GHSA-pmfr-63c2-jr5c
HIGHExecution Control List (ECL) Is Insecure in Singularity
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
github.com/sylabs/singularityReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Impact
The Singularity Execution Control List (ECL) allows system administrators to set up a policy that defines rules about what signature(s) must be (or must not be) present on a SIF container image for it to be permitted to run.
In Singularity 3.x versions below 3.6.0, the following issues allow the ECL to be bypassed by a malicious user:
- Image integrity is not validated when an ECL policy is enforced.
- The fingerprint required by the ECL is compared against the signature object descriptor(s) in the SIF file, rather than to a cryptographically validated signature. Thus, it is trivial to craft an arbitrary payload which will be permitted to run, even if the attacker does not have access to the private key associated with the fingerprint(s) configured in the ECL.
Patches
These issues are addressed in Singularity 3.6.0.
All users are advised to upgrade to 3.6.0. Note that Singularity 3.6.0 uses a new signature format that is necessarily incompatible with Singularity < 3.6.0 - e.g. Singularity 3.5.3 cannot verify containers signed by 3.6.0.
Version 3.6.0 includes a legacyinsecure option that can be set to legacyinsecure = true in ecl.toml to allow the ECL to perform verification of the older, and insecure, legacy signatures for compatibility with existing containers. This does not guarantee that containers have not been modified since signing, due to other issues in the legacy signature format. The option should be used only to temporarily ease the transition to containers signed with the new 3.6.0 signature format.
Workarounds
This issue affects any installation of Singularity configured to use the Execution Control List (ECL) functionality. There is no workaround if ECL is required.
For more information
General questions about the impact of the advisory / changes made in the 3.6.0 release can be asked in the:
Any sensitive security concerns should be directed to: [email protected]
See our Security Policy here: https://sylabs.io/security-policy
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/sylabs/singularity | ≥ 3.0.0&&< 3.6.0 | 3.6.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/sylabs/singularity. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/sylabs/singularity to 3.6.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-pmfr-63c2-jr5c is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-pmfr-63c2-jr5c is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-pmfr-63c2-jr5c. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-pmfr-63c2-jr5c in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-pmfr-63c2-jr5c across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.