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MEDIUM severity

GHSA-pjvx-rx66-r3fg — openclaw

MEDIUMFix: openclaw/openclaw@70da80b

GHSA-pjvx-rx66-r3fg is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.4) vulnerability in openclaw. A fix is available for openclaw — see the affected versions and patch details below.

OpenClaw: Cross-account sender authorization expansion in `/allowlist ... --store` account scoping

Published
Mar 9, 2026
Updated
Mar 9, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Mar 9, 2026 · OSV.dev, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

133other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
openclawnpm
2.5Mdownloads / week

Description

Summary

/allowlist ... --store resolved the selected channel accountId for reads, but store writes still dropped that accountId and wrote into the legacy unscoped pairing allowlist store.

Because default-account reads still merge legacy unscoped entries, a store entry intended for one account could silently authorize the same sender on the default account.

This is a real cross-account sender-authorization scoping bug. Severity is set to medium because exploitation requires an already-authorized user who can run /allowlist edits.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw (npm)
  • Latest published version checked: 2026.3.2
  • Affected versions: <= 2026.3.2
  • Fixed on main: March 7, 2026 in 70da80bcb5574a10925469048d2ebb2abf882e73
  • Patched release: 2026.3.7

Details

The affected path was:

  • src/auto-reply/reply/commands-allowlist.ts:386-393 resolved accountId and read store state with it
  • src/auto-reply/reply/commands-allowlist.ts:697-702 and src/auto-reply/reply/commands-allowlist.ts:730-733 wrote store state without passing accountId
  • src/pairing/pairing-store.ts:231-234 and src/pairing/pairing-store.ts:534-554 still merged legacy unscoped allowlist entries into the default account

The fix scopes /allowlist ... --store writes to the resolved account and clears legacy default-account store entries on removal so legacy reads no longer create cross-account authorization bleed-through.

Impact

  • Vulnerability class: improper authorization scoping / incorrect authorization
  • Exploitation requires: an already-authorized sender who can run /allowlist edits
  • Security effect: unintended authorization expansion from one channel account into default

Fix Commit(s)

  • 70da80bcb5574a10925469048d2ebb2abf882e73 — scope /allowlist ... --store writes by account and clean up legacy default-account removals

Release Process Note

npm 2026.3.7 was published on March 8, 2026. This advisory is fixed in the released package.

Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmopenclawall versions2026.3.7npm install openclaw@2026.3.7

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for openclaw, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update openclaw to 2026.3.7 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-pjvx-rx66-r3fg is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-pjvx-rx66-r3fg can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to GHSA-pjvx-rx66-r3fg. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary `/allowlist ... --store` resolved the selected channel `accountId` for reads, but store writes still dropped that `accountId` and wrote into the legacy unscoped pairing allowlist store. Because default-account reads still merge legacy unscoped entries, a store entry intended for one account could silently authorize the same sender on the `default` account. This is a real cross-account sender-authorization scoping bug. Severity is set to **medium** because exploitation requires an already-authorized user who can run `/allowlist` edits. ### Affected Packages / Versions - Package:
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-pjvx-rx66-r3fg in your dependencies?

O3 Security finds GHSA-pjvx-rx66-r3fg across npm dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.

GHSA-pjvx-rx66-r3fg: openclaw (Medium 5.4) | O3 Security