How severe is GHSA-pjvx-rx66-r3fg?

GHSA-pjvx-rx66-r3fg has a CVSS score of 5.4/10, rated MEDIUM. Review your exposure and patch according to your risk tolerance.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-pjvx-rx66-r3fg?

GHSA-pjvx-rx66-r3fg affects the following packages: openclaw (npm). Ecosystems affected: npm.

How do I fix GHSA-pjvx-rx66-r3fg?

Update openclaw to 2026.3.7 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-pjvx-rx66-r3fg is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-pjvx-rx66-r3fg in my npm dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for openclaw. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-pjvx-rx66-r3fg if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-pjvx-rx66-r3fg?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-pjvx-rx66-r3fg is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-pjvx-rx66-r3fg actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-pjvx-rx66-r3fg yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

When was GHSA-pjvx-rx66-r3fg published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-pjvx-rx66-r3fg was published on March 9, 2026 and was last updated on March 9, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

📦 npm

GHSA-pjvx-rx66-r3fg

MEDIUM

OpenClaw: Cross-account sender authorization expansion in `/allowlist ... --store` account scoping

Published

Mar 9, 2026

Updated

Mar 9, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.

openclawnpm

4.3Mdownloads / week

Description

Summary

/allowlist ... --store resolved the selected channel accountId for reads, but store writes still dropped that accountId and wrote into the legacy unscoped pairing allowlist store.

Because default-account reads still merge legacy unscoped entries, a store entry intended for one account could silently authorize the same sender on the default account.

This is a real cross-account sender-authorization scoping bug. Severity is set to medium because exploitation requires an already-authorized user who can run /allowlist edits.

Affected Packages / Versions

Package: openclaw (npm)
Latest published version checked: 2026.3.2
Affected versions: <= 2026.3.2
Fixed on main: March 7, 2026 in 70da80bcb5574a10925469048d2ebb2abf882e73
Patched release: 2026.3.7

Details

The affected path was:

src/auto-reply/reply/commands-allowlist.ts:386-393 resolved accountId and read store state with it
src/auto-reply/reply/commands-allowlist.ts:697-702 and src/auto-reply/reply/commands-allowlist.ts:730-733 wrote store state without passing accountId
src/pairing/pairing-store.ts:231-234 and src/pairing/pairing-store.ts:534-554 still merged legacy unscoped allowlist entries into the default account

The fix scopes /allowlist ... --store writes to the resolved account and clears legacy default-account store entries on removal so legacy reads no longer create cross-account authorization bleed-through.

Impact

Vulnerability class: improper authorization scoping / incorrect authorization
Exploitation requires: an already-authorized sender who can run /allowlist edits
Security effect: unintended authorization expansion from one channel account into default

Fix Commit(s)

70da80bcb5574a10925469048d2ebb2abf882e73 — scope /allowlist ... --store writes by account and clean up legacy default-account removals

Release Process Note

npm 2026.3.7 was published on March 8, 2026. This advisory is fixed in the released package.

Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
📦npm	`openclaw`	all versions	2026.3.7

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for openclaw. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update openclaw to 2026.3.7 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-pjvx-rx66-r3fg is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-pjvx-rx66-r3fg is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-pjvx-rx66-r3fg. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary `/allowlist ... --store` resolved the selected channel `accountId` for reads, but store writes still dropped that `accountId` and wrote into the legacy unscoped pairing allowlist store. Because default-account reads still merge legacy unscoped entries, a store entry intended for one account could silently authorize the same sender on the `default` account. This is a real cross-account sender-authorization scoping bug. Severity is set to **medium** because exploitation requires an already-authorized user who can run `/allowlist` edits. ### Affected Packages / Versions - Package:

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-pjvx-rx66-r3fg in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-pjvx-rx66-r3fg across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

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