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GHSA-pgvm-wxw2-hrv9

MEDIUM

Echo has a Windows path traversal via backslash in middleware.Static default filesystem

Also known asCVE-2026-25766GO-2026-4502
Published
Feb 17, 2026
Updated
Feb 27, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk25th percentile+0.26%
0.00%0.28%0.55%0.83%0.0%0.0%0.1%0.1%0.3%Mar 26May 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/labstack/echo/v5

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

On Windows, Echo’s middleware.Static using the default filesystem allows path traversal via backslashes, enabling unauthenticated remote file read outside the static root.

Details

In middleware/static.go, the requested path is unescaped and normalized with path.Clean (URL semantics). path.Clean does not treat \ as a path separator, so ..\ sequences remain in the cleaned path. The resulting path is then passed to currentFS.Open(...). When the filesystem is left at the default (nil), Echo uses defaultFS which calls os.Open (echo.go:792). On Windows, os.Open treats \ as a path separator and resolves ..\, allowing traversal outside the static root.

Relevant code:

  • middleware/static.go (path unescape + path.Clean + currentFS.Open)
  • echo.go defaultFS.Openos.Open

This is the same class as CVE-2020-36565 (fixed in v4 by switching to OS-aware cleaning), but in v5 the path.Clean

  • defaultFS combination reintroduces the Windows backslash traversal.

PoC

Windows only.

Sample code (main.go):

package main

import (
      "log"
      "net/http"

      "github.com/labstack/echo/v5"
      "github.com/labstack/echo/v5/middleware"
)

func main() {
      e := echo.New()

      // Important: use middleware.Static with default filesystem (nil)
      e.Use(middleware.Static("public"))

      e.GET("/healthz", func(c *echo.Context) error {
              return c.String(http.StatusOK, "ok")
      })

      addr := ":1323"
      log.Printf("listening on %s", addr)
      if err := e.Start(addr); err != nil && err != http.ErrServerClosed {
              log.Fatal(err)
      }
}

Static file:

public/index.html

(content can be any HTML)

Run: go run .

Verify:

curl http://localhost:1323/index.html curl --path-as-is "http://localhost:1323/..%5c..%5cWindows%5cSystem32%5cdrivers%5cetc%5chosts" Expected: 404

Screenshot: <img width="884" height="689" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/acb14d70-2a43-47c1-8927-2f3da491a853" /> <img width="1022" height="162" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f2b92aa2-541e-461d-81a2-8a5907d7a447" />

Impact

Path traversal leading to arbitrary file read outside the static root. Any unauthenticated remote user can read local files that the Echo process has access to on Windows, if middleware.Static is used with the default filesystem.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/labstack/echo/v55.0.0&&< 5.0.35.0.3

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/labstack/echo/v5. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/labstack/echo/v5 to 5.0.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-pgvm-wxw2-hrv9 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-pgvm-wxw2-hrv9 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-pgvm-wxw2-hrv9. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary On Windows, Echo’s `middleware.Static` using the default filesystem allows path traversal via backslashes, enabling unauthenticated remote file read outside the static root. ### Details In `middleware/static.go`, the requested path is unescaped and normalized with `path.Clean` (URL semantics). `path.Clean` does **not** treat `\` as a path separator, so `..\` sequences remain in the cleaned path. The resulting path is then passed to `currentFS.Open(...)`. When the filesystem is left at the default (nil), Echo uses `defaultFS` which calls `os.Open` (`echo.go:792`). On Win
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-pgvm-wxw2-hrv9 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-pgvm-wxw2-hrv9 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.