
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-ppxx-5m9h-6vxf in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-ppxx-5m9h-6vxf across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.